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FRONT COVER- Retailing table potatoes in Sunday market, Paro, 
Bhutan. 
Helvetas-Swiss Association for Technical Assistance-is a 
politically neutral, non-denominational, private non-profit organization 
consisting of approximately 30,000 members and set up with the aim 
of providing technical and financial assistance in such fields as rural 
infrastructure, agriculture, forestry and vocational training. 
Directorate of Development Cooperation and Humanitarian Aid 
of the Federal Department of Foreign Affairs is the official Swiss 
Government Agency for foreign aid. 
The Bhutanese national potato program is part of the Department 
of Agriculture, Royal Government of Bhutan . 
The International Potato Center (CIP) is an autonomous, non-profit 
scientific institution established through agreement with the Govern-
ment of Peru to develop and disseminate knowledge for greater use 
of the potato as a basic food. International funding sources for tech-
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At request of the National Potato Program and the Department of 
Agriculture (DOA) in Bhutan, a potato marketing specialist from the Inter-
national Potato Center (CIP), Lima, Peru, surveyed India, Bangladesh and 
Bhutan from October 14 to November 18, 1982, using these terms of reference: 
• Provide a descriptive analysis of existing foreign and domestic 
marketing patterns for Bhutanese potatoes. 
• Assess future demand for table and seed potatoes produced by 
Bhutan with special emphasis on marketing high quality seed potatoes 
abroad . 
• Formulate a list of recommendations to develop markets for Bhu-
tanese potatoes both abroad and at home. · 
• Prepare a comprehensive report containing results of field work 
and associated recommendations. 
During a 6-week trip around the sub-continent, the author visited 
potato marketing centers in Delhi, Calcutta, West Bengal, and Assam in 
India, metropolitan Dacca in Bangladesh, as well as 10 of Bhutan's 17 districts. 
In Bhutan, West Bengal, and Assam about 2,500 kilometers were covered by 
jeep to see and talk to potato marketing participants themselves. 
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100 Indian paise 
1 Indian Rupee (Rs.) 
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Weights and Measures 
Bhutanese System 
I ki lometer (km) 
I acre 
I kilo (kg) 
1 maund (md) 
I quintal (qq) 
I ton (t) 
Equivalent 
.62 mile (mi) 
.4048 hectare (ha) 
2.205 pounds (lb) 
37.5 kilos (kg) 
I 00 kilos (kg) 
1000 (kg)/2,205 (lb) 








Food Corporation of Bhutan 
Department of Agiiculture 
International Potato Center (Centro 
In ternacional de la Papa) 
Samdru p Jongkhar (dist rict capital) 
Wangdi-Phorang (district or di st rict capital, 
depends on context) 
Simple, unrefrigerated warehouse 
Refrigerated storage faci lity 
I 
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Summary, Conclusions, and Recommendations 
Introduction 
Bhutanese policy makers have pro-
posed increased potato production 
and improved potato marketing as 
part of the current national Five-Year-
Plan. While agroclimatic conditions 
in Bhutan make production increases 
technically possible, past potato 
marketing losses raise a key ques-
tion: if Bhutan produces more pota-
toes, where will these potatoes be 
marketed? This report addresses this 
and related issues, based on field 
work in Bhutan and neighboring 
countries. This potato marketing 
study complements earlier research on 
potato production by Bharat Kar-
macharya, "National Potato Develop-
ment Programme" (1981) and on 
potato consumption by Susan Poats, 
"Potato Consumption in the King-
dom of Bhutan" (1982). 
Given the shortage of previous 
potato marketing studies, this report 
is directed at several types of readers. 
For those with a general interest in 
this topic, main points of the entire 
study are summarized below. Read-
ers with a detailed interest in more 
specific issues are urged to consult 
succeeding chapters. 
1.1 Summary of Principal Findings 
Economic Development and 
Potatoes in Bhutan 
Two key macroeconomic considera-
tions influence the Bhutanese national 
potato program. 
First, all development program~ in 
Bhutan are considered in terms of 
the Kingdom's new policy of moderni-
zation. This policy is intended to pro-
mote greater Bhutanese interaction 
with the world community of nations 
and to increase domestic socioecon-
omic progress without altering the 
Kingdom's most admirable customs. 
Second, an overwhelmingly agrari-
an Bhutanese economy is highly de-
pendent on India. In particular, 
Bhutan relies on Indian supplies of 
farm inputs such as seed, fertilizer, 
and basic necessities including rice 
and cooking oil. 
Potatoes are one of Bhutan's most 
important farm commodities. While 
most potatoes have been exported to 
India as a source of foreign income, 
a growing body of evidence suggests 
their present use and future potential 
as a food crop for domestic consump-
tion has been seriously underestimat-
ed. Hence, greater potato produc-
tion and marketing can help Bhutan 
meet two particular development 
goals: achieving food self-sufficiency 
and raising farmers' incomes. 
Potato Production and 
Consumption in Bhutan 
Potatoes are produced primarily 
in the Western and Eastern Hills re-
gions of Bhutan. A relatively small 
quantity are grown in the Southern 
Foothills region. Different types of 
producers cultivate potatoes in the 
Kingdom: commercial growers, semi-
subsistence farmers, and kitchen gard-
eners. Commercial farmers in the 
Western and Eastern Hills grow most 
of the marketable surplus of potatoes. 
Production is about evenly divided 
between local varieties and imported 
hybrids. A main farm-level potato 
production constraint is shortage of 
improved , clean seed. 
Until 1982, Bhutanese officials con-
sidered potatoes almost exclusively 
as a cash crop for export. Although 
rice is Bhutan's major staple, pota-
toes are eaten as a complement in a 
variety of dishes . Recent field work 
(Poats 1982), however, indicated 
not only a much higher level of actual 
potato consumption , but also consid-
erable potential for even greater future 
use. One major constraint for in-
creased potato consumption is a need 
for policy makers to consider the 
potato in food policy deliberations . 
Marketing Patterns for 
Bhutanese Potatoes 
(i) Table Potatoes and 
Common Seed 
Bhutanese farmers market not only 
table potatoes at home and in India 
but also seed potatoes (common and 
high quality) for domestic and foreign 
use. Marketing patterns inside Bhutan 
for table potato and common seed 
exports have distinct regional charac-
teristics. In the Western Hills region, 
most potatoes are transported to the 
border by producers themselves. 
Farmers prefer this type of market-
ing arrangement because they also 
need to buy provisions at the frontier. 
Most of these potatoes are sold for 
table use during August and Septem-
ber. 
Potato producers in the Eastern 
Hills region sell their potatoes to local 
traders. Some of these traders provide 
advances in cash or kind to growers 
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whom they trade with on a regular 
basis. Some producers harvest their 
potatoes in July and August for sale 
in October and November; others 
market their crop in August and Sep-
tember. 
Most Bhutanese potato exports go 
through Phun tsholing. Potato trade 
there recently has been reorganized 
into an auction yard regulated by the 
Food Corporation of Bhutan (FCB). 
Phuntsholing traders pay cash for 
various small lots of Bhutanese pota-
toes and then resell them on credit to 
commission agents in India. Phunt-
sholing merchants prefer red-skinned 
varieties to white-skinned potatoes 
and a small , oval tuber to a large 
round one. ' During 1982, these trad-
ers paid 20% to 30% more per hun-
dred weight for red-skinned potatoes. 
Potatoes exported from the Eastern 
Hills go through Galeyphug and S. / 
Jongkhar. Galeyphug merchants 
handle limited quantities of Bhutan-
ese exports. Generally they sell on 
credit to merchants in India or local 
vegetable vendors. S./ Jongkhar 
traders handle both table potatoes 
and common seed. They pay cash to 
growers and rural assemblers and fre-
quently sell re-graded potatoes out of 
their godowns across the river in India. 
Galeyphug and S./ Jongkhar traders 
both prefer to buy small, oval , white-
skinned potatoes. Most Bhutanese 
potato exports to India are marketed 
in northern West Bengal and Assam. 
Bhutanese potatoes can compete in 
these markets for two reasons: First, 
their distinctive taste is preferred 
by Indian consumers in this region; 
second, they are sold principally from 
mid-August to mid-October when few 
local fresh potatoes are available. 
' A "small" pota to in th is reg ion is 6-8 cm. in 
length a nd 4-6 cm. in width. 
.. 
Several factors have more favor-
ably influenced demand for both 
Bhutanese table potatoes and com-
mon seed in northern West Bengal. 
Demand for table potatoes has been 
spurred by a growing seasonal short-
age of fresh potatoes in northern 
West Bengal. Similarly, demand for 
Bhutanese common seed has been 
boosted by the spectacular growth in 
area planted in potatoes, among other 
reasons. Fewer Bhutanese potatoes 
are shipped to Assam largely because 
Assam is nearer the hilly areas of 
eastern India that also sell fresh pota-
toes at this time. 
(ii) Improved Seed Potatoes 
Bhutanese farmers a lso produce 
improved seed potatoes both for do-
mestic sale and export. The Depart-
ment of Agriculture (DOA) reports 
distributing some 600 tons of improv-
ed healthy seed to Bhutanese growers 
every year. District agricultural of-
ficers produce some of this improved 
seed themselves. They also order im-
proved seed from government farms. 
One problem with the existing seed 
distribution system is matching dis-
trict agricultural officers' requests 
for red-skinned varieties with the 
white-skinned potatoes grown on 
government farms. Farmers believe 
that higher prices for red-skinned 
potatoes more than than compensate 
for their lower yields. This issue needs 
to be studied. 
During the last 2 years, govern-
ment farms and a small number of 
registered growers also have produced 
about 250 tons of high quality seed, 
primarily for export. Since table pota-
to prices have been quite good the 
last two seasons, however, Bhutanese 
officials have had trouble making 
local registered growers abide by the 
contract. As a result, government 
farms have used most of their high 
quality seed to meet contractual com-
mitments and little has been left for 
sale to local growers. 
(iii) Potato Retailing 
Potatoes are marketed retail in the 
major towns and administrative cen-
ters around the Kingdom, particularly 
in the Western Hills and Southern 
Foothills regions . Retail potato sales 
usually take place either in village 
shops or at local Sunday fairs. Dur-
ing the Bhutanese potato harvest, 
shopowners buy potatoes from area 
farmers a sack or two at a time, for 
cash or on a barter basis. Some small 
merchants also sell potatoes that they 
produced on their own farms. From 
December to March, highland shop-
keepers and border town produce 
vendors import cheap Indian potatoes. 
Retail shopowners in the hills usually 
buy their Indian potatoes from tra-
ders in Phuntsholing, Galeyphug or 
S./ Jongkhar. 
Retailers sell potatoes to govern-
ment employees, foreign laborers or 
Indian army personnel. Bhutanese 
farmers rarely buy potatoes to eat. 
Retail potato sales almost always are 
for cash. Gross revenues average 
about 50 paise per kilogram on a sel-
ling price of 1.5 to 2 Nu. per kilo-
gram. Shrinkage losses and transport 
costs appear to account for this rela-
tively high mark-up. 
Government Institutions and 
Marketing Policies 
Government institutions and 
marketing policies have a major im-
pact on potato marketing in Bhutan 
where development plans frequently 
call for direct government interven-
tion. The dilemma inherent in such a 
strategy is how to balance the cost 
of centrally planned programs in-
tended to meet the government's 
socioeconomic responsibilities against 
avai lable public resources and the 
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need to encourage local individual 
initiative. 
The two most prominent govern-
ment institutions that influence Bhu-
tanese potato marketing are the FCB 
and the DOA . The FCB's potato 
marketing activities are confined to 
table potatoes. These activities include 
a support price/direct purchase pro-
gram and the recently established 
auction yard in Phuntsholing. Past 
losses in the support price program 
helped create ser ious financial prob-
lems for the FCB. In the short-run, 
these problems have been assuaged 
by favorable market conditions for 
potatoes and consequently the grow-
ers reluctance to sell to the FCB at 
the st:pport price. In the longer run, 
various proposals are under consider -
ation to place the FCB on sounder 
financial footing . Manpower prob-
lems continue to hamper the FCB's 
potato marketing operations. 
The DOA handles seed potato 
marketing, in particular the export 
program for high quality seed. Con-
tract negotiations and program finan-
cing for high quality seed exports 
are largely the responsibilit y of a vet-
eran, expatriate civil servant. Opera-
ting procedures have been informal 
and pragmatic . Manpower problems 
and, to a lesser extent, program fi-
nancing, have restricted the DOA's 
ability to do detailed marketing re-
search and cost accounting. 
Various government policies in-
fluence Bhutanese potato marketing, 
e.g. support price, market control , 
and export / import policies. This am-
bitious set of well-intentioned initia-
tives raises several concerns. For ex-
ample, they have been implemented 
withou t detailed annual estimates of 
cos ts and returns. Government mar-
keting controls have insured only 
legitimate merchants participate in the 
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FCB auction. However, they also 
have restricted entry to the current 
small group of traders. Because pota-
toes have been classified as an export 
crop, official interest in initiatives 
to expand the domestic market for 
Bhutanese potatoes has been limited. 
Future Prospects for Bhutanesd 
Potato Marketing 
In ,he years ahead, Bhutan is ex-
pected to expand potato production 
and marketing. It is impossible to 
predict the exact quantities that Bhu-
tan can profitably sell because of 
limited statistics and numerous con-
tributing factors. Increases in potato 
production in India is one major un-
known beyond Bhutan's influence. 
Nevertheless, several critical com-
ponents are in Bhutanese hands. As a 
general observation, the Bhutanese 
must secure a reliable source of im-
proved seed for multiplication and dis-
tribution in Bhutan. Without such 
seed , the entire potato development 
program is severely handicapped. 
(i) Potato Exports 
The Bhutanese can also strongly 
influence their foreign potato mar-
keting prospects by: (a) increasing 
productivity, improving quality and 
lowering unit production costs, and, 
(b) expanding efforts to secure ex-
isting outlets and to capture new ones. 
The author envisions that Bhutan will 
continue to export mostly table pota-
toes to northern West Bengal and 
Assam. More distant markets in Cal-
cutta, Delhi, and Bombay are less 
i:kely future outlets because, among 
other reasons, transportation costs 
make Bhutanese potatoes prohibit-
ively expensive. 
Consequently, assuming that Bhu-
tan exported roughly 5,000 tons of 
table potatoes during 1982, this 
quantity seems a reasonable target 
for the years ahead. In other words, 
as potato production increases, Bhu-
tan should probably become less de-
pendent on table potato exports. 
More aggressive commercial farmers 
probably will switch some of their 
ware production for export into im-
proved common and/ or high quality 
seed . Small, semi-subsistence growers 
probably will sell their growing mar-
ketable surpluses of table potatoes 
in local towns . 
As long as Bhutan exports potatoes, 
it seems certain that some of these 
potatoes will be sold as common seed. 
Again, the principal export markets 
for common seed will be northern 
West Bengal a nd Assam. While such 
factors as a further expansion in area 
planted in potatoes in Wes t Bengal 
favor increased demand for Bhutan -
ese common seed, occasional bumrcr 
crops in India and increases in pota-
to productivity in places such as Shil-
long will dampen demand. Bearing 
these conflicting development s in 
mind, the author estimates that Bhu-
tan's annual exports of common seed 
could reach 1.000 tons in the nex t 5 
years. 
Bhutan' s future exports o f high 
quality seed should also increase. 
Still, the principal marke t for thi s 
seed will continue to be northern 
West Benga l and Assam . The volume 
of high qu a lity seed ex po rted will be 
influenced by several unknowns. 
Final seed sta ndards es tablished by 
the Bhuta nese national program and 
the resulting production costs per kilo 
is one such unknown. The ratio 
of prices to productivity for Bhutan-
ese high quality seed versus rival 
Indian products is another unknown. 
Weighing these and other consider-
a tions, the author estimates that Bhu-
tan could ex port 1,000 tons of high 
quality seed per year by the end of the 
current Five-Year-Plan. 
Increased Third country exports of 
Bhutanese table potatoes o r high 
(juality seed are not likely in the near 
future. Bhutan is still negotiating a 
new trade agreement with India that 
would allow rail or river shipments 
direct to northern Bangladesh via 
Assam. Bhutanese potato exports to 
Sri Lanka or Burma seem even more 
improbable. Sri Lanka has stopped 
importing potatoes. Transport costs 
are a formidable handicap in any 
event. While some Bhutanese com-
mon seed apparently goes to eastern 
Nepal via Siliguri, this trade appears 
to be limited. Bhuta n has no official 
trade agreement with Nepal that 
would facilitat e official potato ship-
ments. 
Bhutanese na tional potato program 
officials are a lso exploring ex po rt 
prospects for new potato product s 
such as ba kery starch and founda-
tion seed . Although prospecti ve buy-
ers for bakery sta rch have shown in-
terest in thi s product. it ha~ yet to 
be perfected . Hence, it s economic vi-
ability rema ins promising, but largely 
uncertain. Export o f foundatio n seed 
merits closer exa mination from a 
marketing strategy perspective . Suc-
cessful export o f foundation seed may 
ea rn additional income for some 
farmers. But, it may also elimina te 
the market for certified and common 
see d as well. As a general guid eline, 
Bhutan should strive to multiply foun-
dati o n see(~ or basic seed inside the 
Kingdom a nd ex po rt nothing mo re 
sophisticat ed th an certified seed or 
it s local equiva lent. In other word s, 
top priority sho uld be given to im-
proving seed potatoes for distribution 
to Bhutanese growers and not to ea rn-
ing additional income by selling foun-
da tion seed or basic seed abroad . 
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(ii) Domestic Potato Marketing 
The domestic market for Bhutanese 
table potatoes offers additional future 
possibilities. However, since rural 
potato producers rarely buy potatoes 
to eat, an increase in domestic pota-
to demand depends largely on the 
growth of urban areas. These areas 
offer some prospects for increased 
table potato consumption because 
they are the principal food deficit re-
gions in the country. More generally, 
growth in domestic demand for Bhu-
tanese potatoes could be fostered by 
instituting programs to promote 
greater table potato consumption and 
re-evaluating the present food import 
practices of the FCB. 
Some common potato seed also 
will be marketed inside Bhutan in 
the years ahead. The expanding 
number of local Sunday fairs will en-
able more small-scale potato pro-
ducers to come in contact with ad-
ditional sources of seed besides local 
commercial growers or the village 
retail store. This development should 
help common seed sales. Common 
seed sales may be hurt, however, by 
the increased production and avail-
ability of improved seed . Relative 
seed prices and the price for table 
potatoes in India, also will affect 
future domestic marketing prospects 
for common seed. 
Similar considerations will affect 
future domestic marketing prospects 
for high quality seed. Price per kilo, 
quality and productivity will influence 
Bhutanese potato producers' decision 
whether to purchase high quality seed 
or some other type of seed potato. 
Another important factor is the ex-
tent to which the national potato pro-
gram devotes some resources to pro-
moting, not just producing, improved 
seed. 
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1.2 Conclusions and 
Recommendations 
This report concludes its assess-
ment of the present patterns and 
future prospects for Bhutanese pota-
toes on a note of cautious optimism. 
Readers are cautioned that the re-
port's description and analysis of Bhu-
tanese potato marketing is basically 
qualitative. While the author's as-
sessments are often supported by 
available statistics or field data, much 
of what is written here is descriptive 
and assumes that statements by Bhu-
tanese producers and Indian traders 
are dependable. Nevertheless, some 
conclusions are reasonably certain: 
Potatoes are among the most impor-
tant food crops in Bhutan. Most of 
what is produced is exported . Indian 
consumers prefer a small, oval white 
potato . In West Bengal, they pay 
more money for red-skinned varie-
ties. Bhutan exports table potatoes, 
common seed, and high quality seed. 
Some table potatoes are re-graded 
and sold as common seed; other com-
mon seed is sold by Bhutanese pro-
ducers as such. Still, most Bhutanese 
potatoes are exported for table con-
sumption. 
Other conclusions are less defini-
tive. While relative prices for red-skin-
ned potatoes are higher than for white-
skinned varieties, relative profits for 
red-skinned vs. white-skinned are less 
clear. Use of Bhutanese seed for the 
early and/ or late crop in northern 
West Bengal-hence the size of this 
seed market-also remains vague. 
The quantity of high quality seed 
that can be sold to Indian buyers in 
the future at a guaranteed price is 
really not known. Finally, how Bhu-
tanese consumers would respond to a 
shift in relative prices for imported 
rice versus domestic potatoes is also 
uncertain. For example, higher rice 
prices may lead consumers to eat the 
same amount of rice, because rice is 
the staple, but to purchase less trim-
mings such as potatoes because of 
lc;:ss available money. Or, higher rice 
prices may increase the demand for 
potatoes-urban residents substitu-
ting cheaper potatoes for more ex-
pensive rice. Any of these issues could 
serve as the focus of future potato 
marketing research. 
From the policy perspective, the 
present support price for table pota-
toes is questionable for several rea-
sons. 
First, few developing countries 
have a potato support price. They 
simply lack the financial resources. 
Second, during the 1974 to 1981 
period, the Bhutanese potato support 
price was roughly twice the market 
price received by growers in India 
(Rao et al 1982). Such a high support 
price may be justifiable in the short 
term to encourage some farmers to 
augment commercial production, but 
is less defensible as a long-term policy. 
Third, the support price includes 
a "normal profit" in the calculation. 
Under such circumstances, Bhutanese 
potato growers receive, in effect, a 
supernormal profit in good years 
when they sell to private traders, and 
a normal profit in bad years, when 
they sell at the support price to the 
FCB. In other words, present support 
price policy means that Bhutanese 
potato growers receive all the benefits 
but assume none of the risks associ-
ated with potato marketing. 
Fourth, no study of potato pro-
duction costs serves as a basis for 
calculating the annual support price. 
Instead, rough estimates are used . Al-
though such figures may have been 
the only ones available in 1974, when 
the decision was made to initiate the 
program, more systematic informa-
--------- -
tion gathering is now required as the 
program can cost the Royal Govern-
ment of Bhutan millions of Ngul-
trums. 
Fifth, instead of supporting the· 
price for table potatoes and in so 
doing distributing revenues, the Bhu-
tanese should institute policies for 
collecting revenues and thereby make 
the program more self-sufficient. 
Such policies could help raise farm-
ers' incomes on a permanent basis 
by helping to finance multiplication 
and promotion of improved seed in 
the Kingdom. 
The report's overall assessment is 
optimistic. Bhutanese farmers have 
had 3 years in succession of favorable 
prices for table potatoes, common 
seed, and high quality seed. As a re-
sult, they have marketed several 
thousand tons of potatoes during 
that time. Moreover, government in-
stitutions and personnel in Bhutan 
have a growing sense of responsibility 
concerning the work necessary to pro-
mote further market development. 
Thus, although the quantities envis-
ioned marketable by this .study may 
be less than originally anticipated, 
they are, after all, just educated 
guesses about apparent future trends. 
In the final analysis, efforts by the 
Bhutanese themselves to raise pro-
ductivity, to lower unit costs, to in-
crease quality, and to improve potato 
marketing will largely determine 
whether or not these estimates prove 
accurate. 
As a general recommendation, then, 
the author encourages the Bhutanese 
to continue to pursue plans to divers-
ify their potato marketing as part of 
an overall effort to develop the na-
tional potato program and the entire 
economy. It should be emphasized, 
however, that the Bhutanese sell 
potatoes in a highly competitive and 
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volatile market. Consequently, ef-
forts to increase potato production 
should be complemented by acting 
on a series of specific marketing re-
commendations listed below. These 
recommendations refer to three gen-
eral areas: (a) market promotion, 
research, and information; (b) market 
institutions, administration, and per-
sonnel, and, (c) marketing policy and 
food self-sufficiency. 
A. Market Promotion, 
Information, and Research 
In this area the report recommends: 
1. Seeking out alternative sources 
of high quality seed for multiplica-
tion in Bhutan. Total dependence on 
Indian seed suppliers restricts pro-
gram planning and development. 
2. Selling Bhutanese high quality 
seed first to local growers to increase 
the quality of what they produce and 
export, and second to buyers in West 
Bengal and elsewhere. This priority 
will make it necessary for national 
program personnel to set aside some 
resources to promote use of high 
quality seed in Bhutan as well as to 
produce varieties that local growers 
want to purchase. Two possible ways 
for promoting grower interest in high 
quality seed are demonstration plots 
in different potato producing areas, 
in farmers' fields, and group visits by 
farmers to government farms. 
3. Providing market information 
via correspondence, newspaper ads, 
or personal visits by FCB staff to 
more foreign buyers about the quan-
tity, quality, and type of Bhutanese 
potatoes available for sale. 
4. Relaying weekly market infor-
mation to FCB highland depots 
about prices and flows for potatoes 
in the border towns. This information 
could be transmitted, for example, by 
radio broadcast. 
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5. Organizing small groups of 
farmers for field trips to Indian mar-
kets so they can see rival products, 
meet with commission agents, and 
inform growers in their districts on 
their return. 
6. Utilizing contacts with various 
Indian commission agents and with 
Bhutanese trade representatives 
abroad to collect information about 
rival foreign products. This data 
should be used to prepare regular writ-
ten reports about the competitive po-
sition of Bhutanese potatoes. The re-
ports should improve Bhutan's bar-
gaining position in annual negotia-
tions for sale of high quality seed. 
7. Collecting production and mar-
ket cost data in Bhutan to help as-
sess the relative profitability of table, 
common, and high quality seed, in 
general, and red-skinned vs. white-
skinned varieties, in particular. 
8. Studying the costs and returns 
to potato processing before further 
efforts are made to promote potato 
starch as a new export product. 
9. Strengthening contacts with the 
Bangladesh national potato program 
to assess future prospects for founda-
tion seed exports and their particular 
varietal needs. 
B. Market Infrastructure, 
Administration, and Personnel 
In this area, the report recommends: 
1. Pursuing plans to organize regu-
lated markets for potatoes and other 
products in Galeyphug and S./Jongk-
har. Services provided sellers in these 
markets (weighing, calculations of ac-
counts, overnight storagt and im-
mediate payment as apparently plan-
ned for 1983) should be charged for 
on a cost basis. Plans to organize ad-
ditional weekly fairs around the King-
dom should also be pursued and pub-
licized. 
2. Reviewing licensing procedures 
for auction yard merchants so as to 
promote maximum participation by 
as many reputable buyers as possible. 
Every incentive should be given to en-
courage greater participation by Bhu-
tanese traders in these markets. Bord-
er and bazaar taxes should be re-eval-
uated to consider their consistency 
with export promotion programs at 
the farm level. 
3. Developing plans for efficient 
use of the new potato cold storage 
facilities in Phuntsholing. These 
plans should include estimates of 
rental fees for storage space, con-
tingency arrangements in case electric-
ity supplies are cut off, and the rela-
tive advantage of cool storage using 
rustic facilities in the highlands vs. 
cold storage using refrigerated facil-
ities in the foothill s. Such plans 
should distinguish between 1- or 2-
month storage (and germination) of 
ware potatoes, which would be sold 
as common seed and more long-term 
storage of table potatoes, which would 
be sold for human consumption . Giv-
en production and price patterns for 
Indian table potatoes, the latter pos-
sibility does not seem economically 
viable. Re-sale of stored Bhutanese 
table potatoes to Bhutanese farmers 
a s quality seed should be prevented. 
4. Providing producers with simple, 
illustrated pamphlets about correct 
grading procedures and requirements 
of common seed vs. high quality seed 
vs . table potato export market s in 
terms of potato size, varieties, a nd 
time of sale. Extension agents (and 
auction yard personnel) should distri-
bute these pamphlets prior to harvest 
and conduct grading clinics in their 
districts. 
5. Discontinuing shipment of high 
quality seed and table potatoes in 
special bags. Since the DOA cannot 
prevent re-use of these bags after 
they leave Bhutan, an ordinary bag 
with an official invoice should be 
the standard shipping arrangement. 
This protects quality reputation of of-
ficial potato exports. 
6 . Assigning someone, on a pa rt 
time basis, from the regulated mar-
ket staff to collect and to forward 
potato prices and quantities sold to 
the highland FCB depots. 
7. Giving top priority to ass ign-
ment of DOA's economist to the 
marketing cell. This person should 
be ass isted in admini stration o f th e 
potato marketing program - ta bl e 
potatoes, common seed, and hig h 
qua lity seed-by Mr. Dorji of th e 
FCB. Assignments should be on a 
long-term basis to promote continuit v 
in the program . At the outset, every 
effort should be made by Mr. Awas-
thi to provide these two individu a ls 
with a minimum of 3 month ~ in -se r-
vice, i~formal training. 
8. Institutionalizing regular coop-
eration and consultation between 
DOA, FCB and Ministry of Trade 
concerning potato exports . 
9. Improving accountin g pro-
cedures of high quality seed progra m 
to include an annual written rer o rt 
listing expenses incurred, revenue re-
, ceived, and resulting profits or losses. 
C. Marketing Policy and Food 
Self-Suffir.iency 
In this area, the report recommends: 
I . Promoting greater institutional 
use of potatoes in schools and govern-
ment facilities . 
2. Urging local contractors to 
purchase some Bhutanese potatoes 
for their workers , rather than en-
tirely imported food. 
3. Curtailing sale of imported rice 
from August to October as part of 
a food self-sufficiency, potato pro-
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motion campaign. This policy may 
prove more palatable to the general 
public if it is accompanied by informa-
tion about the potato's nutrition and 
alternative ways of potato prepara-
tion. 
4. Abandoning support-price sys-
tem for table potatoes over the next 
3 years. To encourage increases in 
productivity and a reduction in the 
government's dependence on foreign 
financial support, the present support 
price system for table potatoes should 
be gradually eliminated. In the im-
mediate future a revised support price 
that covers only "cash costs" as-
sociated with potato production 
should be announced. This support 
price should include neither the cost 
of family labor, land, and oxen nor 
a margin for normal profit. The re-
vised support price should be dropped 
after 3 years . 
5. Restricting payment of table 
potato support price to only those 
farmers who freely submit to a proper 
inspection of their potatoes at the 
appropriate FCB depot. 
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6. Making every attempt to nego-
tiate price and quantity for high qual-
ity seed potato exports to India be-
fore the guaranteed price is declared 
to growers and planting begins on 
government farms in Bhutan. If ne-
gotiations cannot be conducted in 
such a fashion, a much more modest 
guaranteed price that covers only 
cash costs should be announced to 
registered Bhutanese seed growers. 
7. Restricting participation in the 
high quality seed export program only 
to those registered farmers who: (a) 
buy their seed from the DOA; (b) 
comply with quality control measures 
to insure top standards are enforced 
on a regular and equal basis, and (c) 
sell agreed upon quantities of seed to 
the program as specified in the con-
tract. 
8. Calculating the selling price of 
improved seed to local growers on 
the basis of improved cost of pro-
duction estimates. 
9. Developing alternative internal 
sources of financial support for the 
potato program, for example selling 
improved seed at a slight profit. 
CHAPTER TWO 
Economic Development and Potatoes in Bhutan 
Introduction 
· Time and again experience has 
shown that development, particularly 
agricultural development, rarely 
takes place in a vacuum. Hence, for 
agricultural development programs 
to be successful, a variety of pre-
vailing factors must be considered 
prior to implementation: for example, 
ecological conditions, the socioecono-
mic organization of production, con-
sumption patterns, access to markets, 
and agricultural price policy. The 
proposed national potato develop-
ment program in Bhutan is no ex-
ception. In fact, given that most Bhu-
tanese potatoes are exported to India, 
the task of understanding how po-
tatoes fit into on-going production 
and marketing activities is doubly 
difficult. Under these circumstances, 
Bhutanese potatoes are really part of 
two production and marketing net-
works, not just one. Previous re-
ports by Karmacharya ( 1981) and 
Poats (1982) have discussed potato 
production and consumption, respec-
tively, in Bhutan. The purpose of this 
study is to explain how Bhutanese 
potatoes are marketed abroad and at 
home in an effort to promote Bhutan-
ese economic development. 
2.1 Economic Development 
in Bhutan: An Overview 
(i) The New Policy 
of Modernization 
The Kingdom of Bhutan consists 
of roughly 47 ,000 square kilometers 
of mountainous terrain nestled be-
tween China (Tibet) in the north and 
India in the south (West Bengal and 
Assam), east (Arunachal Pradesh), 
and west (Sikkim). For centuries, 
peoples of what now is Bhutan were 
content to preserve their traditional 
way of life by living in semi-isolation 
behind natural barriers. In response 
to rapidly changing regional political 
developments of the post World War 
II era, however, the late King Jigme 
Dorji Wangchuk reversed this long 
standing practice. In the 1960's the 
former monarch set in motion a series 
of reforms intended to promote great-
er interaction with the world com-
munity of nations, to increase his 
subjects' socioeconomic well-being 
and at the same time, to preserve the 
Kingdom's most admirable customs. 
During the last decade, the late King's 
son has continued to pursue his 
father's goals. As a result, all develop-
ment programs-from apples to 
water resources-are considered in 
terms of the Kingdom's new policy 
of modernization. 
(ii) Economic Dependence 
on India 
Another factor involved in the 
evaluation of proposed development 
programs in Bhutan is the Kingdom's 
economic dependence on India . The 
open border with India and Bhutan's 
limited trade with third countries 
mean that India is Bhutan's domi-
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Bhutan has its own currency-the 
Ngultrum-the Indian rupee is also 
used as legal tender in the country. 1 
Estimated trade figures for 1978, the 
latest information available, indicate 
a negative balance with India of 
roughly Nu. 80 million (see Table 2.1). 
In particular, Bhutan depends on 
India for several necessities, mainly 
petrol and rice. Furthermore, given 
the trained manpower shortage, In-
dian technicians occupy numerous 
positions in Bhutan's civil service, 
especially at higher, decision-making 
levels. India also continues to pro-
vide most capital necessary to finance 
Bhutan's ambitious development 
plans. Consequently, Bhutanese 
policy makers and administrators are 
eager to place the country's economic 
relations with India on a more equal 
footing. They also seek to expand 
trade with third countries to some-
thing beyond underutilized, formal 
agreements. 
(iii) Agriculture in the 
Bhutanese Economy 
An additional consideration in re-
viewing proposed development pro-
grams in Bhutan is the extent to which 
such programs build upon ex1stmg 
economic activities. Estimated Gross 
National Product (GNP) in 1979-80, 
the only data available, gives one in-
dication of the importance of agri-
culture in Bhutan's economy (see 
Table 2.2). Crop production, animal 
husbandry and forestry generated 
more than 50% of estimated GNP. 
Thus, with the exception of a hand-
ful of small factories along the border 
and the hydroelectric project at Chuk-
ha, Bhutan has an agrarian economy . 
An estimated 95% of the work force 
is employed in agriculture. 
The agricultural economy consists 
primarily of subsistence production 
on family farms. While most crops 
and livestock go to feed the peasant 
household, modest surpluses fre-
quently are exchanged for essent ial 
items not grown on the farm such 
as salt. Trade is through traditiomll 
rural marketing networks based on 
the barter system. 
Thus, although Bhutan is one of 
world's least developed countries 
'Exchange rate for the Bhut anese N1<ultrum. 
Nu.9.5 = US$ 1(October, 1982) . 
Table 2.1 Bhutan: Value of exports and imports, i978. (Million Nu.). 
Major Groups Exports 
Food . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . IS.SS 
Rice . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 0.50 
Beverage & Tobacco . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 22.28 
Minerals, Petroleum Products . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . • . . . . 9.39 
Manufactured goods . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 0.54 
Vegetable Oils and Fats..... . .. . .......... ..... ... 0.16 
Construction materials . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 0.35 
Timber products............. . ................... 9.57 
C lothing and foot wear . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 0.06 
Fruits and spices. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2. 76 
Animals and Birds . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 0 .06 
Miscellaneous. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1.87 
Total 62.60 






























with an estimated GNP per capita of 
about US$ I 00, the existing agrarian 
economy provides an adequate stan-
dard of living for almost all the 1 mil-
lion plus Bhutanese. The country-
side exhibits little sign of malnutrit'on 
or extreme deprivation. Likewise, the 
Kingdom's towns and administrative 
centers show relatively few indica-
tions of growing urban poverty fre-
Table 2.2 Bhutan: Estimated Gross National Product (GNP) at market prices 
1979-1980. (Million Nu.). 
Sector Co-tpbution to GNP % 
1. Agriculture . ........ .. .......................... . . 491.5 54.3 
a. Crop Production ..................... . .... . .. .. . 255.7 28.2 
b. Animal Husbandry ...... . ... . .................. . 76.5 8.4 
c. Forestry . . .. .. .. . . ............................ . 159.3 17.6 
2. Manufacturing and Mining . . .. . .................... . 91.7 10.1 
a. Manufacturing . ....... . ............... . .. . .. . .. . 54.0 6.0 
b. Small and Cottage Industries ..................... . 18.1 2.0 
c. Mining ............ . ...... . ................... . 8.6 0.9 
d. Tourism .......................... . ......... .. . 11.0 1.2 
3. Services ...... . .... . . . . .. ................... . .... . 133.8 14.8 
a. Power .. . .. . ............... . .... . ......... . ... . 2.7 0.3 
b. Communications ........... . ..... . ..... . . . ..... . 5.8 0.6 
c. Transport . .... . . .. ..................... . .. . ... . 27.6 3.0 
d. Construction .. . . . . . ........................... . 18.9 2.1 
e. Social Service e.g. health, education, etc ............ . .34.8 3.8 
f. Financial Institutions ......... ... .. . . . . . .... . . . . . 15.4 1.8 
g. Trade ..... . ... . .............................. . 28.6 3.2 
4. Government and Administration .................... . 106.6 11.8 
5. Net rental income ................................. . 82.0 9.1 
Total 905.6 100% 
Source: United Nations, 1981. 
Table 2.3 Bhutan: Government development expenditures (1961-1986). 
Total Outlay (Million Nu.) ...... . 
Agricultural Sector ("lo) ' .•••... • • 
Hydro-electric power ("lo) ....•... 
Industry ("lo) ' ....•....•...•...• 
Social Services ("7o) 3 • ••••••••••• • 
Public works ("lo)' •• • ••••.... • •. • 
Transport and Communication ("lo) . 










' Plant produc1ion, irrigation , and animal husbandry. 
i1nc\uding fores t. 
1Education and health. 
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quently present in other Third World 
countries. 
Nevertheless, Bhutan's agricultural 
economy is in transition. The late 
King's agrarian reform law gave vir-
tual universal access to land. Over 
the last several decades, more and 
more growing areas gradually have 
emerged as centers of commercial ex-
port crop production, e.g. Chapcha, 
Paro, Bumthang. Bhutanese officials 
are concerned, however, about recent 
dependence on food imports, particu-
larly rice (F AO 1982). The shortage 
of cultivable land and low levels of 
productivity on Bhutanese farms have 
combined with a steady, albeit moder-
ate (l.2%), rate of population growth 
to generate a small, but distributing 
food deficit (5,000 to 15,000 tons per 
year). 
(iv) Agricultural Development: 
Goals and Strategies 
Development programs in Bhutan 
also are reviewed in terms of the 
Kingdom's development goals and 
strategies. Since the preparation of 
the first Five-Year-Plan in 1961, the 
basic goals of Bhutanese economic 
policy have remained the same: 
a) to improve living standards of 
the people, especially those be-
longing to the poorer sections; 
and 
b) to achieve economic self-reli-
ance. 
In the course of the last 20 years, 
however, program emphasis in sup-
port of these basic goals gradually 
has shifted from an early concentra-
tion on public works, mainly roads, 
in favor of greater expenditures on 
industry (including forestry) and agri-
culture (see Table 2.3). 
The current, fifth Five-Year-Plan 
(1981-1986) sets the following objec-
tives for Bhutanese agricultural de-
velopment: 
a) to achieve self-sufficiency in 
food grain production within 5 
years; 
b) to raise incomes in the farming 
community, and 
c) to improve nutritional intake 
of the population as a whole 
both as a result of increasing 
incomes as well as of diversified 
farm production. 
The strategy adopted to achieve 
these goals emphasizes improved pro-
ductivity and generation of market-
able surpluses. On the one hand, 
greater utilization of improved agro-
nomic practices and of high yielding 
inputs are considered key determin-
ants of improved productivity. On the 
other, cultivation of cash crops, (po-
tato and cardamom2 , for example) and 
improved marketing services are seen 
as critical elements, in addition to the 
improved productivity necessary to 
generate the planned growth m mar-
ketable surpluses. 
Through its policies, programs, and 
institutions, the government is ·to play 
a major role in implementation of 
agricultural development strategy. 
For example support price policies 
for principal staple and cash crops 
provide financial guarantees for farm-
ers to increase production. Plant pro-
tection services are subsidized by the 
government. In addition, the Depart-
ment of Agriculture (DOA) manages 
seed multiplication programs on gov-
ernment farms and seed distribution 
to local farniers and foreign buyers . 
(v) Constraints to 
Agricultural Development 
Several constraints condition pur-
suit of development goals and strate-
gies in Bhutan. The principal con-
' Cardamom is an Asian plant of the ginger 
family used in med icine and as a spice. Web-
ster's New World Dictionary 2nd edition 
(1970). 
IS 
straints to agricultural development 
are: 
1. Lack of financial resources. 
Roughly 80% of government budget 
for the fifth Five-Year-Plan is to be 
financed with loans or grants from 
abroad. 
2. Shortage of trained manpower. 
There were fewer than 10 Bhutanese 
agricultural graduates in the country 
in 1981. 
3. Inadequate infrastructure . 
Mainly because of rugged terrain, 
many of the country's remote rural 
communities remain in semi-isolation 
due to limited road and communica-
tions network . 
4. Insufficient supply of farm 
labor. lndigeneous farm labor short-
age, lack of capital and credit to mech-
anize, and government restrictions 
on hiring foreign farm workers thwart 
more labor intensive agriculture. 
5. Shortage of cultivable land . 
While government policies restrict ex-
pansion of the agricultura l frontier, 
shortage of cultivable land means 
most farms are less than 6 hectares in 
size. 
6. Complete dependence on ferti-
lizer imports. A fertilizer shortage in 
India has meant unreliable fertilizer 
exports to Bhutan. 
7. Limited availability of improved 
seed. Due to the Kingdom 's geogra-
phic iso lation and mountainous ter-
rain, production and distribution of 
improved seed is a limited and re-
cent phenomenon. 
8. Lack of knowledge about pre-
vailing production, consumption, and 
marketing practices. Farmer surveys 
or descriptions of potato production 
and / or marketing are virtually non-
existent. 
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2.2 Bhutanese Agricultural 
Development and Potatoes 
Within the agricultural sector, 
separate development programs are 
under consideration for each major 
activity. The nature of these programs 
tends to vary depending on: (a) the 
activity's relative importance and, (b) 
if resulting production is destined for 
export or domestic use. Interest in 
potatoes has been primarily in terms 
of export crop potential. But, this em-
phasis has obscured the potato's rela-
tive importance in other respects, such 
as total production, existing per 
capita consumption, and potential 
for increases in domestic utilization. 
Potatoes ranked fourth in total 
product ion among major crops in 
Bhutan, according to the latest sta-
tistics for the 1981 / 82 crop year (see 
Table 2.4). The relative importance 
of potato production is attributable 
to it s relatively high estimated average 
yields in comparison with the esti -
mated average yields for cereals, puls-
es and oil crops. More importantly, 
by the end of the present Five-Year-
Plan, potatoes are expected to grow in 
relati ve importance. Area planted in 
potatoes is projected to increase by 
about one third and total potato pro-
duction to nearly double. In fact, pro-
jected increases in output and area 
planted are higher for potatoes than 
for any of the cereals or pulses. 
Po~atoes also were fir st in total 
volume and second in total value of 
the four principal export crops hand-
led by the Food Corporation of Bhut-
an (FCB), during the period 1975176 
to 1978179, (see Table 2.5). Never-
theless, the FCB either lost money 
or barely broke even on potato sa les 
in each of these years. Moreover, 
in 1979, FCB potato export opera-
tions sustained a loss of Nu. 22 mil-
lion. Although in recent years nearly 
:::i 
Table 2.4 Bhutan: Present and planned agricultural production. 
Paddy .............. . ............ . 
Maize ...... ....... ...... ...... .. . 
Wheat/ Barley .................... . 
Buckwheat/ Millets ................ . 
Pulse Crops ......... .. ........... . 
Mustard ......................... . 
Potato .. .... .. . .................. . 
Ginger ........................... . 
Chili and Other Vegetables .......... . 
Orange .......................... . 
Apple ... ····· ········ ........... . 
Cardamom .. · · · · · · · · · · \ " · · · · · · · · · · 
Source: Planning Cell, DOA. 
Table 2.5 Bhutan: Estimated exports of cash crops by FCB, selected years . 
. (Quantity: Tons; Value: Thousand Nu.). 
1975-1976 1976-1977 1977-1978 1978-1979 
-----
Quantity Value Quantity Value Quantity Value Quantity Value 
Apples . .............. 7 14 23 46 70 175 70 174 
Cardamom ....... . ... 79 600 99 1944 337 5096 200 3900 
Oranges ...... . .. .... 300 275 570 283 N.A. N.A. 193 219 
Potatoes ... ....... ... 1046 1046 2476 1823 1146 1622 1397 1507 
Source: Rao, et al., 1982. 
Potato vender leaving Bumthang with load of potatoes. 
all potato exports went through.pri-
vate traders, government officials 
still are concerned about another 
possible collapse in prices. This con-
cern is further magnified because the 
latest Five-Year-Plan calls for sub-
stantial increases in potato exports 
by 1986/ 87. 
Potatoes also play an important, if 
often underestimated, role in the 
Bhutanese diet. While the major 
staple in Bhutan is rice , potatoes 
and a variety of other vegetable, 
dairy, and meat products serve as 
complements. Still, even estimates of 
annual per capita consumption of in-
dividual food items in Bhutan are 
unavailable. Estimates of annual per 
capita cereal consumption vary from 
199 kilograms, based on the pilot Con-
sumer Expenditure Survey in 1977, to 
about 140 kilograms, based on FAO 
Food Security Mission. In compari-
son, estimates of per capita potato 
consumption recently have been re-
vised upwards from 5.2 kilograms 
18 
per year. In summary, then, there 
are several reasons to consider in-
creasing Bhutan's potato production. 
2.3 Issues for This Study 
In the context of prevailing factors 
described above, Bhutans' national 
potato development program pro-
poses to increase production, especial-
ly high quality seed, over the next 5 
years. While such increases in pro-
duction are considered quite feasible 
technically, a key series of marketing 
issues must be studied. The focus of 
this study, then , can be organized 
around the following set of critical 
questions: 
1. If Bhutan produces more pota-
toes, then can these potatoes be sold? 
2. What kind of potatoes can be 
sold? 
Type: Seed (common or high quality)? 
Table potatoes? 
Variety: Swiss red? Kufri-Joyti? 
Other varieties? 
Appearance: Oval or round? Small 
or large? White or red-skinned? 
3. Where can these potatoes be 
sold? 
Domestic sales: Fairs? Retail shops? 
Auction yards? 
Indian sales: West Bengal? Assam? 
Other Indian states? 
Third Country sales: Bangladesh? 
Nepal? Sri Lanka, or Burma? 
4. When can these potatoes be 
sold? 
Monthly: July-August? September-
October? November and beyond? 
5. To whom can these potatoes 
be sold? 
Type of buyers: Farmers? Traders? 
Foreign potato programs? 
6. How many potatoes can be 
sold? 
Unit of sale: 30 kilogram packets? 
80 kilogram bags? 
Total quantities: 5,000 tons? 10,000 
tons? 
7. How can these potatoes be 
sold? 
Types of payment: Cash? Check? 
Bank draft? 
Terms of sale: Contract (formal or 
informal)? Auction? 
8. Form in which these potatoes 
can be sold? 
Fresh market: graded by variety and 
size? Ungraded? 
Processed potatoes: starch? 
9. What kind of infrastructure is 
needed for these potato sales? 
Storage facilities? Their capacity? 
Private vs. Public? 
Processing Plants? Their capacity? 
Auction yards? Their number? Loca-
tion? 
Harvesting potatoes near Khadapchu. 
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10. What kind of transportation 
and communication facilities are need-
ed to sell these potatoes? 
11. At what price can these pota-
toes be sold? Open market price? 
Support price? Dual price mechanism? 
12. Who will sell these potatoes? 
DOA? FCB? Private traders? Grow-
ers? 
13. Principal factors that affect 
future marketing prospects? 
Production factors: Quality? Pro-
ducti vity in India vs. Bhutan? 
Marketing factors: Unit costs? Pro-
motion? 
2.4 Methodology Utilized for 
this Study 
Little has been written a bout Bhu-
tanese agriculture in general and po-
tato marketing in particular. The re-
cent study (Rao et al. 1982) is per-
haps the only publication on potato 
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marketing available. Consequently, 
the author gathered information in 
the field to address the questions out-
lined above . 
The results presented in the fol-
lowing pages are based on: (a) a syn-
thesis of the limited, available litera-
ture; (b) informal interviews with 
numerous producers, traders, and 
government officials-a complete list 
of contacts is in the appendix; and 
(c) participant observat ion of potato 
marketing in Bhutan, India and Bang-
ladesh . 
Given the shortage of reasonably 
reliable time-series data, thi s report 
tests no formal quantitive models. 
Instead, it provides a descriptive 
analysis of prevailing potato market-
ing patterns and a largely qualitative 
assessment of Bhutan's future potato 
marketing prospects. Subsequent, 
more detailed research, for example, 
of costs of potato processing can 
build on this baseline study. 
; 
CHAPTER THREE 
Potato Production and Consumption in Bhutan 
Introduction 
Official interest in the systematic 
improvement of potato production 
and consumption is a relatively re-
cent phenomenon in Bhutan. Accord-
ing to Roddar (1982), the Department 
of Agriculture (DOA) only started 
to promote potato production about 
10 years ago. Partly for that reason, 
perhaps, accumulated knowledge 
about existing potato production and 
consumption patterns is rather mea-
ger. Nevertheless, as is made clear 
below, understanding the basics of 
Bhutanese potato production and con-
sumption is critical for appraising 
future potato marketing prospects. 
With that thought in mind, this chap-
ter provides a concise description of 
present potato production and con-
sumption activities. In so doing, it 
relies heavily on recent research by 
Karmacharya (198 I, I 982a, I 982b) , 
Poats (1982) and Roddar (1982) ~ 
3.1 Potato Production 
Potatoes have been cultivated in 
the region of present day Bhutan for 
at least 2 centuries. Some accounts 
trace their introduction to the travels 
of George Bogel in I 774/75 on behalf 
of the East India Trading Company 
(Roddar I 982). Others contend that 
the potato may have been introduced 
as early as the late I 600's (Poats I 982). 
In any event, the modern era of Bhu-
tanese potato production dates back 
roughly 30 to 40 years. According 
to the oral tradition, Bhutanese grow-
ers around Chapcha first started 
regularly planting and exporting po-
tatoes to India at about that time. 
(i) Agroecological Regions 
While Bhutan is a mountainous 
country throughout , considerable dif-
ferences in topography and climate 
exist within the national boundaries. 
The nature and importance of potato 
production varies depending on which 
of three generally recognized agro-
ecological regions are being discuss-
ed (FAO 1982). These regions are: 
a) The Western Hills Region 
Typography of this region is noted 
for several relatively flat , irrigated 
river valleys that vary in altitude from 
1,000 to 2,500 meters. The rainy sea-
son is generally during summer 
months of June to August. Still, in 
comparison to other parts of Bhutan, 
the climate in the Western Hills region 
is sunny and quite dry . Estimated 
annual rainfall varies between 500 
and 700 millimeters . 
The Western Hills region consists 
of the districts of Paro, Thimphu/ 
Punakha, Wangdi, Dagana, Ha, and 
Gasa. The irrigated river valleys in 
these districts are devoted principally 
to paddy production. Potatoes fre-
quently are planted before paddy as 
an early cash crop with harvest in 
May or June, e.g. Paro. Proceeds 
from potato sales then help finance 
paddy production. Nevertheless, the 
main potato crop in this region is 
21 
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grown on dry land slopes overlooking 
the valley floor. In this case, pota-
toes are rotated with wheat, buck-
wheat and barley. 
bl The Eastern Hills Region 
This region is the most rugged and 
mountainous in all of the Kingdom. 
Apart from the relatively small area 
around Bumthang, there is no flat 
farm land in this part of the country. 
Instead, the Eastern Hills are characte-
rized by a seemingly unending series 
of spectacular gorges and lofty slopes 
separated from the Western Hills by 
the Black Mountains range. Given the 
extremely rugged terrain, the Eastern 
Hills remain the most under-develop-
ed region in Bhutan. Consequently, 
official climatological data are dif-
ficult to obtain. The Eastern Hills 
region is noted for its frequent morn-
ing mists in winter. Annual rainfall 
reportedly varies between 700 and 
1,000 millimeters. 
The Eastern Hills region includes 
the districts of Tongsa, Shemgang, 
Bumthang, Mongor, Pemagatsel, 
Tashigang and Lhuntsi. These dis-
tricts, in particular Mongor and Tashi-
gang, are noted for dry land maize 
production. With the exception of 
Bumthang and Pemagatsel, paddy 
grown on irrigated terraces is the 
second most important crop in terms 
of area planted . At higher altitudes, 
a rotation that includes wheat, buck-
wheat, barley and potatoes replaces 
maize and/ or paddy. At lower aiti-
tudes in Shemgang district, potatoes 
are intercropped with maize. In the 
Eastern Hills region, few potatoes 
are planted on irrigated land. 
c) The Southern Foothills Region 
This region has three distinguish-
ing ecological characteristics: First, 
although parts are extremely steep, 
the area generally has a much lower 
elevation than the rest of the country. 
Second, this region includes a sliver 
of flat farm land that separates the 
plains of India from the foothills of 
Bhutan, along the Souther.n border. 
Third, the climate in this region is 
hot and humid. Estimated annual 
rainfall for the Southern Foothills is 
5,000 millimeters. 
The Southern Foothills region con-
sists of the districts of Samchi, Chir-
ang, Galeyphug, and Samdrup Jongk-
har. Principal crops in order of 
importance are: dry land maize, 
irrigated paddy, and dry land buck-
wheat or millet. Relatively, few pota-
toes are grown in the Southern Foot-
hills. Instead, oranges and cardamom 
are cultivated as the main cash crops. 
(ii) Potato Production, 
Area, and Yields 
According to a recent DOA survey, 
some potatoes are grown in every 
district in Bhutan. Still, national po-
tato production is geographically 
concentrated . Four districts: Paro 
and Thimphy in the Western Hills 
region along with Bumthang and 
Tashigang in the Eastern Hills region 
planted and produced nearly 7011/o of 
the national total in 1981 (see Table 
3.1). 
Yields also vary considerably. The 
Western Hills region with its irri-
gated river valleys and productivity 
conscious commercial growers has the 
highest estimated average yields: 3 .16 
tons per acre. With the exception of 
Bumthang district, estimated average 
yields are lowest in the more isolated 
parts of the Eastern Hills region: 1.57 
tons per acre in Mongar, for example. 
Farmers in these areas have limited 
access to irrigation, extension and 
high yielding inputs such as fertilizer, 
improved seed. 
In addition to ware potato produc-
tion, seed potatoes are grown at sever-
al sites around Bhutan. In the West-
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Table 3.1 Bhutan: Estimated area planted, production, yields, marketable 
surplus for potatoes by agroecological region, 1981-82 crop year. 
Area planted Total production Yields Marketable surplus 
Region (acres) (tons) (tons/ acre) (tons) 
Western Hills 
Paro ............. 1,375 4,250 3.09 3,275 
Thimphu/ Punakha. 1,665 5,475 3.29 4,015 
Wangdi ........... 400 1,350 3.38 925 
Dagana ........... 20 50 2.5 
Ha ............... 375 1,075 2.87 875 
Gasa ........ . ... . 5 8 1.6 
Sub-Total 3,840 12,208 3.18 9,090 
f1/o of Total 42.2 
Eastern Hills 
Tongsa .... . .. .... 60 
Shemgang ......... 270 
Bumthang .. ....... 565 
Mongor ..... . ..... 525 
Pemagatsel ........ 175 
Tashigang ......... 2,375 
Lhuntsi ... .. ... ... 320 
Sub-Tota.I 4,290 
f1/o of Total 47.1 
Southern Foothills 
Samchi ..... ...... 225 
Chirang ..... . . . ... 325 
Galeyphug ........ 400 
Samdrup Jongkhar. 15 
- -
Sub-Total 965 
f1/o of Total 10.6 
Total (All Regions) 9,095 
N.A. =Not Available 
Source: Plannin se Cell, DOA. 
em Hills region government farms 
at Yoesepang, Phubjikha and Pelela 
produce seed potatoes. During the 
1982 season, the Yoesepang facility 
harvested roughly 20 metric tons of 
seed. Similarly, the Phubjikha farm 
produced roughly 75 tons of most ly 
high quality seed for export in 1982. 
Government farms at Pelela and 
Nasphgel also grow some potato seed 
(Roddar 1982) primarily for distribu-
tion to local growers . 
(iii) Types of Potato Producers 
Four major types of producers 
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48.9 56.5 
170 2.83 100 
700 2.59 350 
2,475 4.38 1,325 
825 1.57 250 
365 2.09 260 
4,975 2.09 3,300 
500 1.56 N.A. - -
10,010 2.33 5,585 
40.2 34.7 
400 1.78 
1,000 3.08 700 
1,275 3.19 700 
30 2.0 
2,705 2.8 1,400 
10.9 8.7 
24,923 2.74 16,075 
grow potatoes in Bhutan. The most 
market-oriented are the well-establish-
ed, commercial potato growers 
around Chapcha, Paro and Thimpu 
in the Western Hills region and 
around Bhumthang and Khaling in 
the Eastern Hills part of the country. 
These farmers have the largest market-
able surpluses per unit of production. 
They also use the most disciplined, 
if not sophisticated, agronomic tech-
niques. 
In contrast, perhaps, the most 
numerous group of Bhutanese potato 
producers are kitchen gardeners. fields, or they grow potatoes· in geo-
These growers plant small patches graphically isolated parts of the King-
of potatoes adjacent to their homes dom-Ura, for example. 
in towns and administrative centers (iv) Varieties Planted and 
around the country. Included in this Growing Season 
category are construction workers Bhutanese potato producers plant 
employed on sites throughout the numerous potato varieties, both tra-
country. In addition, many schools, ditional and hybrid. The open border 
monasteries and other such institu- with India and customary trade be-
tions plant potatoes in gardens to tween the Bhutanese hi ghlands and 
help supply the communal kitchen neighboring potato growing areas in 
with fresh vegetables. West Bengal, Assam, and Sikkim, has 
The third category of potato pro- led to the introduction of several tra-
ducers includes the government farms ditional Indian varieties such as Dar-
and experiment stations referred to jeeling Red Rounds. Other old po-
briefly above. Some half-dozen such tato varieties still planted in Bhutan 
facilities exist throughout the Kingdom. are Magnum Bonum and Dop Langay 
They grow potatoes as a service to (see Poats 1982). 
the nation's farmers and as a source During the last decade , the Swiss 
of revenue to finance the future ex- introduced the Dutch variety Desiree, 
pansion of similar activities. known locally as "Swiss Red." The 
The final category of potato pro- DOA's most recent seed multiplica-
ducers in Bhutan are the numerous tion program has promoted use of 
semi-subsistence growers. They grow the Indian hybrid, Kufri-Joyt i. The 
more potatoes than the kitchen gar- old German variety, Cosima, has also 
den producers, but have smaller mar- been grown lately in Bhutan. Further-
ketable surpluses than the well-es- more, the Dutch hybrid, Maritta, is 
tablished, commercial farmers. They being planted as well. 
tend to be marginalized in the regions The importance of one hybrid vs. 
of major potato production. In other another in terms of its percent of 
words, they have smaller, less fertile national potato production, has not 
Farmer's irrigated fields in Paro Valley. (Photo by Poats). 
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Planned site for major seed farm in Phubjikha Valley 
to be operated by National Potato Program . 
been throughly studied. Some casual 
estimates by DOA personnel suggest 
that Kufri-Joyti represents 50% or 
more of total production . Figures 
cit ed in Roddar (1982) imply other-
wise (see Table 3.2). According to 
these calculations, other hybrids, like 
Maritta and Cosima (33.5%), and 
local varieties (320Jo) constitute a 
much larger percent of national out-
put than previously believed . 
The potato production calendar in 
Bhutan varies from region to region. 
Planting begins as early as December 
in Chirang di strict or around S./ 
Jongk har in the Southern Foothills 
region. It then continues during Janu-
ary and Febru ary around Paro and 
Chapcha in the Western Hills region. 
Planting concludes by early March in 
the Eastern Hill s region, when Bum-
thang and Tashigang growers seed 
their potato field s. 
A somewhat analogous patt ern 
characterizes potato harvesting in the 
Kingdom. The earliest harvest is in 
May at the lower, foot hill elevations. 
Some potatoes are even harvested 
in the Paro Valley at this same time. 
Nevertheless, the bulk of production 
Table 3.2 Bhutan: Potato varieties planted by major growing center, 1982, 
(percent). 
Growing Center/ Variety Maritta/ Cosima Swiss Red (Desiree) Kufri-Joyti Local 
Bumthang 80 20 
Paro..... .... . ... .... ... 50 35 15 
Tashigang . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 40 10 10 40 
Thimphu.. . . . ....... . .. . 10 60 30 
Other. . ...... . .... .. .... 20 30 10 40 
Nationwide (based on 
acreage) .. . ..... .. ...... . 33 18 17 32 
Source: Roddar . 1982 . 
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is dug during August and September. of special concern in Bhutan are late 
Potato harvest ing culminates in Octo- blight, early blight, and wart. 
ber and ear ly November as farms at Another potato production con-
higher altitudes in eastern Bhutan straint is shortage of trained extension 
complete digging activities. personnel. Similar to mountainous 
(v) Farm-Level Production regions anywhere in the developing 
Constraints world , growing conditions vary dra-
A number of production con- matically within short distances in 
stra int s thwart potentiai increases in the Bhutanese highlands. Therefore, 
potato productivity at the farm level blanket recommendations for im-
in Bhutan. The principal constraint proved potato cultivation are simply 
is a shortage of clean seed. According inadequate . At the same time, how-
to Karmacharya (1981) , less than 10% ever, the DOA has limited personnel 
of the total potato area used im- and transportation to reach the 
proved DOA seed during the 1979/ 80 numerous, semi-isolated potato pro-
and 1980/81 crop years. Since much ducing communities. 
of the locally available seed is from Most hybrid potato varieties re-
the same, degenerated germplasm spond favorably to applications of 
used year a fter year, new seed must chemical fertilizer. Yet, potato pro-
be imported from abroad to help raise duction in Bhutan has been handi-
yields. capped by its dependence on fertilizer 
A second related farm-level produc- shipments from India, a country suf-
tion constraint is incidence of potato fering through its own nitrogen short-
diseases, (Karmacharya 1982 b). Con- age. 
tinued use of degenerated, disease- Another major constraint to potato 
susceptible seed is partly responsible production in Bhutan is the shortage 
for this constraint. Potato diseases of production credit. Potatoes are a 
Dry land potato production near Chapcha. (Photo by Poats) . 
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relatively expensive crop to produce. 
Studies frequently show that produc-
tion costs per hectare for potatoes are 
at least three or four times production 
costs for most cereals. Hence, financ-
ing is a critical component in a po-
tato productivity improvement pro-
-gram. Such credit is hard to secure 
in Bhutan. 
Potatoes also are a fairly labor in-
tensive crop. But, Bhutanese agri-
culture in general is characterized by 
a shortage of farm labor. This situa-
tion is made more difficult by govern-
ment regulations restricting increased 
employment of foreign workers. Con-
tinued labor shortages reduce potato 
growers options when it comes to 
adopting more labor intensive cultural 
practices. 
Finally, productivity increases on 
Bhutanese potato farms are hamper-
ed by limited knowledge of prevail-
ing agronomic techniques . Farm level 
research about potato production is 
still in its embryonic stage . Experience 
in other countries clearly has shown 
the advantage of including potato 
farmers in the research process as 
early as possible (see Booth and 
Rhoades 1982). 
3.2 Potato Consumption 
Until 1982, Bhutanese potatoes 
were considered almost exclusively 
as a cash crop for export. Field work 
by Poats (1982), however, was large-
ly responsible for the on-going re-
evaluation of the potato's actual and 
potential role as a food crop for do-
mestic consumption. At a minimum, 
there is a growing consensus in Bhu-
tan that, as Poats observes, "very 
little is really known about actual 
levels or patterns of potato consump-
tion in the country." 
(i) The Potato in the 
Bhutanese Diet 
Although consumption patterns 
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vary from region to region in Bhutan, 
rice is the basic, preferred staple every-
where. Potatoes then are considered 
a complementary vegetable by most 
of the Kingdom's inhabitants . As 
such, potatoes most frequently are 
boiled and served either with hot chil-
lies or other sauces as a complement 
to the customary plate of rice. Or, 
they may be eaten as one ingredient 
in the seemingly infinite number of 
curries that add variety to the daily 
meal. Potatoes occasionally are con-
sumed in local meat dishes. 
Potatoes generally are consumed 
in their fresh form in Bhutan. Some 
potato chips are eaten in the larger 
towns. But, these are simply thinly 
sliced fried potatoes packaged in small 
bags for sale primarily to foreigners 
and the younger generation of Bhut-
anese. Few potatoes are used to make 
alcohol, flour , or industrial starch. 
Plans to use simple village level pro-
cessing plants to produce bakery 
starch for export to India are still 
undergoing refinement through ex-
perimentation. 
(ii) Levels of Potato 
Consumption by Region 
In the absence of a detailed house-
hold consumer budget survey, com-
prehensive estimates of potato con-
sumption by region are non-existent. 
Available information is based on a 
series of structured interviews carried 
out during 1982 in different regions 
and different locations (rural vs. mar-
ketplace) around the country (see 
Table 3.3). 
Average annual per capita potato 
consumption was found to be similar 
among urban consumers (x= 39.6 
kilograms) and rural households (x = 
45 kilograms). Nevertheless, within 
each group, considerable differences 
did exist. Consumers in the Western 
Hills generally reported eating more 





Average Per Capita 
Potato Consumption 
Per Year (kg.) 
Range in 
Consumption 
Per Year (kg.) 
Western Hills .. ... .. .... .. ..... . 
Rural Households 
26 36 0.6-122.0 
Eastern Hills ... . ........... . ... . 10 22 9.0- 78.0 
Southern Foothills .. . ........... . 14 63 13 -194 
Total 50 45 
Market Place Consumers 
Western Hills (Thimphu). . ... . ... . 80 
Southern Foothills (Galeyphug) . . . . 80 
Southern Foothills (Sarbhang) . . . . . 34 
Southern Foothills (Lamidara).. . . . 20 
Total 214 
Source: Poats, 1982. 
potatoes. This result coincides with 
the known importance of potato pro-
duction in this agroecological region. 
Most important, all groups reported 
a level of annual per capita consump-
tion vastly superior to the previously 
reported national average of 5 kilo-
grams per year. Moreover, the range 
in reported average annual per capita 
potato consumption among rural 
households was extremely high. This 
finding suggests that increases in the 
average level of per capita potato 
consumption would be compatible 
with the already prevailing consump-
tion patterns of some consumers. 
(iii) Types of Consumers 
Potato consumers in Bhutan may 
be classified first as growers or non-
growers. The most important potato 
consumers in Bhutan are potato grow-
ers. This group of consumers in-
cludes commercial producers, semi-
subsistence farmers, kitchen gar-
deners, and a few institutions such 
as schools and monasteries. For these 
consumers, potato consumption is 
highly seasonal. They eat primarily 






Except for the kitchen gardeners , 
perhaps, growers rarely buy potatoes 
to eat. 
Non-growers also consume pota-
toes in Bhutan. Individual non-grow-
ers such as resident expatriates, tour-
ists, and shopkeepers tend to con-
sume potatoes year round . Similarly, 
institutional non-growers such as 
Indian army posts, hotels, and res-
taurants also buy potatoes on a con-
tinuous basis. This type of potato 
consumer is much less numerous in 
Bhutan. However, they generaily 
have higher incomes and therefore, 
their effective demand is much greater 
than that of other consumers. 
(iv) Consumer Preferences 
Consumers in Bhutan often express 
preferences for a particular variety, 
color, size, and shape of potato. 
Poats (1982) reports that rural house-
holds generally "liked the taste of 
the old or traditional varieties best." 
Like potato farmers in other parts 
of the developing world, they ap-
parently grow some "old" or "tra-
ditional" varieties for their own con-
sumption, but they plant mostly high 
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yielding "modern" hybrids for sale. 
Furthermore, if given a choice be-
tween red- and white-skinned hybrid 
varieties, most Bhutanese potato con-
sumers prefer red-skinned ones. 
Again, the deciding factor seems to 
be ''better taste.'' 
Bhutanese generally do not like to 
buy big, round potatoes. The reason 
for this, perhaps, is that local potato 
dishes call for a small, oval-shaped 
potato. Smaller potatoes also are 
considered easier to prepare. In ad-
dition, small potatoes are less likely 
to have hollow hearts, as sometimes 
occurs with certain hybrid varieties 
when they are allowed to over-mature 
in the field. Finally, Bhutanese con-
sumers, as do consumers everywhere, 
prefer to eat fresh potatoes in lieu of 
stored. 
(v) Constraints to Increased 
Potato Consumption 
Among the major constraints to 
increased potato consumption in 
Bhutan are: (a) the average consum-
er's unawareness of the potato's 
versatility as a nutritious food, and 
(b) the need for policy makers to 
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consider the potato in food policy 
deliberations (Poats 1982). At the 
consumer level, many Bhutanese are 
unaware of the variety of potato 
dishes that can be made with readily 
available vegetables and spices . Rather, 
they tend to equate potato consump-
tion with consuming "boring" boiled 
potatoes. Moreover, much could be 
done to educate the public concern-
ing the nutritive value of the potato. 
Potatoes need not be considered as 
merely a second-class complement to 
rice. 
At the policy making level, pota-
toes have been overlooked as part of 
a potential solution to the country's 
food self-sufficiency problems for 
various reasons. Since Bhutanese pre-
fer rice as a staple food, most pota-
toes are sold as exports. However, 
growing awareness about actual and 
potential levels of potato consump-
tion may lead to a promotional pro-
gram consistent with the Kingdom's 
development goals. A key set of is-
sues in these deliberations concern 
the marketing of Bhutanese pota-




Prevailing Marketing Patterns for Bhutanese Potatoes 
Introduction 
Most Bhutanese potatoes are ex-
ported to India , rather· than consum-
ed in Bhutan . This, everyone agrees 
upon. Whether these potatoes are used 
in India for seed or for table con-
sumption is another question entirely. 
On that topic no one seems to agree. 
Not surprisingly, prevailing market-
ing patterns for Bhutanese potatoes 
might best be described as highly 
complex and extremely volatile. 
On the one hand, these patterns are 
complicated because Bhutanese farm-
ers market not only table potatoes , 
at home and in India, but al so seed 
(common and high quality) for do-
mestic and foreign use. Moreover, 
some Bhutanese potatoes are .mar-
keted by private traders acting inde-
pendently, others are sold in markets 
regulated by the Food Corporation of 
Bhutan (FCB), and still others are 
sold by the Department of Agricul-
ture (DOA) itself. On the other hand, 
these patterns are highly volatile be-
cause Bhutan's potatoes are marketed 
in competition with potatoes from 
several Indian states, whose output 
varies from year-to-year. 
More fundamentally, while most 
Bhutanese potato exports are sold 
either as table potatoes or as common 
seed, the distinction between these 
two types is often subtle and subject 
to change. Many consumers and 
many peasant producers both prefer 
small potatoes. The former simply 
buy to eat now what the latter buy 
to plant later. Furthermore, the same 
traders frequently sell both types of 
potatoes simultaneously and, depend-
ing on market conditions, charge 
more or less money for either type of 
potato. 
The purpose of this chapter is to 
clarify these various distinctions. The 
chapter initially describes table po-
tato and common seed marketing: 
producers' domestic sales, exports, 
and imports. It then examines the 
improved quality seed potato trade: 
internal marketing of improved seed 
potatoes and exports of high quality 
seed as well. The chapter ends with a 
special section devoted to potato re-
tailing in Bhutan. 
4.1 Marketing Patterns Inside 
Bhutan for Table Potato and 
Common Seed Exports 
According to the oral tradition, 
potatoes have been sent from the 
mountains of Bhutan to the lowlands 
of neighboring India for decades, if 
not centuries. Nevertheless, the vol-
ume of potato trade only reached con-
spicuous proportions in the last 5 to 
10 years. With increasing interest in 
potato exports and a growing number 
of local weekly fairs, potato market-
ing patterns have evolved accordingly. 
In particular, these patterns have 
taken on distinct regional characteris-
tics. 
(i) Western Hills Region 
Most of the marketable surplus of 
potatoes is produced in the Western 
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Hills region (see Table 3.1). Within 
this region , potatoes are shipped pri-
marily from farms in and/or around 
Chapcha, Paro, Thimphu and Wang-
di .Growers around Chapcha have 
been selling potatoes in India for 
decades. They first hauled them down 
by mule and, later , when the road 
opened, by truck. Chapcha potatoes 
have developed a reputation for su-
perior taste among Indian traders. 
Over the years as a result, potatoes 
from this area reportedly receive a 
premium price in India. 
According to Chapcha farmers con-
tacted for this study, area growers 
first produced a white-skinned Indian 
potato. They now grow some red-
skinned potatoes as well because they 
get a better price. Most Chapcha 
potatoes are harvested in August and 
September through a system of labor 
exchange. They then are hauled in 
split bags to the road where they are 
combined into large sacks for trans-
port to Phuntsholing. 
Chapcha farmers prefer to sell their 
potatoes themselves at the border. 
Even if they have relatively few po-
tatoes, individual Chapcha growers 
collectively hire a truck to be able 
to go to Phuntsholing in person. The 
need to buy provisions is the reason 
for this preference. Only a few Chap-
cha potato farmers sell their surpluses 
to other farmers or keep some for 
local retail sale. 
Potato marketing in the Paro valley 
is divided into two crops. The early, 
irrigated crop is marketed in June-
July. The late, dry land crop is sold 
in August-September. Since many 
farmers in Paro are also profit cons-
cious businessmen, they sell some po-
tatoes at both times to spread out 
their risk and to reduce their labor 
requirements at harvest. Paro potato 
growers also divide their production 
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between Swiss Red, Cosima, and 
Maritta varieties. In 1982, Swiss Red 
potatoes produced in Paro received 
a premium price in Phuntsholing. 
These potatoes sold for 117 to 150 
rupees per quintal vs. JOO to 127 
rupees per quintal for the higher 
yielding, white-skinned varieties. 
Although several of Paro's largest 
farmers market a truckload (7 tons) 
or more of potatoes at a time, most 
growers in this region sell from 100 
to 2,500 kilograms per sale in Phunt-
sholing. However, small Paro farmers 
sell their few sacks of surplus pota-
toes locally. Some sell their potatoes 
to trucker /trader / large farmers, who 
steadily assemble loads of potatoes 
for eventual sale in Phuntsholing. 
Others barter their harvest for dry 
goods in the community's retail shops 
or they sell directly to consumers, 
for example, at nearby Indian army 
camps. 
A number of communities produce 
and market potatoes in the vici ni ty 
of Thimphu, the capital city. Grow-
ers interviewed near Jemina sold 
mostly red-skinned potatoes at the 
end of August or during September. 
Growers in these places tend to sell 
their potatoes to local traders for re-
sale in Phuntsholing for various 
reasons: they sell only a few bags of 
potatoes; transportation to market 
is difficult to secure; and local re-
tail trade is saturated by many small 
lots of potatoes. 
The villages of Y oesepang and 
Hongtsho are also near Thimphu. 
Several potato farms in these villages 
are managed in absentia by civil ser-
vants or businessmen living in the 
capital. Given their proxi mity to 
Thimphu and their location adjacent 
the main highway, rain fed potato 
farms in this area are readily acces-
sible by truck. The largest of these 
'> 
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operations markets up to 20 tons of 
white-skinned potatoes a year. The 
farmers (or their employees) from 
these villages sell their potatoes in 
Phuntsholing from August to Octo-
ber. 
Potato farmers in these communi-
ties also sell a small part of their 
harvest in local retail shops or the 
Thimphu Sunday fair. Their stock 
of stored potatoes serves as sort of a 
bank account in these instances. 
Whenever they need to make a pur-
chase, they draw out some of their 
potatoes and sell them. Other farm-
ers acknowledged as well that they 
occasionally gamble a little on potato 
price movements. If they think po-
tato prices will go up, then they hold 
back their small supplies for later sale. 
A small scale/large scale dichotomy 
characterizes field-to-market potato 
movements in the Wangdi-Phubjikha 
area. Some farmers sell or barter 
small lots of potatoes in the Wangdi 
shops or to retailers who visit their 
farms. Large farmers in the Phubjikha 
valley ship their truckloads of po-
tatoes straight to Phuntsholing. The 
FCB depot in P hubjikha purchased 
about 180 tons of potatoes from local 
growers in 1982. But, as in other 
areas, most farmers sold on the open 
market at well above the FCB support 
price. 
(ii) Eastern Hills Region 
In the Eastern Hills region, prin-
cipal commercial potato production 
centers are Bumthang, Yungphula/ 
Kanglung, and Khaling. Bumthang 
potato producers market primarily 
white-skinned hybrids from the end 
Consumer selecting table potatoes in Galeyphug market. Note small size 
of tuber. (Photo by Poats) 
.14f r 
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of August to mid-October. In contrast 
to producer potato marketing in West-
ern Bhutan, most Bumthang growers 
do not travel to the border to sell 
their crop. Several reported being 
unable to write or to perform simple 
calculations. So, they are reluctant 
to trade with Indian border merchants 
directly. However, Bumthang has no 
retail stores as in Paro, Thimphu, or 
Wangdi , nor does the area have a 
Sunday fair. Consequently, all the 
marketed table potatoes are exported 
through local traders. One Bumthang 
trader in particular handled 70 to 80 
truckloads in 1982. This trader oper-
ates out of a tiny dry goods shop in 
Bumthang itself. He and his wife pro-
vide cash advances to about 30 or 
40 growers. The couple also supplies 
farmers with sacks, thread and needle 
for bagging potatoes. 
Ura is about 40 kilometers from 
Bumthang, on the road to Mongar . 
Lack of transportation hampers pota-
to marketing in this area. As a result, 
most Ura growers sell either to con-
tractors from Bumthang who have 
their own trucks or to the town 's FCB 
depot. Local retail potato trade is 
virtually non-existent. Most growers 
around Bumthang and Ura cultivate 
Swiss Red, Maritta and Cosima varie-
ties. Potato marketing takes place 
from late August to mid-November. 
Still, outsider's interest in Ura's crop 
usually picks up in late September 
and October, once all the potatoes 
around Bumthang have been sold. 
Producer potato marketing in the 
Yungphula/Kanglung region is un-
usual in at least two respects. First, 
growers there harvest their potatoes 
in July-August, but (in 1982) sell 
about half in October-November. 
Second, they separate their potatoes 
by size. The larger potatoes sell as 
ware in July-August. The smaller 
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ones as seed in late October-Novem-
ber. Farmers delay their potato sales 
because of several, different factors. 
Prices may be down in July-August. 
Rainy weather may discourage buyers 
from purchasing wet potatoes at har-
vest time. In any event, Yungphula/ 
Kanglung farmers generally market 
white varieties themselves in S./Jongk-
har . These growers sell their potatoes 
for cash and use the proceeds to pur-
chase provisions. The typical sale is 
I to 3 tons. 
Along with Chapcha in the West-
ern Hills region, Khaling is one of 
the more established potato produc-
ing areas in Bhutan (Roddar 1982). 
Unlike in Chapcha, however, Khaling 
growers sell some potatoes through 
local traders/ farmers and take some 
down to the border with India on 
their own. Three or four traders have 
their own potato farms as well as 
shops in Khaling itself. Khaling mer-
chants buy potatoes at harvest in 
June-July and sell the larger ones im-
mediately as ware. They then keep 
and germinate the smaller potatoes 
for sale in October-November as seed. 
These traders handle from 2 to 6 tons 
of potatoes a year. They sell every-
thing at the border. 
Khaling farmers sell to these local 
traders for a variety of reasons . Some 
have neither the spare time to go 
down to S./Jongkhar themselves nor 
someone that they can send. Others 
feel that it is simply uneconomical to 
take their potatoes to S./ Jongk har. 
Given the small quantities, travel 
costs easily exceed any difference in 
potato prices between Khaling and the 
border. 
(iii) Southern Foothills Region 
Table (and seed) potatoes sent 
down from the Bhutanese highlands 
go as far as the border to be sold. 
Bhutanese generally are reluctant to 
sell their potatoes in India for several 
reasons: many cannot speak the lan-
guage; most are unfamiliar with In-
dian markets; and, they express con-
cern about being robbed. Under these 
circumstances, the most important 
border potato market in Bhutan is 
Phuntsholing. Potatoes from all over 
the Wes tern Hills as well as some 
from Bumthang in the Eastern Hills 
are exported through this city. Some 
table potatoes are imported through 
Phuntsholing as well. 
Eight Phuntsholing licensed trad-
ers-one Bhutanese and seven In-
dian-export potatoes to India from 
about mid-June to mid-November. 
During August 1982, Phuntsholing 
exported about 200 tons of potatoes 
per week. Most of these merchants 
have been in potato marketing for 
several years, but all seem to look on 
it as a part-time business. Several 
operate dry goods shops. Others buy 
and sell various products, not just 
potatoes. 
Phuntsholing traders buy Bhutan-
ese potatoes in the FCB-organized 
auction yard. Up until August 1982, 
these merchants brought directly from 
individual growers or rural assem-
bler/traders. Now, all potatoes, except 
high quality seed, leaving Bhutan via 
Phuntsholing must be purchased in 
the FBC auction. This practice is 
enforced by a system of export per-
mits for trucks carrying produce 
across the border. 
The FCB auction convenes every 
day of the week except Tuesday at 
the FCB godown. Potatoes that ar-
rive one day are auctioned the next 
morning in separate lots. Only the 
eight licensed traders are allowed to 
buy potatoes. However, these mer-
chants must attend every auction. 
Before bidding begins on each lot, 
several bags are opened to enable 
traders present to personally inspect 
the quality of the potatoes. Bidding 
then starts at the current FCB support 
price (see Chapter Five) and goes up. 
Each trader simply calls out the price 
that he is willing to pay. 
Phuntsholing traders bid 20% to 
30% more for red-skinned potatoes 
in 1982. They generally make higher 
bids for small, oval, white-skinned 
potatoes than for large, round pota-
toes of the same color. Phuntsholing 
potato merchants bid less for mixed 
lots of different color, different size, 
different quality potatoes. They find 
that poorly graded Bhutanese pota-
toes are harder to sell in the highly 
competitive Indian market. The trad-
ers claim that these characteristics 
merely reflect the preferences of 
Indian consumers in northern West 
Bengal. 
Auction rules allow the seller to 
accept or reject the closing price bid 
for his potatoes. If the seller accepts 
the closing price bid, then the sale is 
finished. FCB personnel weigh the 
potatoes in the afternoon. The trader 
then pours them into his own bags 
and hauls them to his godown. FCB 
personnel usually collect payment for 
the potatoes within 48 hours. The 
farmer can then receive his money. 
(Potatoes purchased by the FCB at 
the Phubjikha depot are also sold in 
the Phuntsholing auction yard). If a 
seller rejects the closing price bid, 
then his potatoes are stored overnight 
and re-auctioned the following morn-
ing. This last year, all the weighing, 
accounting, and storing was provided 
free as an incentive to sellers to use 
the auction. 
Potato traders in Phuntsholing gen-
erally ship Bhutanese table potatoes 
to commission agents in Alipur-Duars, 
Coochbehar, Jalpaiguri, Siliguri 
and much less frequently Calcutta. 
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These shipments normally involve 
only fresh table potatoes, sold on 
short-term credit. Although some 
traders occasionally separate tiny po-
tatoes for sale as seed, they maintain 
that these represent a minor percent 
of their total sales volume. Similarly, 
while every Phuntsholing potato trad-
er either owns or rents a godown, 
none has any refrigerated storage 
space. They argue unanimously that 
storing Bhutanese potatoes makes no 
sense. For short time periods of 1 or 
2 weeks, it is unnecessary. They can 
simply keep the potatoes in their 
godown . For longer periods of several 
months, it is uneconomical. Potato 
prices start to fall in November as the 
new Indian crop comes on the market. 
Beginning in late December, Pl;lunt-
sholing potato traders sell imported 
table potatoes to retailers from Paro 
and Thimphu. These are fresh, cheap 
white-skinned potatoes from India. 
They usually sell on a cash basis to 
retailer/traders from Paro and Thim-
pu. Some of these same retailer/ 
traders supply Phuntsholing mer-
chants with potatoes during the Bhu-
tanese harvest. Most Phuntsholing 
traders reported selling about 5 or 6 
of the 70 kilogram bags of Indian 
potatoes per week in the off-season. 
Some Bhutanese table potatoes also 
are exported through Galeyphug. 
While plans are to open an auction 
yard there, most potatoes sold in 
Galeyphug in 1982 went through three 
or four resident Indian traders. These 
merchants operate dry goods shops 
on or near the main square. They 
trade potatoes on a part-time basis 
using rented facilities for that purpose. 
Galeyphug traders purchase Bhu-
tanese potatoes from growers, rural 
assemblers and the local FCB depot. 
The FCB Galeyphug received about 
150 tons of potatoes from the high-
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lands, primarily Ura, during 1982. 
Galeyphug traders generally pay cash 
and only rarely barter for potatoes. 
They prefer to purchase small to med-
ium sized, cylindrical shaped, white-
skinned potatoes. They pay less for 
large, round potatoes or for potatoes 
covered with dark, grayish soil. They 
buy Bhutanese potatoes mostly during 
September and October. Local FCB 
officials estimate that these traders 
exported about 1,500 tons of potatoes 
in 1982. 
Galeyphug traders sell primarily 
to potato merchants in Bongaigoan. 
They also sell to the dozen or so local 
vegetable retailers. These sales are 
frequently on credit. Galeyphug mer-
chants do not re-grade or re-package 
Bhutanese potatoes, but sell them in 
the form that they are received. Most 
sales take place in Galeyphug itself. 
On occasion, Galeyphug traders trans-
port potatoes to Bongaigoan or even 
to Alipur-Duars and Siliguri. How-
ever, they are reluctant to do this. 
Aside from the added expense and in-
convenience, one trader claims that 
he was cheated on previous trips. In 
any event, Galeyphug traders take 
turns visiting Bongaigoan every day 
to monitor regional potato price 
movements. 
From December to July, Galey-
phug traders import Indian table 
potatoes. They sell 90% of the esti-
mated 5 tons of imported potatoes 
that they market per month in Galey-
phug itself. Few Indian table potatoes 
are shipped up to Shemgang, Tongsa, 
or Bumthang. 
Potatoes produced in Mongar, 
Pemagatsel, Khaling and Yungphula/ 
Kang! ung are sold in S ./ Jongkhar. 
While the FCB has a depot in this 
border town, it handled less than a 
ton of potatoes in 1982. S./ J ongkhar 
has no auction yard. Instead, Bhutan-
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ese potato exports go through about 
six local Indian traders. Some of these 
merchants have shops and/ or go-
downs in S./ Jongkhar. Others have 
godowns across the river in the In-
dian village of Mela bazaar . One or 
two S./ Jongkhar traders have some 
type of facility in both places. Still, 
all buy Bhutanese potatoes in S./ 
Jongkhar for later sale to India. One 
trader reportedly exported about 500 
tons of potatoes in 1982. 
Traders in S./ Jongkhar (and Mela-
bazaar) buy Bhutanese potatoes from 
producers and rural assembler/ trad-
ers who truck their crop down to the 
border themselves. Bargaining then 
frequently takes place at the S./ Jongk-
har truck stop or at a nearby trader's 
godown. Negotiations usually revolve 
entirely around the selling price. Once 
an agreement has been reached, the 
potatoes are unloaded at the seller's 
expense and weighed using the buy-
er's scale. The standard procedure 
is to pay cash and for the seller to re-
ceive his bags back. Traders provide 
no advances either in money or in 
kind. 
S./ Jongkhar traders pay the same 
price for a redc or a white-skinned 
table potato. But they do offer more 
money for a small, cylindrical pota-
to than for a large, round one. These 
traders acknowledge that they nor-
mally re-grade Bhutanese potatoes. 
They claim that this re-garding is 
necessary to compete with well-grad-
ed Indian potatoes . Larger potatoes 
sell as ware, smailer ones as seed. Ac-
cording to S./ Jongkhar merchants, 
demand for table potatoes is strongest 
in August-September. At that time, 
prices are higher for medium sized 
potatoes and lower for smaller, seed-
size tubers. The market for seed 
potatoes peaks in October to early 
November. During these later months, 
prices for seed are generally higher 
than for table potatoes. At least one 
trader in S./ Jongkhar keeps small 
potatoes in his godown for I or 2 
months before selling them as seed. 
S./ Jongkhar traders sell most of 
their ootatoes for cash , a few bags 
at a time. Their principal buyers are 
itinerant Indian merchants who fre-
quent weekly markets in Assam. 
S./ Jongkhar traders also supply some 
potatoes to vegetable vendors in S./ 
Jongkhar itself. One particular trader 
provides 4 or 5 tons of common seed 
to the local DOA extension officer. 
Potato traders in S./ Jongkhar im-
port few Indian potatoes in the off-
season from January to May. Based 
partly on conversations with retailers 
in Tashigang and Khaling, S./ Jongk-
har traders handle only I or 2 tons 
of imported potatoes per month. 
4.2 Marketing Patterns for 
Bhutanese Table Potato and 
Common Seed Exports 
in India 
Most Bhutanese potato exports to 
India are marketed in nearby north-
ern West Bengal and Assam. No 
definitive official statistics exist to 
support this observation. It is based on 
informal interviews with potato traders 
in Bhutanese border towns, in Delhi, 
and in Calcutta. It also makes good 
economic sense. On the one hand, 
potatoes are a semi-perishable com-
modity relatively expensive to trans-
port. Shrinkage losses in transit and 
a high ratio of freight charges to final 
selling price mean potatoes can be 
sold most profitably near production 
centers. On the other hand, some 
potatoes from as far away as Uttar 
Pradesh are marketed in north&n 
West Bengal. In this instance, how-
ever, considerably lower unit produc-
tion costs apparently make Uttar 
Pradesh potatoes, delivered in West 
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Bengal markets, as cheap as those 
produced nearby. Available data sug-
gest that Bhutan's potatoes have a 
competitive edge in adjacent Indian 
states in spite of high or higher pro-
duction and transportation costs. The 
reasons why Bhutanese potatoes can 
compete in these markets are: (a) they 
have a distinctive taste which Indian 
consumers in this region like, and, (b) 
they are sold principally from mid-
August to mid-October when there 
are few local fresh potatoes avail-
able. Given the importance of the 
quantity and timing of Indian pota-
to production for Bhutanese potato 
marketing, the report turns briefly 
to this topic. 
(i) Indian Potato Production and 
Bhutanese Potato Marketing 
The quantity and timing of In-
dian potato production has a major, 
if not decisive, influence on Bhutan-
ese potato marketing. This influence 
is transmitted through national, re-
gional, and local Indian potato de-
velopments. At the national level, 
India is now recognized as among the 
10 largest potato producing countries 
in the world (CIP 1982). During the 
period 1963/64 to 1978/79, national 
potato production increased spectacu-
larly from 259,000 tons to more 
than 10 million (Srivastara 1980). 
Estimated average yields per hectare 
in India in 1980 were 12 tons (vs. 6.2 
tons in 1981 for Bhutan). 
While at least some potatoes are 
cultivated in India year 'round, nearly 
900Jo of total production is grown 
during the winter months. Most po-
tatoes, then, are harvested from No-
vember to March. Given the seasonal 
glut and associated collapse in farm 
gate prices, it becomes temporarily 
economical to dispatch potatoes from 
the major production zones to centers 
of strong demand, even over con-
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siderable distances. As a result, some 
potatoes, for example, harvested in 
Uttar Pradesh in January are sent 
across northern India for sale in or 
near Bhutan. Potatoes not sold at 
harvest time go into cold stores. 
India had an estimated cold storage 
capacity of 3.3 million tons in 1979, 
or roughly one third of total produc-
tion (Srivastara 1980). 
From the regional perspective with-
in India, three states cultivate more 
than 700Jo of all the hectares plant-
ed in potatoes: Bihar, Uttar Pradesh 
and West Bengal (see Table 4.1). West 
Bengal, in particular, had one of the 
fastest increases in area planted in 
potatoes of any state in India from 
1963 to 1979. Estimated annual aver-
age growth rates in West Bengal's 
potato production and productivity 
from 1960/ 61 to 1978/79 were equally 
impressive, (see Table 4.2). Factors 
cited as having contributed to these 
Potato retailing in Sarbhang. 
(Photo by Poats). 
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Table 4.1 India: Area under potatoes by states 1963/ 64 to 1978/ 79. 
1963-64 1968-69 1973-74 1978-79 
State 000 ha. % 000 ha. % 000 ha. % 000 ha. 
Andhra Pradesh . ...... . .......... 1.1 0.26 0.6 0.11 0.5 0.09 0.3 
Assam ..... ... .... .. . .. . . . .. .. . .. 36.2 8.72 39.8t 7.59 28.8 5.30 34.8 
Bihar .•.............. ... . ... .. ... 82.2 19.80 109.3 20.84 106.2 19.54 141.6 
Gujarat. .. .. . . ........... . ....... 2.3 0.55 3.8 0.72 3.6 0.66 10.5 
Haryana .. .. .. ...... ...•. ... • .... * - 4.3 0.82 8.1 1.49 14.8 
Himachal Pradesh. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12.6:j: 3.04 16.0 3.05 14.7 2.70 13.6§ 
Jannu & Kashmir ... . .. . . . ... . .. . . . 0.7 0.17 1.4 0.27 1. 7 0.31 ~. (i 
Karnataka . . ..... . ............... 7.7 1.86 8.5 1.63 11.5 2.12 9.8 
Madhya Pradesh . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13.3 3.20 18.4 3.51 18.6 3.42 21.0 
Maharashtra . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14.9 3.59 12.6 2.40. 13 . ' 2.4 1 10.9 
Manipur ... .. . . ..... .. . . ... . ..... - - 2.3 0.42 2.2§ 
Meghalaya . ... .. . . . .. . ...... . . .. . - 16.9 3.11 18.0 
Nagaland .......... .... . .. .. .... . - - - - 3.5 0 .64 3.0 
Orissa . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 29 .4 7.08 28 .7 5.47 5.J 0.97 8.5 
Punjab . .......... .. ..... . . . . . .. . 16.l :j: 3.88 11.0 2.10 23.J 4.25 36.4§ 
Rajasthan ..... . ...... . . . . .. .. . . . . 1.7 0.41 1.9 0.36 2.4 0.44 2.9 
Tamil Nadu ....... .... .... .. ... . 6.4 1.54 12.6 2.40 12.3 2.26 13.6 
Tripura .. . . .... • . . .. . ....... . ... . 2.4 0.58 2.8 0.53 2.8 0 .51 2.3 
Uttar Pradesh ........ . . .. ........ 122.2 29.45 173.8 33 .14 187.0 34.41 281.3 
West Bengal . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 65.6 15.81 78.6 15.00 80.5 14.81 161.5 
Delhi .. . . .. ....... ... . ........ . . . 0.2 0.05 0.3 0.06 0.3 0.05 0.2§ 
Mizoram . . ... .. . . . . ... .. ...... . . . - - 0.2 0.04 0.5§ 
India ....... . . . . .. ......... . .. . .. 415.0 100.00 524.4 100.00 543 .4 100.00 790.3 
Source: Directorate of Economics and Statistics, Ministry of Agriculture and Irriga tion, Government of India, as cited in Srivastava, 1980. 
* Included in Punjab. 
t Dates relales to Assam (a l presenO and Megha la ~·a and Mizoram. 
W t Related lo se t up before November 1966. 

























Table 4.2 West Bengal: Area, produc!ion, and average yields for potatoes 
for selected years, plus respective compound ~rowth rates. 
Years 
1960-61 .. . ........... . . . . ..... . ........ . 
1970-71 .. . ... . .... . .... ... ........ . .. .. . 
1978-79 . . .... . ........ . .... . . . . ... . .... . 
Compound Growth Rates 
1960-61to1978-79 .. . .................... . 
1970-71to1978-79 .... . .. .. .... . .. ....... . 
Source: Chowdhury and Sen, 1981. 
growth rates include: (a) the expanded 
area in irrigated potato production; 
(b) introduction of shorter duration 
paddy, freeing more land for other 
crops, including potatoes; (c) construc-
tion of additional refrigerated storage 
facilities to absorb seasonal potato 
surpluses; (d) use of improved higher 
yielding seed varieties, and, (e) steady 
increase in potato prices inducing pre-
viously marginal areas to cultivate 
this crop (Chowdhury and Sen 1981). 
The last two factors confirm that 
WestBengal producers and consum-
ers have a growing interest in both 
seed and table potatoes . Given the 
strong increase in demand, more iso-
lated production zones, such as Bhu-
tan, can profitably produce and mar-
ket potatoes for this region. 
Timing is also a factor in the re-
gional context. The peak potato har-
vesting period in West Bengal is Janu-
ary and February. Fresh potatoes 
are marketed from late November to 
the end of March. Stored potatoes 
are sold from April to the lean period 
of September-October. The evolution 
of wholesale potato prices in Calcutta 
reflects this well-established pattern 
of potato supply, (see Table 4.3). 
From 1960 to 1980, potato prices gen-
erally were lowest in January and 
February at the peak of harvest, and 
highest in September and October 
40 
Area Production Yield 
(000 ha.) (000 tons) (kg.Iha .) 
58 .6 579.1 9882 
65.1 929.7 14281 
159.6 2433.5 15247 
4.1 6.8 2.6 
11.1 12.8 1.9 
right before the new crop comes in. 
Moreover, a recent study observed 
that the seasonal spread between post-
harvest and lean period prices in West 
Bengal actually has increased over 
the last 20 years, (Chowdhury and 
Sen 1981). Consequently, Bhutanese 
potatoes fi nd a ready outlet in West 
Bengal precisely because they reach 
the market at a time of temporary 
scarcity. 
At the local level, the quantity and 
timing of potato production in Cooch-
behar, Darjeeling, and Jalpaiguri also 
influence Bhutanese potato marketing. 
For example, over the last 2 decades, 
Darjeeling is the only district in West 
Bengal to show a decline in potato 
production (see Table 4.4). Seed po-
tatoes once produced and shipped by 
Darjeeling growers now are supplied 
by farmers in other areas, e.g. Him-
achal Pradesh . Interest in Bhutanese 
seed potatoes probably stems in part 
from the shortage of Darjeeling-pro-
duced seed. Moreover, potato pro-
duction in these northern districts 
is split between the early crop, plant-
ed August-October, and the late 
crop, planted November-January. 
Bhutanese potatoes thus are harvest-
ed when the demand for seed is high-
est and the supply of locally-produced 
fresh potatoes is exhausted . Lastly, 
a relative shortage of cold store facili-
,. 
Table 4.3 Calcutta: Average monthly wholesale prices for potato, 1960-1980. (Rs. per quintal). 
Year Jan. Feb. March April May June July Aug. Spt. Oct. Nov. Dec. Avg. 
1960 .... 26.00 23.33 25.33 26.67 34.67 36.00 44.00 37.33 44.00 48.00 37.33 28.00 34.37 
1961. ... 20.10 16.08 21.44 30.00 37.00 48.50 52.40 61.70 50.30 80.40 74.40 64.50 46.40 
1962 .... 31.60 22.80 28.20 37.80 40.20 45.60 53.60 50.90 56.40 58.90 45.60 29.50 41.76 
1963 .... 22.80 20.10 27.20 28.00 28.20 32.20 34.90 43.00 36.30 41.60 43.00 51.18 33.68 
1964 ... . 23.00 29.00 40.50 52.60 58.90 60.00 65.00 75.20 88.60 91.30 94.00 42.50 65.76 
1965 .... 34.40 47.50 52.50 47.50 51.20 72.50 75.00 70.00 68.75 66.25 46.25 48.75 56.72 
1966 . ... 33.75 35.00 37.50 42.50 43.75 56.25 60.00 60.50 62.50 83.75 85.00 55.00 54.58 
1967 ... . 43.75 57.50 67.50 80.00 85.00 92.50 93.75 100.00 107.50 112.50 112.50 90.00 86.88 
1968 .... 50.00 62.50 68.75 72.50 82.50 87.50 85.00 85.00 85.00 72.50 66.25 45 .00 71.88 
1969 .... 32.50 36.25 38.75 50.00 58.75 59.00 60.00 62.50 70.00 75.00 87.50 77.50 58.98 
1970 .... 40.00 55.00 67.50 77.50 102.50 97 .50 97.50 97.50 110.00 122.50 105.00 110.00 90.21 
1971 .. .. 52.50 57.50 60.00 53.75 60.00 80.00 72.50 80.00 80.00 82.50 75.00 82.50 69.69 
1972 ... . 50.00 52.50 47.50 55.00 82.50 83.75 85.00 87.50 87.50 90.00 85.00 45.10 70.94 
1973 .. . . 47.50 60.00 75.10 82.50 97.50 97.50 102.50 95.00 98.25 122.50 105.00 92.50 89.64 
1974 . ... 70.00 77.50 92.50 92.50 112.50 115.00 117.50 115.00 117.50 122.50 95.00 85.00 101.04 
1975 . . . . 55.00 60.00 55.00 61.25 90.00 92.50 87.50 88.75 92.50 110.00 117.50 72.50 81.88 
1976 . . .. 50.00 55.00 75.00 85.00 102.50 105.00 107.50 107.50 125.00 120.00 120.00 70.00 87.77 
1977 ... . 62.50 70.00 77.50 105.00 120.00 120.00 120.00 112.50 120.00 130.00 180.00 152.50 114.17 
1978 ... . 72.50 85.00 77.50 85.00 85.00 112.50 112.50 117.50 125.00 130.00 95.00 70.00 97.29 
1979 .... 52.50 50.00 45.00 50.00 90.00 95.00 92.50 90.00 85.00 87.50 90.00 119.00 78.88 
1980 . ... 65.00 58.00 80.00 110.00 130.00 145.00 
Source: C howdhury and Sen. 1981. 
... ... 
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Table 4.4 West Bengal: Potato production in different districts, 1960/ 61to1978/ 79, (000 tons). 
Midna- 24 ParJ?a- Murshi West Di- Jalpai- Darjee- Cooch-
Year Burd wan Birbhum Bankura pore Howrah HOOJ!hly nas Nadia dabad najpur Maida J!U ri linJ! behar Purulia 
----------~··------· ·-- --·----·------· 
1960-61 .... 144.4 51.1 15.7 43.2 9.7 217.8 13.8 1.7 25.1 16.8 5.6 10.2 16.8 7.3 0.4 
1961-62 . .. . 137.8 77.7 16.4 66.0 9.5 324.4 13.0 1.2 18.7 20.3 6.2 13.6 16.8 9.8 0.2 
1962-63 .... 198.1 31.5 13.3 74.3 16.9 354.4 16.2 2.2 25.8 17.5 4.8 16.7 15.8 10.6 0.4 
1963-64 .... 127.0 38.0 14.1 84.4 12.0 180.6 13.5 1.7 17.9 13.7 2.8 7.2 18.9 3.7 0.4 
1964-65 . ... 195.5 51.2 18.8 88.0 23.5 293.1 21.6 4.7 37.9 15.5 6.1 12.3 20.6 5.2 2.5 
1965-66 .... 192.2 59.0 24.0 107.9 22.3 311.6 38.1 6.3 39.6 16.9 3.8 9.5 18.1 8.9 1.5 
1966-67 ... . 146.5 44.6 21.9 90.7 16.8 202.6 25.2 4.5 36.0 15.9 4.4 7.7 16.0 7.3 1.9 
1967-68 .... 153. 7 47.7 23.2 95.0 20.0 88.0 30.4 3.5 34.6 14.3 4.3 5.7 14.4 5.3 2.5 
1968-69 .... 181.9 62.2 36.4 114.9 19.0 297.3 36.6 4.5 48.7 22.7 5.0 5.5 11.4 8.3 5.3 
1969-70 .... 114.5 38.6 38.8 90.8 28.3 193.7 27.1 3.1 27.1 15.3 2.6 5.3 11.6 6.1 4.7 
1970-71 .... 256.1 55.8 43.9 134.0 29.1 282.6 32.4 3.3 38.2 17.3 4.1 7.0 11.7 9.3 4.9 
1971-72 ... . 206.5 87.6 60.0 139.0 35.7 408.2 34.6 4.6 43.9 10.0 2.3 4.0 10.9 4.4 8.1 
1972-73 .. .. 220.6 48.9 39.8 124.7 30.2 324.6 46.2 10.0 49.1 22.0 3.9 4.9 10.6 7.8 5.5 
1973-74 .... 194.0 47.7 39.7 119.3 30.8 383.2 32.6 9.2 52.2 24.0 3.4 4.3 15.8 5.6 3.5 
1974-75 .... 408.8 72.8 53.4 111.3 19.8 485.6 32.6 19.4 90.5 20.2 5.1 8.5 14. 1 7.6 5.2 
1975-76 .... 421.4 77.0 67.8 217.6 51.7 448.4 62.4 41.4 86.5 46.4 11.2 22.5 21.9 24.9 14.4 
1976-77 .... 424.0 87.9 63.5 231.9 59.4 440.9 71.9 45 .0 94.9 42.8 19.4 20.0 12.1 26.7 9.6 
1977-78 ... . 447.0 90.9 90.4 256.7 66.7 567.0 70.8 53.0 82.7 60.4 24.0 28.2 14.6 34.4 14.1 
1978-79 . . .. 574.5 90.1 137.8 304.8 91.3 732.6 95.6 70.1 108.0 86.8 20.2 39.3 14.5 50.8 17.1 
Source: Chowdhur~· and Sen, 1981. 
'II 
Table 4.5 West Bengal: Distribution of total potato production, cold stores 
and their capacity by district, 1980. 
Potato 
Production 





Capacity as OJo 
of total prod. 
in each dist. District No. total Tons total 
Calcutta ........ . . 
24-Parganas .... . . . 
Howrah ....... .. . 
Hooghly ......... . 
Burdwan . . ....... . 
Birdhum ..... .. .. . 
Bankura . . ... ... . . 
Midnapore . .... . . . 
Nadia . . ......... . 
Murshidabad .. . .. . 
Jalpaiguri . . ...... . 
Coochbehar ...... . 
W. Dinajpur ...... . 














Darjeeling. . . . . . . . . 0.6 















S.2 2S, 180 
3.3 26,747 
10.4 13S,708 





















Total 100 210 100.0 970,834 100.0 39.9 
Source: Chowdhury and Sen , 1981. 
*Percenl of total polato produclion in We!->I Bengal produced by each district. 
ties in these districts (see Table 4.5), 
means district markets are dependent 
on potatoes shipped in from other 
areas, such as Uttar Pradesh, south-
ern West Bengal, Bhutan. The next 
section examines the flow of Bhutan-
ese table potatoes and common seed 
into these districts. 
(ii) Marketing Patterns for 
Northern West Bengal 
Principal outlets for Bhutanese po-
tatoes in northern West Bengal are 
AliJ?ur-Duars, Coochbehar, Jalpaiguri 
and Siliguri. Merchants in the three 
former cities sell potatoes to both 
local urban residents and adjacent 
farm families. In contrast, Siliguri 
serves primarily as a trading center 
for potatoes and a variety of other 
products produced in India, Nepal, 
Sikkim and Bhutan. 
Being the nearest major urban area 
to Phuntsholing, Alipur-Duars is 
probably the most important single 
outlet for Bhutanese potato exports. 
Three or four veteran traders sell 
potatoes there. They each have a 
small shed located on Station Road 
in the center of the city, adjacent to 
the main retail market. Unlike most 
potato traders in Bhutan, these mer-
chants deal almost exclusively in 
potatoes (both seed and ware) and 
onions and specialize in these com-
modities year 'round. Moreover, Ali-
pur-Duars traders are commission 
agents. In other words, they sell po-
tatoes for a fixed percentage (4% to 
5%) or commission, rather than buy-
ing them outright for re-sale at their 
own risk . Several years ago, in fact, 
one or two of these traders sold Bhu-
tanese potatoes on a commission 
basis for the FCB. 
Alipur-Duars traders handle table 
potatoes from all over India, Assam, 
Uttar Pradesh (via Siliguri) as well 
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as fro m Bhutan. Most Bhutanese 
potatoes shipped to Alipur-Duars 
(estimated volume 500 tons) are sold 
as table potatoes in August and Sep-
tember. These potatoes come primari-
ly from Phuntsholing but about 250Jo 
to 300Jo are from Galeyphug (Bum-
thang). Consumers in and around 
Alipur-Duars prefer a cylindrical 
shaped potato . They also will pay a 
premium, of 10 to 15 rupees more 
per quintal for potatoes from Chap-
cha. All other things being equal, 
red-skinned varieties sell for more 
money than white-skinned potatoes. 
These same Alipur-Duars traders 
also market an estimated 50 to 60 
tons of Bhutanese seed. Bhutanese 
seed sales, however, are strongest 
from November to January for the 
second local crop. The reason for 
the smaller volume, delayed sale of 
Bhutanese seed is that time is neces-
sary between harvest and planting 
to break dormancy. Hence, when 
most seed is needed for the early first 
crop, Bhutan's potatoes are not germi-
nated. Seed for this crop comes from 
cold stores in other states in India 
or from the Burdwan district of West 
Bengal (see section Marketing Bhutan-
ese Improved Potato Seed below). 
Coochbehar handles about the 
same total volume (400 to 600 tons 
nearby Alipur-Duars. Two or three 
commission agents dominate potato 
trade there. One of these traders 
sold potatoes for a commission on 
behalf of the FCB in past seasons. 
This trader has a small, simple stall 
among the maze of passageways and 
shops that constitute Coochbehar's 
central bazaar. At the time of this 
study, he had 14 to 16 quintals in 
stock. He handles only Bhutanese 
table potatoes because he has insuf-
ficient stall space to market both table 
potatoes and seed . (A farm supply 
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dealer in Coochbehar markets high 
quality Bhutanese seed (see section 
Marketing Bhutanese Improved Po-
tato Seed). This merchant brings 
about 150 tons of potatoes from Bhu-
tan a year, during September and Oc-
tober. At other times of the year, he 
markets potatoes from Calcutta (Jan-
uary onward), Siliguri (year 'round), 
and Shillong via Gawahti (June to 
August). 
Coochbehar consumers prefer red 
potatoes over white-skinned varie-
ties. However, the difference in price 
is rather small, about 5 rupees per 
quintal or 185 vs. 180. Still, they will 
pay 10 to 15 rupees more for Bhutan-
ese red-skinned potatoes vs. Indian 
red-skinned varieties. Retailers also 
like potatoes that have been well 
graded. The commission on whole-
sale potato sales in Coochbehar re-
portedly is 3 OJo to 40Jo. 
Three or four traders market po-
tatoes as commission agents in Jal-
paiguri. They operate out of a cluster 
of bamboo huts set off by themselves 
a few yards from the river in Din 
Bazaar in the heart of the city. These 
merchants procure most of their 
potatoes on credit in adjacent (40 
kilometers) Siliguri. Local retailers 
also buy direct from Siliguri from 
time to time. As such, Jalpaiguri 
is more a satellite market of Siliguri 
than an independent trading center as 
Alipur-Duars or Coochbehar. Still, 
Jalpaiguri traders also purchase po-
tatoes on credit direct from Phunt-
sholing from time to time. 
Jalpaiguri traders report that Bhu-
tan has "best quality, more tasty" 
table potatoes. However, Bhutanese 
potatoes tend to be up to 20 to 25 
rupees more per quintal in Jalpai-
guri. Therefore, they have difficulty 
competing with cheaper Indian po-
tatoes. Jalpaiguri traders do not mar-
ket Bhutanese seed. Rather, they sell 
Bhutanese table potatoes to local re-
tailers and to small scale merchants 
in outlying villages. Their gross mar-
k~ting revenue is about 10 to 15 rupees 
out of a wholesale table potato price 
of 160 to 180 rupees per quintal. 
Siliguri is the potato marketing 
crossroads from northern West 
Bengal. Potatoes from all over India, 
Nepal, Sikkim, and Bhutan pass 
through this trading center.An esti-
mated 20,000 tons of table potatoes 
were shipped there in 1981 (Rao, et 
al 1982) and another :Several thousand 
tons of seed (see section Marketing 
Bhutanese Improved Potato Seed be-
low). In short, potatoes are big busi-
ness in Siliguri . 
Fourteen potato traders work as 
commission agents in Siliguri. As do 
their counterparts in other markets 
in India, they buy and sell onions 
as well. Most operate out of their own 
godown. This facility may consist 
of either rooms in a regular building 
converted into simple storage space 
or a larger building that serves as a 
warehouse for keeping potatoes tem-
porarily between shipments. These 
traders also rent space in the city 's 
two cold stores. The estimated stor-
age capacity for potatoes is 2,000 
tons. 
Siliguri traders have perhaps the 
clearest understanding of potato 
flows into the region. They indicate 
that Bhutan's table potatoes compete 
primarily with cold store potatoes 
from Bihar and Uttar Pradesh as well 
as with fresh potatoes from Shillong 
(see Tabie 4.6). Siliguri traders also 
observed that potato supplies in 1982 
were down relative to 1981 and prices 
were up. 
Weighing potatoes for retail sale in Thimphu Sunday market. 
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Table 4.6 Siliguri: Timing of table potato shipments. 
Shipping Point / Type of Potato Fresh Cold Store 
Bihar ... ..... ..... .... .... ... ..... ... December to April June to December 
June to November* 
June to December* 
Nothing 
Burdwan/ Calcutta .............. .. .. ... January to May 
Delhi ..... ..... ... ........ . .......... November to December 
Nepal .. . ....... .. ................. ... Not hing 
Meghalaya (Shillong) ... ............ .... June to November Nothi ng 
Sikkim ..... . ... ... ..... .. ............ May to October Nothing 
Uttar Pradesh ... . ..................... December to May June to December 
Source: In terviews with Siliguri Potalo Traders. 
•Relalivel~· Jillle. 
When Siliguri traders want to pur-
chase Bhutanese potatoes, they do not 
attend the Phuntsholing auction. In-
stead, they simply telephone to Phunt-
sholing merchants. In addition, one 
Siliguri trader contacted for this 
study reportedly acts as a commis-
sion agent for a trader in Bum-
thang. He sold about 250 tons for 
him in 1982. Siliguri's potato mer-
chants also have their own associa-
tion and have pressured local officials 
to prevent the FCB from establish-
ing a local sales outlet for pota-
toes. 
Siliguri traders ship table potatoes 
to Assam, Nepal, West Bengal and 
indirectly to Bhutan. When the Bhu-
tanese harvest concludes and Phunt-
sholing traders want to buy Indian 
potatoes, they call to Siliguri. They 
do little grading or re-packaging but 
merely dispatch potatoes in the form 
that they originally are received. Sili-
guri potato merchants corroborate 
the observations of other area traders 
in reporting that consumers in Ali-
pur-Duars and Coochbehar prefer 
red-skinned varieties. In contrast, 
consumers in Assam prefer white-
skinned potatoes. 
(iii) Marketing Patterns for Assam 
Some Bhutanese potatoes shipped 
through Galeyphug and S./Jongkhar 
also are sold in Assam. Fewer Bhutan-
ese potatoes go to Assam than north-
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ern West Bengal, however, because 
(a) smaller marketable surpluses are 
produced in growing areas adjacent 
Assam (see Table 3.1) and, (b) Assam 
is nearer to the hilly areas of eastern 
India that also sell fresh potatoes at 
this time. 
Bongaigoan is the most important 
marketing outlet in Assam for pota-
toes sent through Galeyphug. The 
basic reason for this is that Bongai-
goan is the nearest Indian town to the 
Bhutanese border (see Map I). Po-
tato trade in Bongaigoan is largely in 
the hands of two or three commission 
agents. One of these traders still acts 
as FCB's sales representative, al-
though he handled only 20 to 30 tons 
as such in 1982. This trader now pro-
cures the bulk of his Bhutanese po-
tatoes from private traders in Galey-
phug as well as from a merchant in 
Bumthang. He trades Bhutanese po-
tatoes from late August to late Sep-
tember. During the last three seasons, 
he estimated having marketed the fol-
lowing quantities: 1980-100 tons, 
1981-70 tons, and 1982-50 tons. 
Most, if not all, Bhutanese table 
potatoes shipped to Bongaigoan are 
sold to local retailers. Area consum-
ers prefer the taste of Bhutanese 
potatoes to that of those from Mag-
halaya (Shillong). They also prefer a 
small, cylindrical, white-skinned po-
tato covered with reddish brown dust 
~. 
to a round white-skinned potato cover-
ed with blackish gray dust. They ap-
parently associate the blackish gray 
dust with a bitter taste and poor stor-
ability. The difference in wholesale 
price for these two types of potatoes, 
may be as high as 30 rupees per quin-
tal , or 160 vs. 130. 
Farther east along the Bhutan-As-
sam border, potatoes are sent through 
S./ Jongkhar. They go to daily markets 
and weekly fairs in neighboring towns 
and villages. During field work for 
thi s st udy Bhutanese potatoes were 
seen being sold in Tamul Napur and 
Rangia. Potato traders in Rangia 
procure Bhutanese potatoes in several 
ways.Sometimes they buy them in 
Malabazaar. On other occasions, they 
buy them from itinerant traders who 
visit their shops . Or, they may buy 
Bhutanese potatoes in outlying Sun-
day markets for re-sa le in Rangia 
it self. In any event, Bhutanese table 
potatoes marketed in Rangia face stiff 
competition from potatoes produced 
in Shillong largely because the latter 
are 20 to 30 rupees less per quintal. 
4 .3 Marketing Bhutanese 
Improved Potato Seed 
In addition to table potatoes and 
common seed, Bhutan produces two 
types of improved seed. Di st rict 
agricultural officers, the Agri-Horti-
cultural farm at Kanglung and the 
Swiss technical assistance program at 
Bu:nthang all produce improved seed 
of varying quality mainly for di st ri-
bution to local Bhutanese potato 
farmers. These potatoes are one type 
of improved seed. Furthermore, since 
1980 government farms at Phubjikha 
and Yoeseang have been producing 
high quality seed potatoes, primarily 
for export. These potatoes are the 
second type of improved seed. As in 
the case of table potatoes and com-
mon seed, however, the distinction 
between these two types of improved 
seed is not always clear. For example, 
some lower quality, "high quality" 
potatoes are sold as improved seed 
to local growers instead of to grow-
ers in India. To clarify these distinc-
tions, this report now considers mar-
keting of Bhutanese improved potato 
seed, first inside Bhutan and then in 
northern West Bengal. 
(i) Marketing Bhutanese 
Improved Potato Seed 
Inside Bhutan 
DOA officials report distribu-
ting about 600 tons of improved, 
healthy seed every year (Karmacharya 
1981 ). The DOA authorizes di st rict 
agricultural officers to conduct seed 
multiplication programs for their dis-
tricts. Currently, Bumthang, Lhunt-
shi, Mongor, Paro, and Tashigang 
districts have such programs (Roddar 
1982). Government farms at Pelela, 
Phubjikha, and Yoesepang also pro-
duce improved seed for the domestic 
market. Nevertheless, until quite re-
cently no institution has assumed com-
plete responsibility for managing the 
national distribution of such seed. 
One major task of the newly created 
( 1981) national potato development 
program is to coordinate domestic 
distribution of improved seed. 
Improved potato seed is distributed 
in Paro every yea r through the di s-
trict agricultural officer at the govern-
ment agricultural research station. 
The station itself produces 5 to 10 
tons of improved seed. Shipments 
from Bumthang meet the remain-
ing di stri ct improved seed require-
ments. The Paro experiment sta tion 
also distributes Bumthang seed. Im-
proved seed varieties made available 
include those most popular locally: 
Swiss Red, Cosima, and Maritta . 
Government farms at Yoesepang, 
Phubjikha, and Pelela produce and 
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distribute improved seed to potato 
growers in surrounding villages as 
well as to district agricultural officers 
in different parts of the country. In 
the former case, growers purchase 
directly at one of these farms. In the 
latter case, district agricultural of-
ficers send requests for given quanti-
ties of given varieties to these seed 
production centers based on requests 
from farmers in their respective dis-
tricts. Improved seed is sold to grow-
ers for about the cost of production , 
100 Nu. per quintal in 1981182. The 
DOA also absorbs transportation 
charges in some instances. 
As part of the high quality seed 
export program, government farms in 
1982 grew Kufri-Joyti, a white-skin-
ned Indian hybrid . High quality seed 
is produced at these sites using basic 
seed imported from Simla, the Indian 
national potato research center. To 
meet 1982 export commitments, how-
ever, much high quality seed harvest-
ed at Yoesepang and Phubjikha was 
sold to buyers in India (see below). 
Although plans are to sell the remain-
ing 5 to I 0 tons at Yoesepang and 30 
to 40 tons at Phubjikha inside Bhutan, 
many district agricultural officers cur-
rently have requested improved red-
skinned seed varieties for their grow-
ers. Bhutanese farmers who grow 
table potatoes for export apparently 
believe that the higher prices for red-
skinned potatoes more than com-
pensate for lower yields. This issue 
needs to be studied. 
The Swiss technical assistance pro-
ject at Bumthang also has a potato 
seed production and distribution com-
ponent. For the past 6 or 7 years, im-
proved seed produced in Bumthang 
proper has supplied the district's 
farmers and those in other, more 
distant locations around the coun-
try. Recently, emphasis has shifted 
from the former to the latter. For 
48 
example, some Bumthang seed goes 
to the district agricultural officer at 
Shemgang. In 1982, he requested 5 
tons for the foothill planting in Oc-
tober-November. He will need an-
other 11 tons for distribution in the 
highlands area of his district from 
January to March in 1983. Bumthang 
grows mainly Maritta and Swiss Red. 
Total seed production in Bumthang 
has averaged over 30 tons the last 
several years. 
S./ Jongkhar's district agricultural 
officer purchased some 8 tons of 
seed from Yoesepang in 1981. How-
ever, aside from the high transport 
costs and resulting increased price to 
growers, potato farmers complained 
about poor germination. Since pota-
toes are planted in this district in De-
cember, the Yoesepang seed may not 
have had sufficient time between har-
vest and planting to break dormancy. 
In any event, plans are to procure all 
7 tons of seed potato in 1983 through 
local or area traders . However , this 
arrangement implies that the DOA's 
representative buys table potatoes 
from Bhutanese growers, at least in 
some cases through Indian mer-
chants, to re-sell to Bhutanese grow-
ers as seed. 
The district agricultural officer in 
Tashigang gets improved seed mainly· 
from the Agri-Horticultural Training 
Institute in Kanglung. Last year, 19.5 
tons of Maritta seed was obtained 
from the Institute and 500 kilograms 
from local farmers for re-distribution. 
This year (1983), about 13 tons will 
be purchased from the Institute and, 
perhaps, an additional quantity from 
Yoesepang. 
Two or three years ago, the dis-
trict agricultural officer in Tashigang 
also began multiplying improved seed 
locally. In 1981, 2.5 tons of Kufri-
Joyti from Yoesepang were planted 
on the local government farm . Eight 
tons were harvested and 2.5 to 3.5 
tons given to farmers to try out in 
1982. Plans are to give away about 
4.5 tons of Kufri-Joyti and Maritta 
for planting in 1983. 
(ii) Marketing Bhutanese 
Improved Potato Seed in India 
In 1980 the DOA began producing 
high quality seed for export. Within 
the DOA, several different, though 
not necessarily mutually exclusive, 
reasons are given for this program. 
One reason given is that Bhutanese 
growers can then be sure of high, 
secure prices for their output. The col-
lapse of table potato prices in 1979 
frequently is mentioned in discussing 
this reason . Another reason is the 
need to exploit Bhutan's comparative 
ecological advantage to produce clean 
seed for the Indian plains. In other 
words, the high altitude makes Bhu-
tan a logical place, from the agro-
nomic perspective, to grow potato 
seed to sell to lowland growers. A 
third, less frequently mentioned, rea-
son is the improved seed requirements 
of Bhutanese growers themselves. 
Given their degenerated seed, Bhut-
anese farmers must also have good, 
clean seed to raise productivity. This 
seed can be produced locally by the 
DOA fr9m foundation seed imported 
from India. In actual practice, prior-
ity has been given to the first expla-
nation because establishing markets 
which ultimately will provide incen-
tives for numerous Bhutanese farmers 
to grow and / or use high quality seed 
should be given immediate attention. 
During 1981 and 1982, the high 
quality seed export program produced 
and exported about 250 tons of Kufri-
J oyti. In 1982, production was split 
between (a) the government farms at 
Yoesepang and Phubjikha and (b) 
about 20 registered growers around 
these two facilities. 
The Yoesepang farm itself supplied 
12 tons of high quality seed for ex-
port out of a total production of 17 
tons. The six or seven registered pro-
ducers with farms in the vicinity of 
Yoesepang also grew some high qual-
ity seed. These growers received im-
proved seed from the program and 
then were to comply with a series of 
cultural practices to insure high qual-
ity production. Several of these grow-
ers, however, failed to follow recom-
mendations. Since the price for table 
potatoes was relatively high, they 
simply sold what they produced as 
ware. At least one grower followed 
the recommendations but insisted on 
keeping all the harvest for re-plant-
ing on his own farm next year. 'In the 
initial years of the project, then, the 
agreement between the national po-
tato program and the registered 
growers has been hard to enforce. 
The Phubjikha farm produced 
about 80 tons of Kufri-Joyti in 1982. 
Ten tons were sold as table p,otatoes 
through the local FCB depot. Forty 
tons were sold to the West Bengal 
Agro-Industrial Corporation as high 
quality seed.Remaining potatoes will 
be available to local growers as im-
proved seed. 
After potato seed produced at 
Yoesepang and Phubjikha are dug, 
they go through a rigorous grading 
process. They are graded first in the 
field, again at the adjacent warehouse, 
and a third time prior to packing in 
bags for shipment. Potatoes grown 
by registered farmers not meeting 
requisite quality standards at grading 
time are returned to the owner for 
sale as ware. Some farmers complain 
that these odd-sized or damaged po-
tatoes ar~ then hard to sell. Others 
have tried to pressure DOA person-
nel to accept all their potatoes as is. 
These and other entreaties have met 
with limited success.Yet, one unantici-
pated result was that most high qual-
ity seed produced by government 
farms went to complete the shipping 
requirements of the export contract. 
Nevertheless, these commitments 
were met and the program is pro-
ceeding as scheduled. 
Once potatoes have been graded 
the last time, they are packed into 
80 kilogram bags or 30 kilogram mini-
packets. These bags have a label on 
the front identifying the contents as 
DOA high quality seed. An earlier 
label, declaring the potatoes to be 
"certified seed," was abandoned be-
cause it was considered misleading. 
Among other things, certification 
standards in Bhutan differ from those 
in India where the potatoes are sold . 
Government trucks then transport 
the bags to West Bengal or Phunt-
sholing for collection by buyers. 
Labeled bags have an excellent resale 
demand, for unscrupulous traders 
can fill them with any type of pota-
toes, then offer the bag for sale as 
high quality seed. 
West Agro-Industrial Corporation, 
with headquarters in Calcutta, has 
purchased about 100 tons of high 
quality seed from the Bhutanese DOA 
the last 2 years on an experimental 
basis. This state enterprise specializes 
in the provision of inputs to West 
Bengal farmers, mostly fertilizer .Seed 
sales are an important, but relatively 
minor, component of its overall oper-
ations.Still, the corporation has had 
some difficulty in securing sufficient 
quantities of high quality seed from 
Indian growers, so it has turned to 
other sources of supply including 
Bhutan. The practice has been for 
the corporation and the DOA to ne-
gotiate a selling price in June. Once 
this is agreed upon, the corporation 
signs a contract to accept a given 
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quantity of seed and makes an ad-
vance payment. It then takes delivery 
in October and November at selected 
locations of West Bengal. During the 
last 2 years, the corporation has been 
satisfied with the quality of potatoes 
received and hopes to slowly, but 
steadily, increase purchases of Bhut-
anese seed in the future. 
A private trader in Coochbehar al-
so purchases Bhutanese high quality 
seed. He operates a hardware store/ 
farm supply outlet and only sells seed 
potatoes as a sideline. While this 
trader pays the same price for Bhut-
anese seed as the West Bengal Agro-
lndustrial Corporation, he only 
makes a deposit in June and provides 
final payment at the time of delivery 
in November. He purchased 100 tons 
in 1981 and 50 tons in 1982. He took 
fewer potatoes last year because he 
had to sell some Bhutanese seed on 
credit in 1981 and is still trying to 
collect his money. In addition, this 
Coochbehar merchant sees three 
major factors limiting the potential 
market for Bhutanese seed in north-
ern West Bengal. First, of 4,000 hec-
tare of potatoes planted in Coochbe-
har, about 3,200 hectares are planted 
in September and 800 hectares in De-
cember. Bhutanese seed cannot be 
harvested, shipped, and germinated 
in time for the first planting, so it 
can only be used for the smaller sec-
ond crop. Second, a government 
agency must maintain certain quality 
standards, for example, high quality 
seed potatoes must be a certain size, 
but not too big. Growers in northern 
West Bengal prefer very small seed 
because of better coverage. The prob-
lem is that potato technicians con-
sider such small seed too small to be 
designated high quality. Third, high 
quality seed normally is relatively ex-
pensive. As long as table potatoes 
are also expensive, a relatively high 
price for good seed presents no prob-
lem. However, when table potato 
prices decline, growers prefer to use 
common seed because it can cost as 
little as one-third the price of high 
quality seed . Bhutanese officials cer-
tainly must consider these factors 
in mapping out a marketing strategy 
for high quality seed potatoes in the 
future. 
4.4 Potato Retailing in Bhutan 
Retail sale of potatoes in local fairs 
and shops is often overlooked in 
policy discussions of this crop. This 
section provides a brief panorama of 
potato retailing inside the Kingdom 
to complete its description of mar-
keting patterns for Bhutanese pota-
toes. Note that potato retailing is 
largely confined to the Kingdom's 
towns and administrative centers, 
such as Paro, Thimphu, Tashigang. 
Bhutanese producers rarely buy table 
potatoes to eat. 
Nine of the 32 Paro retail shops 
visited for this study had 20 to 30 
kilograms for sale. From June to 
November Paro shopkeepers buy po-
tatoes from local farmers and/ or they 
sell what they produce themselves. 
Sales during this period average 20 
kilograms/week. From December to 
March, about five shopkeepers buy 
Indian potatoes from merchants in 
Phuntsholing. Average sales during 
this period are 100 kilograms/week. 
Paro shopkeepers sell potatoes 
along with rice, cloth, and other es-
sentials to construction workers and 
civil servants. These sales normally 
are for cash, but most retailers ex-
tend some credit to their reg1.1lar cus-
tomers. Retail prices are generally 
highf!r for red-skinned varieties. In 
October 1982, the differential was 2.U 
Nu. per kilogram for red-skinned po-
tatoes vs. 1.5 Nu. per kilogram for 
white-skinned. 
Some potatoes also are sold in the 
Paro Sunday farmers' market. 
Twenty to 30 vendors were in the 
market on the day of our visit in 
late October. Of this group, four 
farmers were selling potatoes. Each 
had about 20 to 30 kilograms to sell. 
Potato prices were identical to those 
in retail shops. 
About 60 retail shops line either 
side of the main street in the center 
of Thimphu . Of this total, about 24 
were selling potatoes at the time of 
this study. Thimphu shopkeepers pro-
cure potatoes in a combination of 
ways. During the local harvest, some 
potatoes come from their own farms. 
Others are purchased at the shop it-
self from area farmers (payment may 
be in cash or kind) . A few potatoes 
are bought in the Sunday farmers' 
market for resale during the week. 
From July to November, Thimphu 
retailers sell 30 to 40 kilograms per 
week. 
About six Thimphu retailers also 
buy Indian potatoes in Phuntsholing. 
for re-sale in the capital during off-
season . Most of these purchases are 
for cash. However, at least one re-
tailer gets his potatoes on one-month 
credit from a Phuntsholing trader. 
From December to March, Thimphu 
retailers sell anywhere from 30 to 
150 kilograms of potatoes per week. 
Thimphu retailers generally sell po-
tatoes to government employees, for-
eign laborers and expatriate profes-
sionals. Almost all sales are for cash. 
The standard mark-up appears to be 
50 paise per kilogram. For example, 
if the retailer buys at 1 Nu. per kilo-
gram, then he sells at 1.5 Nu. per kilo-
gram. Nevertheless, potato retailing 
appears to be more a service to cus-
tomers by providing a full line of 
items than a highly profitable activity. 
No pronounced differences in price 
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exist for red-skinned vs. white-skin-
ned potatoes in Thimphu. 
Potatoes are also sold re tail in the 
Thimphu Sunday farmers ' market. 
On the day of our visit, 200 farm ers 
came to the market to sell their pro-
duce. Of this group, 24 had po t(:ltoes 
for sa le. These potato farmers come 
from surrounding villages. They nor-
mally bring 50 to 60 kilograms of var-
ious types and sizes of~ potatoes a ll 
mixed together. They simpl y di spl ay 
what they have to sell and consumers 
then choose what they want to buv. 
On the cb.y of our visit, prices va ri ~d 
somewhat from farmer to farmer, but 
all were similar to the l .5 to 2.0 N u. 
per kilogram being charged in local 
s hop~ . 
In Wangdi six small retail sho ps 
sell some potatoes. Some farm ers 
al so se ll potatoes in the Sunday ma r-
ket. Wangdi shopkeepers usuall y 
handle sma ll quantities of potatoes , 
approximately 20 to 30 ki lograms per 
month. However, one retailer claims 
selling some 600 kilograms per month. 
Most potatoes are procured on an ex-
change in kind basis from local grow-
ers. From December to March, at 
leas t one retailer bu ys Indian pota-
toes for cash in Phuntsholing and 
sell s them in his shop . The standard 
mark-up is 50 paise per kilogram . 
Wangdi retailers sell potatoes to 
labo rers, government employees and 
local schools. Area consumers gen-
era ll y prefer a red-skinned potato. 
Th ey a lso prefer a large table potato 
rat her than a small one and are will ing 
to pay 50 to 75 paises more per kilo-
gram to purchase thi s kind of potato. 
Two or three shopkeepers in Tong-
sa and Shemgang al so se ll potatoes 
re ta il. One Tongsa retailer only sells 
potatoes that he brings from Ga ley-
phug. From December to the end of 
February hi s sa les average about 110 
Consumer buying table potatoes at Chirang market. (Photo by Poats) . 
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kilograms per week. Other Tongsa re-
tailers together sell a bout 100 kilo-
grams per month. They only buy po-
tatoes from local farm ers either in 
their shop (for cash or kind) or at the 
Sunday market.Shemgang retailers 
follow similar practices. One only 
sells potatoes that he grows himself, 
about 100 kilograms per season . The 
other buys and re-sells 10 kilograms 
per week during the Bhutanese har-
vest. He gets these potatoes from the 
highlands. Thi s same merchant then 
sells twice that amount from January 
to March. A Galeyphug trader sup-
plies him Indian potatoes at that time. 
Eight to I 0 produce vendors sell 
potatoes retail in Galeypbug. These 
Indian merchants operate out of stalls 
situated at the weekly Sunday market. 
They sell potatoes along with various 
other vegetables and fruits. During 
the Bhutanese harvest, they buy about 
I 00 kilograms per week on credit from 
Galeyphug potato traders. They never 
buy potatoes from Bhutanese farmers. 
From December to July, they go on 
buying trips to India to purchase po-
tatoes. Average sales are roughly a 
quintal per week in the off-season. 
Galeyphug produce vendors sell 
potatoes to both local consumers 
and subsistence farmers. The former 
purchase larger potatoes for table 
consumption all year round.The lat-· 
ter purchase small potatoes for use 
as seed in October and November. 
Galeyphug produce vendors generally 
grade potatoes by size themselves. 
Some produce vendors keep smaller 
potatoes in a bag to induce sprout-
ing before marketing as seed. The 
average difference between buying 
and selling price for these retailers 
is 30 to 40 paise per kilogram. 
Small-scale fruit and vegetable 
vendors dominate potato retailing in 
S./ Jongkhar. On e or two whole-
saler traders also se ll potatoes retail 
but thi s volume seems relatively min-
or. The six or seven potato / produce 
vendors are all Indian. They sell po-
tatoes from make-shift stands on the 
pavement or from more permanent 
shops off the street. Some vendors 
buy Bhutanese potatoes from farmers 
directly. About half purchase their 
potatoes from the S./ Jongkhar trad-
ers. All these petty potato merchants 
buy some Indian potatoes from De-
cember/ January to April/May. They 
travel thems.elves to buy Indian po-
tatoes either across the river to Mela-
bazaar or to more distant Indian 
markets such as Gawahti. 
S./ Jongkhar potato vendors sell 
anywhere from 80 to I60 ki!Ograms 
per week throughout the year. They do 
not conspicuously re-grade potatoes 
by size as do retailers in Galeyphug. 
Consequently, they appear to sell 
primarily to local consumers. The 
average wholesale-retail mark-up in 
S./ Jongkhar is about 30 to 60 paise 
per kilogram. S. / Jongkhar retailers 
have mixed views about prevailing 
consumer preferences. Some retailers 
claim their clients prefer red-skinned 
potatoes. O:hers feel that consumers 





Government Institutions and Marketing Policies 
for Bhutanese Potatoes 
Introduction 
Government institutions and 
marketing policies can have a major 
influence on agricultural marketing 
in any country. This is especially true 
for Bhutan where development strate-
gy traditionally has called for direct 
government intervention to promote 
socioeconomic progress. Beginning 
with programs initiated under the new 
policy of modernization and con-
tinuing on with main responsibilities 
given State institutions in subsequent 
Five-Year-Plans, the government of 
Bhutan has exercised a prominent role 
in stimulating, supporting and regu-
lating agricultural marketing. A 
major concern in applying. develop-
ment strategy to Bhutanese potato 
marketing is how to meet the govern-
ment's genuine socioeconomic re-
sponsibilities and to encourage local, 
individual initiative. Various govern-
ment programs such as the Food Cor-
poration of Bhutan (FCB) potato 
purchase scheme, guaranteed prices 
for high quality seed, and the establish-
ment of regulated markets, have af-
fected potato marketing, especially 
over the last decade. This chapter 
looks closely at these and other po-
tato marketing activities of the FCB 
and the Department of Agriculture 
(DOA). It then examines the gov-
ernment's price, market controls, 
and export/import policies as they 
affect potatoes. 
5.1 The Food Corporation of 
Bhutan and Potato Marketing 
The two most prominent institu-
tions affecting potato marketing in 
Bhutan are the FCB and DOA. As 
the government food marketing cor-
poration, the FCB facilitates table 
potato exports. The DOA handles ex-
tension and input supplies such as 
seeds. It also organizes high quality 
seed potato exports. The FCB and 
DOA each have various responsibili-
ties of which potato marketing forms 
only a part. 
The Food Corporation of Bhutan 
was founded by the Royal Govern-
ment in 1974, and has its headquart-
ers in Phuntsholing. The FCB has 
been charged with four main respon-
sibilities: (a) to buy and sell agricul-
tural produce to insure fair prices 
for producers and coP.sumers; (b) to 
accumulate and store supplies of es-
sential commodities in the event of a 
food emergency, (c) to purchase and 
distribute foodgrains and other basic 
necessities as considered appropriate 
by respective government depart-
ments; and (d) to build and manage 
warehouses and/or storage facilities 
required to perform its official duties. 
The FCB in practice essentially 
does two things. 
First, it sells imported cereals, sugar, 
salt, and edible oils through a chain 
of 34 depots/retail outlets situated 
throughout the Kingdom. From 1977 
to 1981, the FCB imported about 
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3 ,000 tons of cereal products a year. 
Most imports were rice, purchased at 
a subsidized price from the Indian 
government. During the same period, 
the FCB also bought and sold about 
200 tons of locally produced grain, 
again mostly rice, through a support 
price/purchasing program for cereals. 
All FCB food sales are retail, in small 
quantities and for cash. 
Second, the FCB manages a cash 
crop export program. This program 
includes the following crops: table 
potatoes, apples, oranges, cardamom 
and ginger. FCB responsibilities vary 
somewhat from crop to crop, but 
generally include an annual support 
price, a direct purchase scheme, the 
facilitation of technical assistance 
missions, and market research, 
(i) Support Price and 
Direct Purchase Program 
The FCB's potato program began 
in fiscal year 1974175 with the an-
nouncement of a support price for 
table potatoes of Nu. 30 per maund 
(approximately 37 1/2 kilograms). 
Since then corporation officals have· 
fixed a support price .for table pota-
toes every year at planting time (see 
Table 5.1), but also have introduced 
some modifications. For example, 
there are presently separate support 
prices for Grade I and Grade II table 
potatoes . Moreover, during each har-
vest, the FCB now reserves the right 
to revise the support price up or 
down, or leave the price in Phunt-
sholing the same and change the price 
at highland depots. 
Annual changes in the support 
price are intended to reflect changes 
in production costs. Shifts in the sup-
port price during the potato harvest 
are made to account for shifts in pre-
vailing supply and demand conditions. 
Adjustments in. the provincial support 
price (vs. the border support price) 
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are considered a necessary producer 
safeguard against beguiling traders. 
Jn this last instance, FCB announces 
new highland support prices as prices 
at the border go up, so that rural 
traders will be pressured to pay grow-
ers more money for their potatoes. 
The support price program does 
not obligate potato growers to sell 
their potatoes to the FCB. In fact, 
over the past three seasons , growers 
have sold the FCB few potatoes. 
However, if they decide to do so, then 
certain procedures are generally fol-
lowed. Farmers first bring their po-
tatoes to one of the FCB depots them-
selves for inspection and grading. 
Once all potato sacks have been 
poured open and contents examined, 
the farmer is paid according to the 
prevailing support price for the quan-
tity and quality of potatoes accepted 
by FCB personnel. In spite of farmer's 
complaints to accept all their harvest 
as is, generally some potatoes are 
returned to the growers. Purchased 
potatoes are packed in FCB-labeled 
bags for shipment. When the depot 
has accumulated a truck load of po-
Table 5.1 Bhutan: FCB potato 












33 Grade I 82.5 
30 Grade II 75 
35 Grade I 87.5 
32 Grade II 80 
32 Grade I 80 
(Support price reduced to Nu. 30 and 
Nu. 28 per maund during the harvest) 
1980/ 81 30 Grade I · 75 
1981/82 28 Grade I 70 
Source: FCB, as cited In Rao. et al., 1982. 
•one maund = rou~hly 37.5 k~. 
tone qulntal = 100 k~. 
Table 5.2 Bhutan: FCB potato purchases and exports for selected years. 
Purchases Exports Value Profit (Loss) 
Year (tons) (tons) (Nu. 1,000) (Nu. 1,000) 
1975/ 76 1046 1046 1046 (50) 
1976/ 77 2476 2476 1823 (357) 
1977/78 1146 1146 1622 N.A. 
1978/79 2617 1397 1507 (76) 
1979/ 80 5000 N.A. N.A. (20,000) 
Source: FCB, as cited in Rao, et al., 1982. 
tatoes, a message goes to regional 
headquarters. A government truck 
then comes and transports the pota-
toes from the depot to the border for 
sale . 
In the initial years of this program, 
the FCB sold these potatoes either to 
traders in the border towns of Phunt" 
sholing, Galeyphug and S./ Jongkhar 
or to commission agents in northern 
West Bengal and Assam.The FCB 
occasionally sold some few poratoes 
to traders in Calcutta. In 1979, the 
Bhutan government purchased 3,000 
tons of potatoes from FCB, which 
were then donated to the government 
of Bangladesh. These potatoes were 
shipped through Calcutta, but un-
confirmed reports are that at least 
part of the shipment was spoiled in 
transit and never reached Bangladesh. 
During several harvests in the late 
1970's, the FCB lost money on its 
potato purchases and exports (see 
Table 5.2) . In most years, the reason 
for this was an excessively high sup-
port price in relation to t.he selling 
price in India. Other facrors were un-
secured sales to commission agents 
who subsequently never paid for po-
tatoes and insufficient transport at 
harvest time (1976/77). Heavy losses 
in 1979 apparently resulted from an 
unusual combination of events. There 
was a bumper potato crop in all of 
India in 1979, including West Bengal. 
As a result potato prices collapsed 
(see Table 4.3) . Moreover, technical 
maintenance problems with a number 
of cold stores.in northern West Bengal 
meant that they had to release all 
their stock for sale just when Bhutan-
ese potatoes were reaching the border. 
Due to 1979 financial los.ses and 
based on recommendation of an In-
dian consulting team (see Rao et al. 
1982), FCB officials organized an 
auction yard in Phuntsholing in Au-
gust 1982. The auction yard absolves 
the FCB of any responsibility for the 
prevailing selling price, i.e. the auc-
tion's motto is "no risk, no guaran-
tee." Nevertheless, the auction pro-
vides Bhutanese growers and traders 
with several useful services: weighing, 
tabulating invoices, and overnight 
storage. In its initial months of opera-
tion, FCB provided these services 
without charge as an incentive to pros-
pective participants. 
(ii) Marketing Resources: 
Physical Facilities, Manpower, 
and Capital1 
The FCB has physical, human and 
financial resources at its disposal. 
FCB personnel manage a chain of, 
godowns and a new storage facility 
as part of the potato purchasing pro-
gram. Most godowns are situated in 
the highlands near centers of com-
'This section draws on FAO (1982). 
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mercial potato production (see Table 
5.3). With the cool climate, many 
are constructed of local materials 
which is all that is necessary. At other 
locations, a modern concrete build-
ing, with wire mesh walls to allow for 
ventilation, has been constructed. In 
addition, a Government of Australia 
grant enabled the FCB to construct 
a new, 1,000-ton capacity cold store 
in Phuntsholing. This facility will 
also be used to store apples and or-
anges. 
The FCB employs about 200 in-
dividuals under the authority of a 
Board of Directors and managing dir -
ector (see Table 5 .4). Potato pro-
gram personnel are in the Food Grains 
Division under supervision of the 
deputy managing director for busi-
ness and the assistant director for 
cash crops. While a recent report has 
recommended a new, separate cash 
crops division, this proposal is still 
being evaluated (Rao, et al. 1982). 
More important than the number 
and organization of FCB employees 
per se is their previous experience 
and academic training. Due to the 
Table 5.3 Bhutan: Location, capa-
city, FCB potato godowns, 1980-81. 
Region 
Western Hills 
Thimphu ..................... . 
Yoesepang ... ....... . ........ . 
Paro ... ...... ....... .. ...... . 
Nobding ... ... .. . ... ......... . 
Bitekha ..... ............... . . . 
Khadapchu ...... . ........... . . 
Eastern Hills 











Phuntsholing . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 50 
S./Jongkhar................... 100 
Total 500 
Source: Rao, el al. , 1982. 
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manpower shortage in Bhutan, many 
relatively high positions in the FCB 
are filled by individuals with only 
limited academic preparation and pre-
vious supervisory experience. FCB 
personnel at lower levels have even 
less formal preparation and relevant 
work experience. Perhaps, for this 
reason the corporation's day-to-day 
operations are characterized by a 
hierarchical chain of authority with 
considerable responsibility and final 
decision making concentrated at the 
top. 
Similarly, the record keeping sys-
tem is not only basic but also burden-
some. As such, it inhibits rapid 
processing of information except in 
response to specific requests. More-
over, steady reassignment of FCB 
personnel to different positions with-
in the organization may enable all 
junior staff to acquire a wide range 
of practical experience. But, it also 
prevents any employee from gradual-
ly accumulating the specialized know-
ledge of his counterpart (competitor) 
in the private sector. In the spe-
cific case of potato marketing, the 
lack of academic training, previous 
work experience and specialized know-
ledge on the part of FCB person-
nel has been a definite handicap . 
Most importantly, only limited op-
portunities exist for potato program 
employees to review operating pro-
cedures and program records with 
senior staff or to conduct their own 
market surveys with the proper guide-
lines. No institutional on-the-job 
training is available. 
Since its creation, the FCB has 
been highly dependent on grants from 
t~e Royal Government of Bhutan to 
finance operations. By the end of fis-
cal year 1980/81 the FCB had re-
ceived a total of Nu. 5.2 million for 




Table 5.4 Bhutan: Food Corporation (FCB) organization chart. 
I. Food Grains 
Asst. Director Food Grains 
I 
4 Regional Marketing Officer 
I 
4 Junior Marketing Officer 
I 
34 Depots in Charge 
I 
Inspector and Asst. Inspector 
Chairman and Board of Directors 
I 
Managing Director, Senior Asst. 
I 
Divisions (5) 
2 Ttthnlro/? I ~ 
Quality Control 3. Administrative 4. Finance 
Administrative Officer 
I 
Senior Office Supt. 
I 
Support Staff 
Asst. Director Cash Crops 
I 
Junior Marketing Officers 
I I 
Potato Caramom Siliguri 
Inspector and Sub-Inspector 














FCB also depends on a government 
grant to pay its annual operating ex-
penses of Nu. 2 million. FCB trading 
operations, however, are financed by 
a bank overdraft limited to Nu. 30 
million. Because of the Nu. 16 mil-
lion in operating losses registered for 
the two fiscal years ending March 31, 
1981, FCB faces a severe financial 
crisis. This situation is further aggra-
vated by high annual rate of interest 
(12.5%) payable on the outstanding 
overdraft. Part of the solution to this 
problem has already been suggested: 
the FCB attempt to convert its an-
nual overdraft arrangement to a long-
term, low interest loan (FAO 1982). 
The other part includes a hard look at 
the financial aspects of the FCB's 
annual operating expenses and trad-
ing activities, particularly in terms 
of potato marketing. This set of issues 
is discussed both under section 5.3 
below and in the conclusions and 
recommendations. 
5.2 The Department of Agriculture 
and Potato Marketing 
The Department of Agriculture was 
organized in 1961 and has its head-
quarters in Thimphu. The Depart-
ment's responsibilities are divided into 
three headings: (1) Technical Services, 
(2) Policy Planning, and, (3) Manage-
ment. Technical Services includes 
such things as extension, inputs, and 
horticulture. Policy Planning en-
compasses centrally planned and 
district projects as well as liaison 
with the different aid missions and in-
ternational organizations. The Man-
agement heading is less specifically 
defined on the DOA's organizational 
chart. 
DOA is the government institution 
responsible for exporting high quality 
seed. In organizational terms, the 
horticultural cell under Technical 
Services handles potato seed market-
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ing in co9peration with the national 
potato program and the Internation-
al Potato Center (CIP) representative. 
In practical terms, high quality seed 
exports are largely the responsibility 
of a veteran Indian employee of DOA. 
He is in charge of potato seed mar-
keting and that of a number of dif-
ferent crops. He has no assistants and, 
in the case of potatoes, a meager 
operating budget. 
DOA responsibilities for high qual-
.ity seed marketing has consisted of 
setting a guaranteed purchase price 
for high quality seed grown by regis-
tered growers in Bhutan and negotia-
ting an export contract with interested 
buyers in India. The guaranteed pur-
chase price for high quality seed is 
based on estimated production costs. 
It is announced each year in March. 
Negotiations with Indian seed buyers 
has involved a meeting each year in 
June . After negotiations are con-
cluded and an export price set, a 
formal contract is signed. Neverthe-
less, the terms of contract are quite 
flexible for the Bhutanese. If they are 
unable to deliver the seed, they simply 
return the money and the contract 
is cancelled. Still, the DOA sets the 
guaranteed price for high quality seed 
that it will buy before it knows the 
price for high quality seed that it will 
sell. 
With the small quantities of po-
tatoes involved and DOA's man-
power problems, high quality seed 
export sales are conducted on an in-
formal basis. No written reports are 
available on the estimated cost of pro-
ducing Bhutanese seed or on the cur-
rent selling price for comparable seed 
in India. Similarly, accounting prac-
tices for the program have been rather 
pragmatic. No records are maintained 
')n expenses incurred for producing or 
for marketing seed . Still, the DOA 
person in charge estimates that the 
program has shown a modest profit 
the last 2 years. While he contends 
that the program may have to absorb 
some losses in the future to develop 
the market, he is quite confident that 
high quality seed exports will be profit-
able in the long-run. 
5.3 Marketing Policies that 
Affect Bhutanese Potatoes 
A variety of government policies 
affect Bhutanese potato marketing. 
These policies strongly influence and 
in some cases literally determine the 
price of potatoes, where they are sold, 
by whom they are sold, and what 
other products compete with them in 
the market place. While these poli-
cies are highly interdependent, for 
the purpose of this report they are 
discussed separately below. 
(i) Price Policies 
Government price policy affects 
Bhutanese potato marketing, both 
directly and indirectly. The direct af-
fect comes primarily from the sup-
port price for table potatoes and the 
guaranteed price for high quality seed 
exports. The official price for im-
proved seed sold by DOA inside Bhu-
tan has an additional, albeit less im-
portant, impact. 
Support price for table potatoes, 
announced every year in February 
or March, is based on the current, 
estimated cost of production. Support 
price reflects the government's desire 
to encourage increased agricultural 
Selecting and bagging seed potatoes in Khaling . 
The tin is used as a unit of measure. 
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production and to protect Bhutanese 
farmers with limited resources from 
financial disaster. Support price also 
is used to prevent dishonest traders 
from taking advantage of illiterate 
and uninformed farmers. 
The guaranteed price for high qual-
ity seed is another economic develop-
ment initiative. To develop a new 
export market and to promote di-
versification of potato production 
to include high quality seed as well 
as table potatoes, DOA offers inter-
ested farmers a guaranteed price for 
their output. DOA personnel be-
lieve also that growers need an econo-
mic incentive to assume the additional 
costs associated with producing high 
quality seed according to the depart-
ment's specifications. Interested potato 
farmers are obliged to sign informal 
contracts with DOA guaranteeing 
that they will sell their high quality 
seed to the department. Thus, in 
early 1981and1982, DOA announced 
the price it guaranteed to pay for high 
quality seed harvested at the end of 
the calendar year. 
The DOA also sets the price every 
year for improved seed produced on 
government farms that it sells to local 
growers. This price includes produc-
tion and transport costs . Past policy 
has been to sell these seed potatoes 
for the cost of production and to ab-
sorb freight charges in some instances. 
These moderate charges are justified 
on the grounds that they encourage 
use of improved seed by low-income 
farmers. 
The indirect effect of government 
price policy concerns the official 
sale of imported rice. In the recent 
past, FCB practice has been to sell 
the rice itself at cost as well as to subsi-
dize trucking costs from border to 
highlands. The government views this 
policy as part of its socioeconomic 
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responsibility to provide basic neces-
sities to all Bhutanese at a reasonable 
price. 
(ii) Market Controls 
A series of controls have been in-
troduced recently to regulate potato 
marketing in Bhutan. These controls 
consist of licenses, taxes and permits. 
Auction yard administrators in Phunt-
sholing restrict entry to only licensed 
traders. One justification for this 
particular policy is to insure only legiti-
mate merchants participate in the auc-
tion . Licensed traders must put up a 
deposit of Nu. 10,000. FCB policy 
also limits the number of licenses 
granted to Indian traders so to limit 
influence of Indian merchants on 
Bhutanese potato trade. Licensing 
procedures and public auction also 
are intended to make potato market-
ing a more public form of commerce. 
In the auction, Bhutanese farmers 
can hear the simultaneous bids of 
different buyers. 
Several taxes also affect Bhutanese 
table potato marketing. In Phuntshol-
ing, potato traders pay Nu. 2 per 
quintal as a bazaar tax and a 3% in-
come tax on their reported gross sales. 
In Galeyphug, traders pay Nu. 2.5 
per quintal as a bazaar tax and Nu. 5 
per ton as an export tax. Tax reve-
nues are intended, in part, to help 
border communities maintain local 
marketing facilities. 
Table potatoes shipped through 
Phuntsholing now need a shipping 
permit to cross the border. This mea-
sure helps insure that all table po-
tatoes exported through Phuntsholing 
are sold in the auction yard. It also 
facilitates the collection of potato 
export statistics. These statistics are 
needed to give policy makers and ad-
ministrators a more accurate under-
standing of Bhutanese trade. 
(iii) Export/Import Policy 
The Royal Government of Bhutan 
through DOA, FCB, and various 
ministries also has a definite export/ 
import policy. This policy encom-
passes classification and utilization of 
domestically produced farm com-
modities, the quantity, price and tim-
ing of official food imports, and the 
export/import guidelines governing 
Bhutanese trade. These measures af-
fect potato marketing as well. 
Agricultural policy in Bhutan has 
two thrusts: (a) to increase production 
of staples, and, (b) to promote ex-
portation of cash crops. Until now, 
cereals were classified as staples and 
potatoes as a cash crop. These respec-
tive classifications determine the na-
ture of numerous government initia-
tives. In the case of cereals, measures 
have been taken to insure adequate 
supplies and to import rice from In-
dia, if necessary. In the case of pota-
toes, the focus has been entirely on 
expanding potato exports either by 
promoting new products such as high 
quality seed or by improving existing 
export infrastructure such as con-
structing new cold storage facilities 
in Phuntsholing. 
Past FCB food import practices 
raise additional questions about po-
tato marketing. For example, from 
1979 to 1981, the FCB not only im-
ported 2,500 tons of rice for sale at 
cost in highland depots but also con-
ducted peak rice sales at the time of 
the potato harvest, from August to 
October, in many communities, for 
example, Thimphu, Punakha, Bum-
thang (see Table 5 .5). In 1979, in 
particular, FCB imported rice from 
India at the same time it threw away 
potatoes in Bhutan and for which it 
subsidized production. How such 
practices may have influenced local 
consumption patterns and hence the 
domestic market for potatoes is not 
clear. A more intriguing question is 
whether Bhutanese potatoes could 
substitute in part for Indian rice in 
times of scarcity . 
Government ministries have export 
guidelines that serve to regulate all 
forms of foreign trade. Examples 
are transit papers and documents for 
shipments to third countries are is-
sued by the Ministry of Trade; for-
eign exchange earnings in hard cur-
rency must be sold to the Ministry of 
Finance for Bhutanese Ngultrums 
The Ministry of Trade is negotiating 
a new treaty with India that governs 
transit rights for shipping to Bangla-
desh and Nepal. Thus, third country 
trading of potato shipments to places 
other than India is highly contin-
gent upon government agreements. 
And, from the Bhutanese producers 
point of view, is largely in the hands 
of the public sector. 
(Table 5.5, see page 64) 
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~ Table 5.5 Bhutan: FCB sales of quota rice-major depots (kg.). 
De pol Thimphu Wangdi Punakha Ha Chuck a C himalhoki Bumthang TOnJtsa Shem~ang Mongar Lhuntsi Tashi~an~ Phu n1sholing Gaylephu~ Sharbang Month 
March 1979 31.926 .... . 
April 26.373 5.312 
May 29,266 4, 138 
J une 27,891 11,650 
July 42,847 6,139 
August 43 ,356 ? 
September 27.013 ? 
October 49,535 ? 
November 43,657 4,330 
December 37,058 6,804 
January 1980 37,560 3,863 
February 41,565 4,976 
March 36 ,570 8,506 
April 25,450 5,571 7,350 6,825 11,772 5,604 4,163 5.247 2,256 5.065 5,835 
May 38, 104 5,073 10,900 7,922 9,938 8.884 11,436 6,3 18 22,216 9,248 6,065 
June 46,269 8,037 13,010 10,386 12,432 5 69~ 13,764 8,208 36,247 14 ,348 5,628 
July 49 ,957 7,261 15,051 8,125 9,123 4,569 11.345 8,198 25,229 I 1.643 6,766 
August 57,497 8,906 20,090 9,130 12,275 5,882 6.563 9,490 7,768 9,437 9,33 1 
September 49,831 9,242 14.508 9,959 20,611 5,812 6,402 9,888 8,474 6. 151 8 ,580 
October 53,869 7,315 20.095 9.697 20,080 4,826 5,577 9,492 5,043 4,933 6 ,487 
November 30,764 8.850 10.395 4,597 13.426 3,992 4,574 9,1 16 5,23 1 6.542 9,419 
December 23,801 9,528 12.030 7,556 12.383 2,867 4,386 5, 188 3,630 2, 155 1,945 
January 1981 37,353 1,300 8,337 13 ,860 4,540 9,519 3.600 2.533 4,295 5,417 2,496 3,704 652 5,753 
February 35 ,790 3.200 9 ,218 11.630 4,998 8.922 3,400 2,276 2,960 3.067 4,008 1.666 620 5,573 
March 39.170 3,200 8.095 10,680 4 ,395 13.680 5.400 3,356 4,092 3,652 4,321 1.078 400 
Apri l 25,450 852 1,700 5,200 2,689 5,340 5,463 319 
May 38,104 4,603 3.500 10,100 5,838 4.411 6.042 300 
June 46,269 4,926 3.000 2.400 5,281 5,437 6,692 797 
July 49,957 4. 146 5,800 7,700 3,995 6,094 8.779 1, 125 
Au~us t 57 ,479 1,783 4.400 2.900 5.026 9,088 8, 109 1,7 19 
September 49,831 3,400 I0,400 4.000 I0 .558 I0 , 106 9.692 4,516 
October 53 ,869 2,987 5,000 2.000 8,532 5,080 5,683 63 1 
November 30,764 2,286 7,800 3,500 5,827 3.728 3,310 217 
December 23,801 3,778 700 3800 3,106 4,252 I 273 2, 133 
January 1982 ... .. 5,954 1.300 6, 100 2,893 .. .. ... . 654 
February ... . . . .... 3,200 57 





Future Prospects for Bhutanese Potato Marketing 
Introduction 
Bhutan's current Five-Year Plan 
calls for increased potato production 
and exports. There is an on-going 
debate in policy making circles about 
how much of different types of po-
tatoes can be profitably sold. In fact, 
it is impossible to project the exact 
quantities of potatoes that Bhutan 
can profitably market because of 
limited statistics and numerous con-
tributing factors. Increases in potato 
production in Uttar Pradesh, Bihar, 
West Bengal, and Assam constitute 
one major unknown beyond Bhutan-
ese influence. Nevertheless, several 
critical variables are in Bhutanese 
hands. In general, Bhutanese potato 
program officials must secure a reli-
able foreign source of foundation 
seed for multiplication in Bhutan. 
Specifically, the Bhutanese can influ-
ence foreign potato marketing pros-
pects by: (1) increasing productivity, 
improving quality and lowering unit 
production costs, and, by (2) aggres-
sive efforts to secure existing markets 
and capture new ones. The Bhutanese 
can influence domestic potato sales 
by: (1) instituting programs to pro-
mote greater potato consumption 
and improved seed utilization, and, 
(2) re-evaluating the present food 
import practices of the FCB. This 
chapter considers future prospects 
for Bhutanese potato exports and 
then discusses the outlook for do-
mestic potato marketing. 
6. 1 Future Prospects for 
Bhutanese Potato Exports 
(i) Table Potatoes 
Most Bhutanese potato exports will 
be table potatoes in the near future 
for several reasons. Table potato ship-
ments dominate present trade pat-
terns. Bhutanese farmers have limited 
capacity to alter radically their po-
tato production practices in the short-
run. Infrastructure, grading standards 
and seed multiplication programs 
necessary to promote high quality 
seed exports will take time to estab-
lish . Future potato research should 
help determine (a) the relative profit-
ability of table vs. high quality seed 
production for export, and, (b) the 
quantity of high quality seed that can 
be sold on a contract basis. 
The bulk of these table potato ex-
ports will go to northern West Ben-
gal and Assam. Prices and quality 
considerations are major factors. 
Transportation costs to Calcutta, Del-
hi, or Bombay mean Bhutanese po-
tatoes are much more expensive in 
those markets. For example, little 
difference existed in the wholesale 
vs. retail price for potatoes in Sili-
guri vs. Calcutta during August to 
October in 1981 (see Table6.l). Rath-
er, these data suggest that it would 
be hard to buy potatoes in Siliguri, 
ship them to Calcutta and sell them 
for a profit. Furthermore, consumers 
in adjacent West Bengal prefer a red-
skinned potato. They like the taste of 
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Table 6.1 Indfo: Retail potato prices in selected markets during 1981. (In-
dian Rs per kg.). 
Jan. Feb. March April May June July Aug. Sept. Oct. Nov. Dec. 
West Bengal 
Siliguri* .. 1.00 0.7S 0.80 1.00 1.30 1.3S 1.2S 1.lS 1.20 1.40 l.20 0.90 
1.10 0.80 1.10 1.20 1.60 1.20 1.40 1.60 I.30 
Hirpara ... 1.2S 1.2S 1.2S 1.2S 1.2S I.SO 1.60 2.00 2.SO I.SO 
1.SO 2.SO 
Bataigola . 1.20 1.2S 1.2S 1.40 1.SO I.SO I.SO 1.7S 1.7S 1.80 1.7S 1.2S 
1.30 1.60 I.SO 
Sumuktala .1.00 1.00 1.2S 1.00 1.00 1.40 1.60 1.60 I.SO 1.SO I.SO I.40 
1.10 1.7S 1.7S I.SO 
Hasimara . 1.20 1.20 1.20 l.2S 1.2S I.SO 1.SO 1.80 I.SO 1.30 1.40 
1.2S 1.30 1.60 1.60 
Calcutta 
Bel- 1.00 0.80 0.80 1.00 1.20 I.40 1.40 1.40 1.20 1.20 1.20 
gharia .. 1.20 1.00 0.90 1.20 1.60 1.SO 1.70 
Gora 0.80 0.90 1.00 1.00 1.10 1.30 1.20 1.2S 1.30 1.40 1.30 I.SO 
Bazar .. 1.00 1.00 1.10 1.SO 1.30 1.30 
Jagat- 1.00 1.00 0.80 1.00 1.20 1.30 1.20 1.20 1.30 1.30 1.40 I.SO 
dal. . ..... . 1.00 1.20 2.00 1.40 1.40 1.40 1.40 
Bara 0.90 0.90 1.00 1.00 1.40 1.40 1.40 1.40 1.40 1.40 1.40 1.40 
Bazar .. 1.10 1.10 1.10 1.20 2.SO 
Metia Cruz .1.20 0.80 1.00 1.00 1.20 1.40 1.40 1.40 1.40 1.40 1.40 1.50 
1.25 0.90 1.10 1.20 "' Tongsa ... 0.80 0.80 1.00 1.20 1.20 1.30 1.30 1.30 1.30 1.30 1.30 1.30 
1.00 1.00 1.40 
Assam 
Rangpare . 1.60 1.70 1.70 1.80 1.75 I.00 2.00 2.00 2.00 2.00 2.00 1.80 
1.75 
Tejpur .. . . 1. 70 1.60 1.60 1.60 2.00 2.00 2.10 2.20 2.20 2.20 2.00 2.00 
2.00 
Source: Market Commitlee. Siliguri . Labour Bureau , (Regional Office). Calcutta as cited in Rao, et a., 1982. 
*\.\ .. holesalt prices. 
Note: The figures given indicate the constant or the minimum and maximum price during the concerned month . 
Bhutanese potatoes and they receive tatoes with any distinctly desirable 
their potatoes fresh from the field at taste, and the distance from Bhutan 
a time when mostly only stored pota- means that the potato would lose con-
toes are available locally. Thus, Bhu- siderable freshness in transit. Similar 
tanese potatoes can compete-even quality considerations affect the vi-
at slightly higher prices-with Indian ability of Bhutanese potato sales in 
potatoes sold in West Bengal and Delhi. 
Assam. Consumers in Calcutta, how- Some Bhutanese potatoes occa-
ever, prefer a white-skinned potato, sionally are sent to Calcutta for use 
they do not associate Bhutanese po- by potato chip manufactures. Ac-
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cording to traders in Calcutta's whole-
sale markets, stored potatoes do not 
serve well for making potato chips. 
Bhutanese potatoes, then, have a com-
petitive advantage in Calcutta at 
times when the regional supply of 
fresh potatoes for potato chips is in-
sufficient to meet local factory needs. 
This particular market, however, 
calls for a different size and shape po-
tato. Potatoes for chips are general-
ly quite large and round rather than 
the quite small, oval shaped table 
potato. The little additional informa-
tion available suggests that Bhutanese 
potatoes are only purchased in small 
quantities and under unusual circum-
stances for this purpose. Direct con-
tacts with potato chip manufactures 
in Calcutta, however, might result in 
a new market outlet. 
Assuming that Bhutan exported 
5,000 tons of table potatoes in 1982, 
then this quantity seems a reasonable 
target for the years ahead. In other 
words, this report envisions that as 
potato production gradually increas-
es, Bhuta.n will become less dependent 
on table potato exports. Instead of 
rapid growth in seed exports, more 
aggressive Bhutanese commercial 
farmers will slowly switch part of 
their ware production for export in-
to improved common and/ or high 
quality seed production. In addition, 
some subsistence Bhutanese growers 
probably will begin to produce sur-
pluses for sale in local urban areas. 
(ii) Common Seed 
As long as Bhutan produces and 
exports potatoes, some will be sold in 
India as common seed. Again, princi-
pal export markets for common seed 
will be northern West Bengal and 
Assam. Key factors involved here 
are: (I) the decline in Darjeeling po-
tato production; (2) production trends 
in West Bengal and Assam, and, (3) 
increases in productivity and quality 
in the hilly areas of eastern India, 
such as Shillong. In contrast to the 
rest of West Bengal, Darjeeling po-
tato production has declined in the 
late 1970's. Yield increases were in-
sufficient to affect the reduced area 
planted (see Tables 6.2., 6.3., and 
4.4). If this situation persists, then 
other regional sources of common 
seed, particularly red-skinned seed 
from Bhutan, should experience con-
tinued strong demand. 
Consumer demand for potatoes i.n 
West Bengal has been strong, es-
pecially the past 5 or 6 years. The as-
sociated, steady increase in producer 
potato prices has served to induce a 
rapid growth in potato production. 
Since the area's population continues 
to increase and potato consumption 
remains a complement to rice (hence 
it hardly has achieved saturation lev-
els), the outlook for increased produc-
tion seems bright. All these develop-
ments suggest an accelerated demand 
for common potato seed. However, 
the experience in 1979 indicates price 
and production trends need to be 
studied on a continuous basis. Bump-
er Indian crops mean potatoes are 
cheap locally and there is little in-
centive to import even from Bhutan. 
Less spectacular Indian output trans-
lates into a steady demand for inex-
pensive seed on the part of semi-sub-
sistence potato producers, especially 
in northern West Bengal and Assam. 
The report therefore, estimates that 
Bhutan will be able to ship about 
1,000 tons of common seed into 1 ndia 
by the end of the current Five-Year-
Plan. A final determinant of market-
ing prospects for these potatoes will 
be selection (by variety) and grading 
(by size). Present standards must be 
improved to compete in the years 
ahead with Indian seed growing areas 
like Shillong . 
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Table 6.2 West Bengal: Area under potato in different districts, 1960/ 61to1978179, (000 hectares). 
--
Year Burdwan Birbhum Midna- Howrah Hooghly 24 Parga- Nadia Murshi- We~t Di- Maida Jalp~i- Darjee- Cooch- p J' Bankura pore nas dabad na1pur gun ling behar uru ia 
1960-61 11.3 5.5 5.6 0.9 16.5 2.1 0.3 3.3 3.9 0.9 2.2 2.5 1.5 0.1 2.0 
1961-62 9.6 4.8 6.5 1.1 17.4 2.0 0.2 2.7 3.5 0.8 2.3 2.5 1.7 # 2.4 
1962-63 12.5 4.4 7.5 1.6 20.3 2.2 0.4 3.9 3.5 0.7 2.5 2.7 1.9 0.1 1.9 
1963-64 13.0 5.0 8.2 1.6 19.5 2.9 0.5 2.5 3.1 0.6 1.8 3.0 1.3 0.1 2.5 
1964-65 13.7 5.1 8.7 2.0 21.8 2.9 0.5 3.2 3.5 0.7 1.7 4.1 0.7 0.3 2.1 
1965-66 16.2 6.8 10.5 2.1 24.6 3.9 0.6 4.0 3.0 0.6 1.6 4.3 1.5 0.2 2.2 
1966-67 14.0 5.7 10.5 1.8 22.1 3.2 0.6 4.6 3.2 0.9 1.6 3.4 1.5 0.3 2.4 
1967-68 15.0 6.7 11.6 2.3 21.1 3.5 0.4 3.6 4.0 1.2 1.6 3.1 1.4 0.3 2.7 
1968-69 11.7 6.3 10.5 1.4 20.0 3.0 0.4 3.7 4.5 1.0 1.1 2.4 1.7 0.4 2.8 
1969-70 9.1 4.7 8.8 2.5 14.9 2.8 0.3 2.8 3.8 0.7 1.3 2.6 1.5 0.4 3.4 
1970-71 14.6 5.0 10.0 1.9 16.0 2.3 0.2 2.7 3.2 0.7 1.2 2.5 1.7 0.3 2.8 
1971-72 14.0 5.4 10.9 2.2 20.2 3.0 0.4 3.9 3.0 0.7 1.2 2.4 1.3 0.5 3.7 
1972-73 14.6 4.8 12.6 2.2 19.5 3.7 0.8 4.0 4.5 0.8 1.0 2.3 1.6 0.4 2.9 
1973-74 14.9 4.8 11.5 2.3 23.1 3.3 0.9 4.5 5.0 1.0 1.3 3.1 1.6 0.3 2.9 
1974-75 20.3 6.7 10.1 2.2 23.0 3.5 1.3 4.8 4.0 0.9 1.2 3.0 1.2 0.3 3.5 
1975-76 22.3 7.6 15.0 3.0 22.8 5.2 2.7 5.8 8.2 1.9 3.8 3.9 4.2 1.5 4.9 
1976-77 22.0 7.4 13.9 3.2 25.4 5.8 2.8 6.4 8.4 2.3 3.9 2.0 4.8 I. I 4.3 
1977-78 22.9 7.6 16.0 3.8 29.8 5.4 3.3 6.2 8.6 2.4 4.3 2.1 4.8 1.4 5.6 
1978-79 31.0 8.6 20.8 5.6 37.7 7.7 4.3 8.3 10.3 2.5 5.4 1.9 5.5 I. 7 8.3 
Source: Chowdhury and Sen, 1981 . 





Table 6.3 West Bengal: Average potato yields in different districts, 1960/ 61to1978179, (kg. per ha.) 







































7850 7714 10778 
6833 10154 8636 
13200 
18644 
7000 9907 10563 17458 
5640 10293 7500 9262 
8952 10115 11750 13445 
10909 10276 10619 12667 
9150 8638 9333 9167 
8593 8190 8696 4171 
13000 10943 13571 14865 
11412 10318 11320 13000 
15679 13400 15316 17662 
16216 12752 16227 20208 
13724 9897 13727 16646 
13690 10374 13391 16589 
15257 11020 9000 21103 
13837 14507 17233 19667 
14767 16619 18563 17359 
16143 16044 17553 19027 
16602 14653 16304 19432 
Source: Chowdhury and Sen , 1981. 
24 Par-
ganas 
Nadia Murshi- W.Dinaj- Maida Jalp~i 







7364 5500 6615 5000 
4655 3400 7160 4419 
7448 9400 11844 4429 
9769 10500 9900 5633 
7875 7500 7826 4969 
8686 8750 9611 3575 
12200 11250 13162 5044 
9699 10333 9679 4026 
14087 16500 14148 5406 
11533 11500 11256 3333 
12487 12500 12275 4890 
9879 10222 11600 4800 
9314 14923 18854 5050 
12000 15333 14914 5659 
12397 16071 14828 5095 
13111 16051 13339 7023 































































(iii) High Quality Seed 
Bhutan also will export high quality 
seed potatoes in the future . Most of 
this seed will go to northern West 
Bengal and Assam where the Bhutan-
ese have established a small, but grow-
ing market. Bhutanese high quality 
seed exports will be influenced partly 
by the regional demand and market-
ing considerations referred to pre-
viously. In addition, high quality seed 
exports will be affected by: (a) rela-
tive prices for high quality export 
seed vs. common seed, and, (b) shifts 
in distribution of total area of pota-
toes planted among subsistence and 
commercial growers. 
Relative prices for high quality 
vs. common seed potatoes will af-
fect Bhutanese exports as follows . 
If the price of Bhutan's high quality 
seed goes higher and higher in rela-
tion to common seed, then it will 
become more and more difficult to 
market. Greater and greater produc-
tivity differentials between the two 
types of seed would have to exist to 
economically justify purchasing one 
rather than the other. From the Bhu-
tanese perspective, relative seed prices 
and productivity will depend, in turn , 
on: (a) final quality standards set 
by Bhutan's national potato program 
and the resulting costs of production 
per kilogram, and, (b) yields per hec-
tare received on Indian farms using 
Bhutanese potatoes. 
Casual empiricism suggests that 
most potato producers in northern 
West Bengal and Assam are small-
scale, semi-subsistence growers. One 
in 20, perhaps, are relatively large-
scale, commercial growers . Semi-
subsistence growers prefer a tiny seed 
potato because it gives them better 
coverage. They generally are reluc-
tant to invest large amounts of money 
in high quality seed because of the 
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agronomic and economic risks as-
sociated with potato production. In 
contrast, large-scale commercial grow-
ers appreciate the advantages of using 
larger, high quality seed tubers and 
they have the capital to risk on profit-
generating, improved inputs. The re-
cent trend in West Bengal has been 
for potato production to spread to 
more inefficient farms (Chowdhury 
and Sen 1981). Thus, no economic 
pressure has forced growers to re-
duce unit-costs by utilizing high qual-
ity seed. They could use practically 
any kind of seed and make money. 
If such trends continue, then the de-
mand for high quality seed will be 
restricted to a relatively small group 
of commercial growers. The report 
concludes, nevertheless, that exports 
of high quality seed could quadruple 
to 1,000 tons during the next 5 years. 
This estimate is based on conversa-
tions with national potato program 
personnel in Bhutan, West Bengal 
Agro-Industrial Corporation staff, 
and traders in adjacent Indian states. 
These figures are highly dependent 
on the final seed standards and selling 
price established by Bhutan's national 
potato program. 
(iv) Third Country Potato Exports 
Discussions of Bhutanese potato 
marketing frequently include refe-
rence to the potential for third coun-
try exports, to Bangladesh, Nepal, 
Sri Lanka, Burma. Such exports are 
attractive because they would enable 
Bhutan to break its heavy dependence 
on Indian markets plus they offer the 
possibility of earning hard currency. 
However, exports of table potatoes 
or high quality seed to third countries 
seem doubtful in the near future. 
Bhutan is still negotiating a new trade 
agreement with India that would al-
low rail or river shipments direct to 
northern Bangladesh via Assam. In 
!. 
the interim, shipments of Bhutanese 
potatoes to Bangladesh via Calcutta 
are uneconomical given the transport 
costs. In any event, Bangladesh has 
limited foreign exchange to import 
any kind of potatoes (see Table 6.4). 
Recent seed imports from Holland-
about 2,000 tons in 1981-were fi-
nanced entirely by Dutch commodity 
aid. 
Bhutanese potato exports to Sri 
Lanka or Burma seem even more im-
probable. Sri Lanka is prohibiting 
potato seed imports. ' Little is known 
in Bhutan about potato production 
in Burma: varieties planted, planting 
dates, or cost of locally procured 
seed. Both countries are also far away 
in terms of transport costs. 
The Nepalese case is somewhat 
more complicated. While some Bhu-
tanese common seed apparently en-
ters Nepal via Siliguri every year and 
a potential may exist to expand these 
quantities to more significant a-
mounts, this expansion would have 
to be handled entirely by the private 
sector. Bhutan has no official trade 
agreement with Nepal that would 
facilitate official shipments of high 
quality seed from the DOA to its sis-
ter institution in Nepal. 
Table 6.4 Bangladesh: Potato seed 
imports, selected years. 
Year Quantity (tons) 
1973174. . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2702 
1974/ 75. . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3580 
1975176. . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3672 
1976177......... . .... 1284 
1977/ 78.............. 1436 
1978/ 79. . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1216 
1979/ 80.. .... .... . ... N.A. 
1980/ 81......... ... . . N.A. 
1981/82.. . . . . . . . . . . . . 1640 
1982183. . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2700 
Source: 1973174- 1978179, 1980. 
1981182, Maziruddin, 1982. 
1982/ SJ, Personal communication with Mr. Luitjens. 
(v) New Potato Export Products 
Some consideration has also been 
given prospects for marketing new 
potato export products. For example, 
given the altitude and soil conditions, 
Bhutan is a promising site for foun-
dation seed production . By contract 
for a given variety, small quantities 
(100 tons) of such seed may be mar-
ketable in Bangladesh, even shipping 
through Calcutta. But, Bhutanese 
potato program leaders should also 
consider the economics of exporting 
small quantities of foundation seed 
that Bangladesh producers would 
multiply for re-sale in large quantities . 
Economic development normally 
necessitates increasing the local value 
added to raise (farmers') incomes. 
In other words, as much multiplica-
tion of imported seed as is profitably 
possible should be done in Bhutan. 
Unless shipping costs for large quanti-
ties of common or high quality seed 
are prohibitively expensive, as is sug-
gested above, or profit margins per 
ton for foundation seed unusually 
large, then all Bhutanese seed ex-
ports should be no higher in quality 
than certified seed. Otherwise, foun, 
dation seed exports now reduce the 
market for certified and common seed 
in the future . 
Potato starch is another potential 
export product. An experimental 
processing plant is now being tested 
in Paro and another will be construc-
ted at Phubjikha. At the same time 
overtures have been made to pros-
pective buyers in Phuntsholing and 
Calcutta. Particular interest has been 
shown in a form of starch used by 
bakeries , for which potatoes ap-
parently have a cost advantage over 
corn or rice . Such a processing plant 
may be able to absorb surplus pota-
'This observation is based on conversa ti ons 
with Jim Bryan, CIP seed specialist. 
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toes that are harvested during a sea-
sonal glut in supply. Present plans to 
study the cost of producing and mar-
keting starch are a wise decision. Ef-
forts to insure quality control at the 
more remote village level a lso merit 
attention . 
6.2 Future Prospects for 
(I) the domestic market is the most 
secure in terms of rival potato pro-
ducers; (2) more Bhutanese eat more 
potatoes than previously realized; and 
(3) domestic sales of high quality 
seed in particular can bolster potato 
exports by improving productivity on 
Bhutanese farm s. 
Domestic Potato Marketing (i) Table Potatoes 
The domestic market offers ad- Several considerations point to an 
ditional possibilities for Bhutanese increased potential for domestic table 
potatoes. Even at present, all pota- potato marketing. On the one hand , 
toes that are exported-table pota- demand for table potatoes will de-
toes, common seed, and high quality pend largely on the growth of urban 
seed-are also sold inside the King- areas. These towns represent a small 
dom. Development plans, then, percent of the national population, 
should consider expanding domestic and therefore, presently consume a 
potato sales in light of three factors: minor share of domestically harvested 
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Potato experiments in greenhouse at Yoesepang 




potatoes. On the other hand, since 
these areas are the principal source 
of food deficits in the country, greater 
urbanization and increased incomes 
alone offer some prospect for increas-
ed table potato consumption. 
Furthermore, growth in urban de-
mand for table potatoes could be 
fostered by one or more official in-
itiatives not entirely inconsistent with 
the stated development goals of in-
creased self-sufficiency and improved 
farmer incomes. For example, govern-
ment officials could urge managers 
of local construction projects to buy 
potatoes locally rather than to import 
food for their workers . 
Or, Bhutanese policy makers may 
want to promote potato consump-
tion on nutritional grounds (see Poats 
1982). They also may recognize the 
present cereal shortage and potato 
surplus. While cereal productivity is 
being improved and a high quality 
seed program being established, im-
ported rice sales could be curtailed-
especially at the time of the local po-
tato harvest-and urge government 
employees, schools, and monasteries 
to consume more potatoes as part of 
a nation-building effort. Moreover, 
the Bhutanese are a traditional people 
with tremendous respect for their 
leaders. If Bhutanese officials were 
to consume more potatoes themselves, 
this example may be the most effec-
tive policy of all for promoting 
greater potato consumption and, in 
effect, increasing food self-sufficiency. 
In any event, various different 
policy measures and government in-
itiatives are available from which 
Bhutanese officials may chose. Any 
one, or several in combination~ could 
expand the domestic market for table 
potatoes. 
(ii) Common Seed 
Some farmers and retailers inside 
Bhutan also sell common seed pota-
toes. In normal years, farmers plant 
mostly their own seed saved from the 
previous harvest. In addition, how-
ever, growers will buy or barter for 
seed from other potato areas inside 
Bhutan to supplement their own sup-
ply. And, if potato prices are particu-
larly good, they will sell everything 
at harvest and purchase whatever 
seed they can find at planting time. 
Conflicting developments will af-
fect common seed potato marketing 
inside Bhutan in the years ahead. This 
report anticipates that the growing 
number of weekly fairs throughout 
the Kingdom will stimulate common 
seed potato marketing. More potato 
farmers will know who has potatoes 
to sell and at what price. Still, as the 
national potato program's seed multi-
plication scheme develops , more im-
proved and/or high quality seed 
should become available around the 
country. In other words, potato pro-
ducers will be less dependent on what-
ever seed they can purchase from 
local merchants or fellow farmers. 
Spread of potato production among 
small, semi-subsistence farmers and 
the relative price of improved vs. 
common seed largely will determine 
which of the developments described 
above will have more influence on 
common seed potato marketing in 
the near future. However, it is impera-
tive that more high quality seed be 
utilized in Bhutan to upgrade local 
common seed . 
(iii) High Quality Seed 
The principal beneficiaries of the 
high quality seed program in Bhutan 
should be Bhutanese potato farmers 
themselves. As the program matures, 
more growers should become aware 
of the advantages of using such seed. 
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Consequently, larger quantities must 
be set aside to meet their needs be-
fore any high quality seed potatoes 
are exported . The report envisions, 
then, that three types of high quality 
seed will be marketed in Bhutan: (1) 
seed to produce table potatoes; (2) 
seed to produce common seed, and, 
(3) seed to produce more high quality 
seed. The combined markets could 
amount to some 500 tons of potatoes 
annually. 
This estimate of domestic high 
quality seed sales may appear to be too 
conservative. The rationale is as fol-
lows: 500 tons represent about what 
is demanded in the way of improved 
seed all over the country at present. 
The n~w project, then, needs to grow 
1,500 tons of seed (1,000 for export), 
about 10 times present production, 
and to organize an efficient internal 
distribution system for part of this 
output. This effort will involve not 
only finalizing certification standards 
on government farms, but also tight-
ening contractural arrangements with 
registered growers, improving co-
ordination with district officers about 
varieties and quantities desired, es-
tablishing accounting procedures and 
appropriate price policies. 
6.3 Constraints to Bhutanese 
Potato Marketing 
Bhutanese potato marketing faces 
different types of constraints: one is 
general , others are more specific. In 
general, the Bhutanese potato devel-
opment program is highly dependent 
on imported improved seed for mul-
tiplication and disti:ibution in Bhutan . 
A major effort will be needed to se-
cure adequate supplies of such seed 
in the future to avoid total reliance 
on India. The more specific con-
straints concern potato exports and 
domestic potato marketing . 
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(i) Constraints to Bhutanese 
Potato Exports 
Production constraints refer to 
those factors mentioned in Chapter 
Three that affect increases in produc-
tivity, declines in unit production 
costs, and improvements in quality. 
Production constraints will influence 
Bhutanese potato exports simply be-
cause the most efficient marketing 
arrangements imaginable cannot sub-
stitu te for high quality, low priced 
potatoes. 
A successful export program de-
pends not only on a good product but 
also on effective marketing practices. 
Major marketing constraints to Bhu-
tanese potato exports fall under five 
categories: (1) procedures, (2) person-
nel, (3) information and communica-
tion, (4) policy, and (5) financing. 
The procedural constraints concern 
first , selection and grading. Bhutan-
ese export markets are highly com-
petitive and highly differentiated. In-
dian potatoes tend to be carefully 
graded by size. Different varieties are 
rarely mixed in the same bag. In con-
trast, many Bhutanese growers ap-
parently lack the time, labor or train-
ing to select potatoes by varieties 
and then to grade them by size, de-
pending on whether they are to sold 
as seed or table stock. Border traders 
generally would prefer a better graded 
Bhutanese potato . If they have to 
grade potatoes themselves, then they 
must offer a lower price to absorb 
this additional cost. Some Indian 
merchants simply prefer Indian pota-
toes because of their uniformity. 
Hence, poor grading is a constraint 
to Bhutanese exports . (It does not 
affect domestic sales because con-
sumers prefer to select their own po-
tatoes at the time of purchase) . 
: 
... 
Another procedural constraint is from season to season. This con-
created because Bhutanese are accus- straint limits Bhutanese bargaining 
tomed to market their potato exports power, their ability to , adjust to 
in Bhutan. Bhutanese generally are changing market conditions, and 
quite shy around foreigners. They their "on-the-job" training as potato 
feel more confident dealing with traders. 
them in Bhutan than outside the Personnel constraints also handi-
country. Partly for these reasons, cap Bhutanese export potato market-
partly because of language difficul- ing. FCB does have a small group of 
ties, Bhutanese are accustomed to ex- employees assigned to work on po-
port their potatoes at the border· tatocs, but their experience and train-
Foreign buyers, in effect, come to ing is extremely limited. DOA has 
the Bhutanese to purchase potatoes. only one individual in charge of seed 
This procedure puts Bhucanese at a potato marketing along with half a 
distinct disadvantage in terms of cur- dozen other programs. A long-term 
rent market information, for instance official commitment to promote po-
whether their table potatoes are sold tato exports necessitates a comparable 
as seed or table potatoes, and at what commitment in terms of manpower. 
price. It also means Bhutanese have An effective export program needs a 
limited access to continuous market group of cadres to conduct market-
information. That is how prices, ing research, to seek out and to ne-
grades, vari~ties may be evolving gotiate marketing contracts, to ad-
Bagging potato seed for export at Yoesepang 
government farm . 
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minister the auction yard and to 
disseminate information at home and 
abroad. 1'he present program is con-
strained by absence of such key per-
sonnel. 
A shortage of several different 
types of information constrain Bhu-
tanese export potato marketing. First, 
some confusion exists about whether 
(a) red or white-skinned varieties are 
more profitable to export as table 
potatoes and (b) how much more 
money a grower can make by pro-
ducing high quality seed instead of 
table potatoes in an average year. 
Second, support price and guaranteed 
price levels need to be based on in-
formation about production and mar-
keting costs in Bhutan and India that 
presently are not systematically col-
lected and analyzed. Third, highlands 
growers now rely entirely on in-
formal information channels to ac-
quire knowledge about prevailing 
market conditions in border areas or 
Indian cities and truck movements 
between major towns inside Bhutan. 
Communication between Phunt-
sholing and remote highland potato 
depots is also a constraint. For ex-
ample, poor communication can 
mean that potatoes accumulate too 
fast or ioo slow. As a result, potatoes 
may deteriorate in quality or they 
may be sold at a much lower price 
than might otherwise have been true. 
Certain government policies also 
constrain Bhutanese potato exports. 
Market controls such as shipping per-
mits, border taxes, and market taxes 
are a disincentive to traders or farm-
ers who export Bhutanese potatoes. 
These controls tend to drive up cost 
of exporting and, therefore, the price 
of Bhutanese potatoes in export mar-
kets. They also run counter to the 
thrust of other official measures,. such 
as support prices to encourage pro-
duction for export or the subsidy on 
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fuel to lower internal freight charges. 
Present licensing procedures for 
the Phuntsholing auction yard restrict 
potential new buyers from participat-
ing in the market. The emphasis has 
been on excluding additional and/ or 
illegitimate Indian traders rather than 
on providing credit to finance new 
Bhutanese participants . While latent 
official suspicion of the private sec-
tor is gradually giving way to greater 
pragmatism, recent government mea-
sures to control exports have tended 
to constrain foreign potato sales. 
Most importantly, the shortage of 
financing constrains the exports of 
potatoes. The Bhutanese lack capital 
to hire more staff, collect more in-
formation, or improve existing com-
munication facilities. As a result, 
there is a complete and, to a certain 
extent, counter productive reliance on 
external financial assistance to sup-
port the entire potato export program. 
Such total dependence on foreign aid 
appears at least partly responsible 
for the generous support price policy 
which tends to discourage productiv-
ity increases and for the ineffective 
enforcement of seed potato con-
tracts. A partly self-financed program 
might be less ambitious, more cost 
conscious, and eager to explore 
new avenues for generating revenues 
internally. Such a program might 
even attract greater resources from 
abroad. 
This report does not consider ex-
isting public cold storage capacity to 
be a constraint for potato exports. 
In this regard, it disagrees with earlier 
studies (see Rao, et al. 1982). Most 
Bhutanese potatoes are sold at harvest 
because prices generally are most fav-
orable at that time. Storing potatoes 
harvested in August or September for 
export in December or January would 
not be profitable because these old 
c -· 
potatoes would compete with the new, 
cheap Indian crop. However, storing 
potatoes for export as seed might be 
viable. This type of storage is already 
done on farms in the highlands of 
the Eastern Hills region. 
Transportation arrangements are 
adequate in most areas.The truck-
ing syndicate that dominated freight 
shipments inside the Kingdom until 
recently has been abolished by royal 
decree. The present system for hiring 
a truck is simplier and cheaper. Some 
communities, Ura, for example; still 
have problems securing transport for 
their potatoes. In these isolated pro-
duction areas, transportation is a con-
straint for potato export marketing. 
(ii) Constraints to Domestic 
Potato Trade 
Major constraint to domestic mar-
keting of Bhutanese potatoes con-
cern (a) consumer/producer educa-
tion, (b) government export/import 
policy, and, (c) subsidies and selling 
practices of FCB for imported rice. 
Research by Poats (1982) indicated 
that many Bhutanese are unaware of 
how to prepare potatoes or of their 
nutritional value. The limited con-
sumer education about potatoes no 
doubt discourages greater purchases 
and hampers marketing prospects. 
Furthermore, producers appear to be 
unaware of the advantages of using 
improved seed in terms of yields and 
returns per kilogram. For example, 
Bhutanese growers believe that a high-
er selling price per quintal for a cer-
tain variety automatically means high-
er profits per hectare. This type of 
misconception constrains improved 
seed sales inside Bhutan. 
The government's export/import 
policy also constrains domestic pota-
to marketing. Inaccurrate appraisals 
of domestic potato consumption have 
preempted official interest in greater 
domestic potato utilization. The some-
what arbitrary classification of pota-
toes as exclusively a cash crop for 
export has also served to discourage 
domestic potato marketing. Analo-
gously, local food needs are equated 
with cereal production plus cereal 
imports. The readiness to meet do-
mestic food needs with foreign pro-
duced rice sold by government food 
depots overlooks the possible im-
pact on domestic potato demand. 
Furthermore, the present FCB prac-
tice is to sell great quantities of im-
ported rice at or near the purchase 
price at the time of the potato har-
vest. The timing of these sales and 
the selling price of the rice in ques-
tion, combined with the lack of pro-
grams to promote potato consump-
tion helps to perpetuate the second 
class status of potatoes in the minds 
of most Bhutanese consumers. 
This report does not consider large-
scale storage of Bhutanese table 
potatoes for eventual sale during Jan-
uary, February and March to be a vi-
able way of increasing domestic po-
tato sales. Small-scale storage already 
takes place, but these potatoes can-
not compete with cheap, fresh Indian 
potatoes. Moreover, the World Food 
Program only has limited authority 
to procure food supplies locally. 
Hence, domestic potato marketing 
cannot be argumented in such fashion. 
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A. Bhutan 
LIST OF CONTACTS 
In Phuntsholing: 
Mr. Sangey Khandu .... . ... . . ... Deputy Managing Director, Business Operations , FCB 
Mr. R .B. Rai ................ .. . . ... . . .. .. D<~puty Managing Director, Finance, FCB 
Mr. Nagton Kukpa .. . . . .... ..... .... .. ... ..... . . .. Asst. Director Cash Crops, FCB 
Mr. Ganesh Gurung . .......... .. .. . ... .. . . . .... .. . .. ... Jr. Marketing Officer, FCB 
In Thimphu: 
Dept. of Agriculture 
Dasho Perna Wangchuk .... . ......... . . ... ..... . . . . . . .. .. . . Director of Agriculture 
Mr. J.D. Awasth i .... . .. . . ... ... . ....... . ....... .. .. Deputy Director of Agriculture 
Dr. Bharat Karmacharya ... .. .......... . ..... ....... Head National Potato Program 
Mr. R.B . Rana . . . . . . .. . . . ............... . . . . Deputy Head National Potato Program 
Mr. Rajni Charda ... . .. . ..... . . . .. . .. .. . .. . .... . . .. . ... . ... . ...... Planning Cell 
Mr. Steve Lynch . ... ...... . . ... .. . . .. . . . . . .. . .. . .. . .. . . . . ... ... .. ........ !ADS 
Dept. of Trade and Commerce 
Mr. Khandu Wangchuk .... . ......... .... .. ... .... ..... . ... . ..... . .. .... Director 
FCB 
Mr. Gnangchuck . ............. .. . . ......... . .. ... .... . ..... Jr. Marketing Officer 
Planning Com mision 
Perna Wangdi .. .. ......... .. ... . . . ...... . ... .... . . ......... . ... Deputy Secretary 
World Food Program 
Mr. J. Buranthoki ........... . ......... . . ........ .. .. . ... . . Deputy Representative 
In Paro: 
Dasho K. Nishioka . ... . . . ... ...... . .... ... .. .. . . . .......... Colombo Plan Expert 
Mr. Jambey Dorji .... . ...... .. ........ . ...... .. ....... District Agricultura l Officer 
Mr. Monti Rai ... ... . . ... .. ...... . ....... . ... ... . . ............... Inspector, FCB 
In Yoesepang: 
Mr. Sigey Dorji . ...... . . .... .. . . . . . .. .. . . ... . .. ..... .... . ... . ..... Farm Manager 
In Wangdi: 
Mr. M.B. Gurung .. . .... ..... . ... . . , .... .... ... . . ..... District Agr icultura l Officer 
Mr. Mandan Gharma .. ... . .. ..... . . .. . . . ... .. ... ... ...... . .. .... . Inspector, FCB 
In Phubjikha: 
Mr. Dawa Tshering ... . . . . . . . . .. . . ... .. .. ..... . . . . . ........ ....... Farm Manager 
In Tongsa: 
Dasho Sangui Tshering ... . .... . . .. . . .... . . .. ... . .......... . . . ..... . .. Dzong Rub 
Mr. Perna Tamang .... .. . . .. .. . .. . ... . . .. . . . . .. . .. . Supervisor Dert. of Agriculture 
Mr. S.D. Rai . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Inspector, FCB 
In Bumthang: 
Dasho Karchung Tshering . . .. . ...... . . . . ... ... .. ... .... . ..... . ...... . Dzong Rub 
Mr. Roddar ..... . . . . ...... ... .. . ... . .. . ..... . . . ... . . District Agricultural Officer 
Mr. Tashi Dorji . . . . . .. . . .. .. . .. ... . . .. . . ..... . . .... ......... Headman (Gup) Ura 
In Shemgang: 
Mr. Bottara ...... ... . . ........ . .. ...... . . ... ...... .... District Agriculture Officer 
Mr. Perna Dorji .... .. . . . ..... . . ... .... .... .. ... .. ... . ....... ... . . Inspector, FCB 
Mr. Sharma .... ..... .... . ... . . . . .. .. .... . .... ... . Supervisor, Dept. of Agriculture 
In Galeyphug: 
Mr . Kujru .. .. . . . . .. . .. . . .. .. . .. ... . . ... . . . . . .. . . .. .... District Agriculture Officer 
Mr. Dawa Tshering . ....... .. . ......................... Regional Marketing Officer 
.~ . 
Mr. Dorji Gyelchen ...... . .. ... ... .. ........ . .. ... ... . .. .. . . . .. .. Inspector, FCB 
Mr. Rangawan .. .. . .... . .......... Regional Manager Royal Insurance Corp., Bhutan 
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In S./Jongkhar: 
Mr. V.B. Tamang . . . . . . ... . .. ...... .............. Regional Marketing Officer, FCB 
Mr. Krishra Pradhan . . . ..... ... . . . . . ... .. ..... . . ....... Jr. Marketing Officer, FCB 
Mr. B.L. Agrikotri . . . ...... •.. .. .. . . . .... . .. Extension Officer, Dept. of Agriculture 
.4 
In Tashigang: ·\;" 
Mr. Chimi Dorji. .......... . .... . .. . ......... . ......... Jr. Marketing Officer, FCB 
Mr. Ram Das Singh . . ... . ... .. . . .. . . . . . ...... Officiating District Agricultural Officer ~ 
B. India 
InDehli: 
Dr . Mahesh Upadya ..... ..... .. . ................... .. CIP Representative Region V 
Dr. Bhatty . . .. .. .. ... . .. .. . .. .. .. ... . .. . ... National Socio-Economic Research Inst. 
Mr. V. Vithal Babu .. ... .... Deputy Director General, Indian Institute of Foreign Trade 
L.C. Sud ..... Secretary Potato and Onions Merchants Assoc., New Subzi Mandi Market 
In Calcutta: 
Mr. P .S. lngty . ... . ... .. .. . .. . Managing Director, West Bengal Agro-Industrial Corp . 
Mr. Nripen Bandopadhyay .. . ..... .. . ... . ... .... Center for Studies in Social Sciences 
Mr. Alok Mukhopadhyay ... . ....... . ................... .. . Field Secretary, Oxfam 
Mr. Diviip Charterjee . . ..... . .. .. . . .. ... Researcher , Dept. of Economics, Burd wan U. 
In Alipur-Duars: 
Mr. Jogindra Prasad ... ..... . .. ... . . ... ... . .. Potato Commission Agent, Station Rd. 
Mr. Nepal Chanda Aich + Co ... ...... . .. ..... Potato Commission Agent, Station Rd . 
Mr. Romeshore Singh .. . ... . ............. . .. . Potato Commission Agent, Station Rd. 
Mr. Hirolal Sha .. .. . .. ...... .. .. ... .. .. .. . .. Potato Commission Agent, Station Rd. 
In Coochbehar: 
Mr. Ranjit Baid .. .......... .. . . ... .. . .. . ... ... Merchant/Potato Trader, N.N. Road .• 
Mr. Haradhan Paul . . .... .. . .. .... . . . . ... . Potato Commission Agent , Central Bazaar i 
In Jalpaiguri: 
Mr. Kishanje Naravayanje . ..... ... .. ....... . . Potato Commission Agent, Din Bazaar 
Mr. Sobahrom K. Prasad .......... .. ......... Potato Commission Agent, Din Bazaar 
Mr. Kedar Prasad . . .. . ......... . ............. Potato Commission Agent, Din Bazaar 
In Siliguri: 
Mr. Rameshauar Singh ........ ... .... .. . . ..... .. .. .... .. Potato Commission Agent 
Mr. Shailes Ray Gopal Prasad ...... .... . ....... . .... . .... Potato Commission Agent 
Mr. Mahades Prasad Duarika Prasad .. .... ....... .... .. ... Potato Commission Agent 
In Bongaigoan: 




Dr. Lyle Sikka ... ... . . ........ .... . . ..... ... .... .... ... CIP/IADS Representative 
Dr. K. Maziruddin .. . . ... .. Agricultural Marketing Committee, Ministry of Agriculture 
Mr. Eisie Luitjens . . .... .. .. ..... .... ..... Netherlands Technical Assistance Program 
Mr. R. Wustman ... ... .. .. ... . .. .... . .... NetherlandsTechnical Assistance Program 
In Joydepur: 
Dr. K.A. Ahmed .. .. . . .. ...... . . . ..... . .. ... .... ... Head National Potato Program 
Dr. S.M. Elias .......... ... .. . .. . .. . . . .. Head Div . of Agricultural Economics, BARI 
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